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ABSTRACT 
 
Whistleblowing is a type of ethical decision-making behaviour, and it has been one of 
the positive outcome behaviours investigated in the ethical decision-making literature. 
The issue has garnered widespread attention since the collapse of global multinational 
companies which lead to the passage of the renowned Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  
Since then a vast amount of research has been conducted in the whistleblowing stream, 
though it is still predominantly taking place largely in western countries.  Such studies 
as have been undertaken in Asian countries neglect to consider how Malaysian 
respondents might play their roles in undertaking this type of ethical decision-making 
behaviour. 
 
There have been arguments in the whistleblowing literature on whether the internal 
reporting of corporate wrongdoings should be considered as an internal whistleblowing 
act, and whether internal auditors should also be regarded as whistleblowers. Despite 
the fact that internal auditors hold a unique position in their organisations to prevent, 
deter and detect corporate wrongdoings, the role of this profession in investigating 
ethical decision-making behaviour has been much neglected. Hence, there is little 
research concerning internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions in the 
literature. The purpose of this study is to investigate internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions on corporate wrongdoings in Malaysia.  
 
Theoretically, the study explored individual’s prosocial behaviour theory and 
organisational ethical climate theory to provide the general framework for predicting 
internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. The model developed for this 
study included four levels of factors that can influence an internal auditor’s internal 
whistleblowing intentions: organisational, individual, situational and demographic 
factors. The organisational factors are ethical climate, size of organisation and job level. 
The individual factors are ethical judgment, locus of control, and organisational 
commitment. The situational factors include seriousness of wrongdoing and status of 
wrongdoer. The individual demographics include gender, age and tenure. This research 
is the first to examine the effect of these four factors in the internal auditing profession 
in Malaysia. 
 
iii 
 
A total of one hundred and eighty internal auditors who were members of the Institute 
of Internal Auditors Malaysia (IIA Malaysia) participated in an experimental design 
employing four vignettes constituting four different types of wrongdoing and 
manipulated variables (seriousness of wrongdoing and status of wrongdoer). The 
primary analysis of this study, multiple regression models, were computed individually 
for these four types of vignettes to test the model of internal whistleblowing intentions  
 
The findings confirm those from previous studies, suggesting that organisational 
members have different reactions to different types of wrongdoings. Overall, the 
findings suggest that, depending on the type of wrongdoings, the main predictors of 
internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions were the principle ethical climate 
(organisational factor), relativism dimensions of ethical judgment (individual factor), 
seriousness of wrongdoing (situational factor) and finally, gender (demographic factor). 
Although the findings are not conclusive, the current study is able to provide a much 
needed theoretical and practical contribution to the Malaysian internal whistleblowing 
literature.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis examined internal auditors’ intentions to whistleblow and the factors that 
influence their internal whistleblowing intentions in Malaysian organisations. The first 
chapter is aimed at providing an overview of the thesis and its structural scheme. It 
begins with providing background of whistleblowing research. Next, it outlines the 
purpose of research, research questions and the basic research model. Then, the 
rationale and the significance of the study as well as definition of whistleblowing are 
provided. The chapter then concludes by outlining the thesis organisation.  
 
1.2. Background of Study 
 
The issue of "whistleblowing” has garnered widespread attention globally over the past 
several decades. Many of the whistleblowing issues have centred on employee reporting 
of corporate wrongdoing occurring in their own organisations. Over the years, the 
frequency of organisational wrongdoing across the world has increased (Bowen, Call, & 
Rajgopal, 2010), evident from the constant media coverage of such incidents. The 
infamous cases of corporate debacles such as Enron and WorldCom have triggered not 
only extensive academic whistleblowing studies but have caused legal ramifications that 
have led to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act1 of 2002 (Eaton & Akers, 2007; Lacayo 
& Ripley, 2003).  These corporate cases have resulted in individual and institutional 
investors incurring huge financial losses and have eroded public confidence in financial 
markets. Whistleblowing will allow the organisation to rectify corporate wrongdoing 
internally and this may prevent them from encountering any further substantial 
damages. Therefore, whistleblowing acts on corporate wrongdoing are needed as they 
will yield tremendous benefits to organisation and society at large. Encouraging 
                                                     
1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides guidelines to public companies in U.S. on dealing with various issues 
pertaining to whistleblowing legislation. 
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whistleblowing will send a message to stakeholders and the public at large that the 
organisation is exercising good corporate governance (Eaton & Akers, 2007). 
 
Since the 1980s, there has been a growing interest in whistleblowing on corporate 
wrongdoing in academic research. This interest stems from various academic fields such 
as psychology (Near & Miceli, 1986; Zhang, Chiu, & Wei, 2009b), organisational 
behaviour (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman, & Thornton, 2010), 
culture (Hwang, Staley, Chen, & Lan, 2008; Patel, 2003), business ethics (Greenberger, 
Miceli, & Cohen, 1987; Kaptein, 2011), organisational theory (Miceli & Near, 1984) as 
well as in accounting and auditing (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 
1991). The studies have examined what motivates the whistleblowing act and the 
factors that cause employees to whistleblow. Understanding of these factors and the 
whistleblowing process has been complicated due to the sensitive nature of reporting. 
Furthermore, there is no typical case of whistleblowing as each case of corporate 
wrongdoing is extremely complex and may take years to solve (Miceli, 2004).  Gobert 
and Punch (2000) added that, no two individual whistleblowers are alike and their 
actions are driven by complex psychological and sociological factors. Jennings (2003) 
explains that an employee who discovers wrongdoing in his or her company will 
struggle not only with divided loyalty (loyalty to his or her organisation or conformance 
to his or her personal and moral beliefs) but he or she will be faced with so many 
options as illustrated in Table 1.1 below. 
 
Table 1-1: A Whistleblower’s Options 
Decision Option 
Do nothing Stay 
Do nothing Leave organisation 
Feed rumour mill2 Stay 
Feed rumour mill Leave 
Disclose internally Stay 
Disclose internally Leave organisation 
Disclose externally Stay 
Disclose externally Leave 
Leave Disclose externally 
Source: Jennings (2003, p. 19) 
                                                     
2 The term refers to conduct by employees who do not use formal or informal avenues to report. Jennings 
(2003) likened them as ‘pot stirrers’, who discuss the problem among their colleagues either to persuade 
or merely ask for their support. 
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The table above suggests various types of decisions and options for an employee 
(whistleblower) to choose should he or she intend to act. However, should the employee 
decide to disclose the wrongdoing, it will certainly cause negative consequences for the 
organisation as well as to the employee’s reputation and career. Vinten (1996) likened 
the whistleblowing act as akin to a “bee-sting phenomenon”. He said that the 
whistleblower has only one sting to be used, and once it is used, it will lead to his or her 
career downfall.  Studies have reported that whistleblowers have often suffered serious 
reprisals from their employer in response to their actions. In order to avoid severe 
damage, Vinten (1996) has suggested that organisations may minimise this risk by 
internalising the whistleblowing procedure as part of corporate communications. 
Keenan and Krueger (1992) emphasised that, by having a proper whistleblowing 
procedure, organisations stand to benefit from actions of whistleblowers that may curb 
further substantial adverse consequences such as loss of sales, costly lawsuits and 
negative publicity.   
 
Another issue that has been highlighted in previous studies relates to the definition of 
whistleblowing. There is misperception that it only relates to reporting parties outside of 
the organisation (Keenan & Krueger, 1992). Whistleblowing can in fact occur internally 
or externally (Eaton & Akers, 2007; Figg, 2000; Keenan, 2000; Keenan & Krueger, 
1992; Near & Miceli, 2008). If the wrongdoing is reported to parties within the 
organisation, the whistleblowing is internal. If the wrongdoing is reported to parties 
outside of the organisation, then the whistleblowing is considered as external. Ethically, 
internal whistleblowing, as opposed to external whistleblowing, is preferred. This is 
because external whistleblowing can cause serious damage to the organisations as 
compared to internal whistleblowing (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009).  Zhang, Chiu, and 
Wei (2009a, pp. 25-26) suggest that “disclosing insider information to outsider’s 
breaches obligations to the organization, violates the written or unspoken contract, and 
elicits damaging publicity”. Hence, internal whistleblowing gives an organisation the 
opportunity to deal quickly without the pressure of external publicity. Furthermore, by 
rectifying corporate problems internally, managements can ensure that confidential 
information remains confidential and encourage organisational accountability and 
learning. 
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Although there are two different channels of whistleblowing, researchers have stated 
that internal or external whistleblowers actually share similar characteristics (Dworkin 
& Baucus, 1998). Empirical data indicate there are few differences between internal and 
external whistleblowers regarding their attitudes and beliefs towards whistleblowing, 
types of wrongdoing observed, retaliation expectancies, and other relevant variables 
(Keenan & Krueger, 1992, p. 21). Furthermore, whether the person is an internal or 
external whistleblower, Near and Miceli (1985) state that whistleblowers possess four 
observable characteristics; (1) they are current or former employees of the organisation 
where the wrongdoing was observed, (2) they usually lack the authority to change or 
stop the wrongdoing that is under their employers’ control, (3) they may or may not 
make the report, and (4) they may or may not hold position that requires reporting of 
corporate wrongdoing.  
 
The incidence of corporate fraud and organisational wrongdoing are a global concern. 
PricewaterhouseCooper conducted its fifth biennial survey in 2009, The Global 
Economic Crime Survey among 3,037 senior representatives of organisations in 54 
countries. The survey reported that 38% of these senior representatives experienced 
accounting fraud, a significant increase since the last report in the 2007 survey 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009). The survey also reported that 17% of the frauds 
reported were detected by internal audit, which emerged once more as the means 
through which most frauds were detected. However, only 7% of frauds were detected 
through formal whistleblowing procedures. The survey suggested that this could be 
attributed to the many factors such as ineffectiveness or absence of whistleblowing 
procedures and lack of support within organisations or from management. Malaysia is 
also not spared from having its own issues of corporate fraud and organisational 
wrongdoing. Recently, KPMG Forensic Malaysia issued the results of a fraud survey 
conducted on a sample of 1,125 Malaysian companies across the public and private 
sectors. The survey, known as KPMG Malaysia Fraud Survey Report 2009  revealed 
that fraud is a major problem for businesses in Malaysia (KPMG, 2009). Almost half of 
the respondents acknowledged that their organisations have been victims of fraud over 
the past three years and 61% of them believed that the incidence of fraud is set to 
increase in the next two years. Consistent with the previous 2004 survey, internally 
perpetrated fraud accounted for 87% of the total fraud value of RM63.95 million, of 
which out of this value, 53% was attributed to non-management level employees, 35% 
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was attributed to management level employees, while the remainder, 12% was 
attributed to customers and service providers. Overall, the 2009 survey suggested that a 
broad based fraud risk management plan be adopted, in response to the continued 
increase in fraud.  
 
Due to these circumstances, Zarinah Anwar, the former Malaysian Securities 
Commissions (SC) deputy chief executive, said that Malaysian companies need to 
demonstrate their legitimisation of whistleblowing in the workplace by establishing 
structures and systems that facilitate the reporting of wrongdoing. In January 2004, the 
SC had amended its Securities Industry Act 1983, to introduce whistleblowing 
provisions into local securities law. In her speech, the SC deputy chief executive said 
that, the Act was amended as SC believed that internal auditors could indeed make a 
difference in enhancing corporate governance practices within corporations (Anwar, 
2003). Zarinah Anwar further stated that internal auditors are said to be one of the 
fundamental checks and balances for organisations’ good corporate governance in 
which their roles include examining, evaluating and monitoring the adequacy and 
effectiveness of an organisation’s internal control structure (Anwar, 2003). The SC’s 
view on the need for a whistleblowing mechanism is also consistent with The Institute 
of Internal Auditors Malaysia (IIA Malaysia). Its president, Fatimah Abu Bakar felt that 
whistleblowing should become part of the culture and business ethics of a company. 
Public listed companies are compelled to adopt an internal structure for whistleblowing 
to demonstrate a high level of corporate governance. However, although Malaysia has 
sufficient laws and regulations to create a conducive environment for whistleblowing, 
many local companies still do not have an internal structure for such a purpose (Tan, 
2006).  This could be due to Malaysian companies’ fear that the whistleblowing system 
could be subjected to abuse or there could be whistleblowers acting out of spite, malice 
or grudge. The chief executive officer of the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 
(MWSG), Yusof Abu Othman stated that it is difficult to inculcate the practice of 
whistleblowing in Malaysian society and Malaysians need to change their mindset to 
de-stigmatise whistleblowing (Wahab, 2003). 
 
Previous whistleblowing studies have extensively used subjects such as external 
auditors (Brennan & Kelly, 2007), management accountants (Somers & Casal, 1994), 
executives and managers (Keenan, 2007; Seifert et al., 2010), police officers (Rothwell 
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& Baldwin, 2007a), federal government employees (Miceli & Near, 1984, 1985, 1988) 
and MBA or undergraduate/graduate students as surrogates (Chiu, 2003; Kaplan & 
Schultz, 2007). Read and Rama (2003) contend that the role of internal auditors with 
regards to whistleblowing needs to be further reviewed.  Whistleblowers who have 
higher credibility and power than other organisational members are likely to influence 
management to terminate wrongdoing (Near & Miceli, 1995). Practically, internal 
auditors could posses these two elements, and thus are supposed to be more likely to 
whistleblow. Prior studies have shown that there are limited whistleblowing studies that 
have used internal auditors as subjects (e.g. Arnold & Ponemon, 1991; Miceli, Near, & 
Schwenk, 1991; Seifert et al., 2010; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008). This could be due to 
arguments that the role of internal auditors reporting corporate wrongdoings is not 
regarded as an act of whistleblowing. These studies reveal that whistleblowing should 
be examined extensively in the field of auditing and the act of reporting by internal 
auditors could be regarded as internal whistleblowing. 
 
Employees are generally an important source for detecting corporate wrongdoing 
(Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008; Miethe, 1999), however studies have indicated that 
employees often refrain from reporting such wrongdoing as they believe that their 
organisation does not welcome  reports of wrongdoing (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2009) 
and the act is considered as challenging to the organisational hierarchy (Mesmer-
Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Studies in whistleblowing behaviour have tried to 
answer the question of why employees would blow their whistle. Research on 
whistleblowing has largely focused on three general factors: (1) organisational factors, 
such as organisational ethical climate (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006, 2007a), size of 
organisation (Miceli & Near, 1988; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991), and job level 
(Keenan, 2002b; Keenan & Krueger, 1992); (2) individual factors, such as, ethical 
judgment (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005), locus of control (Chiu, 2003), and  organisational 
commitment (Somers & Casal, 1994); and (3) situational factors, such as the 
seriousness of wrongdoing (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Near & Miceli, 1990), and the 
status of wrongdoer (Miethe, 1999; Near & Miceli, 1990). Miceli et al. (2008) in a 
comprehensive review of whistleblowing literature have suggested that these are the 
three general factors that influence the behaviour of reporting corporate wrongdoing by 
employees within organisations. Additionally, individual demographic factors such as 
respondents’ gender (Miceli & Near, 1988; Sims & Keenan, 1998), age (Brennan & 
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Kelly, 2007; Keenan, 2000) and their working tenure in the organisation (Dworkin & 
Baucus, 1998; Near & Miceli, 1995) have also been investigated. However, studies in 
the whistleblowing literature have found mixed and inconsistent results regarding the 
effect of these demographic variables on whistleblowing tendencies. 
 
Although several empirical studies have been conducted, many questions remain 
concerning the relative importance of these four factors (organisational, individual, 
situational and demographic) in Malaysian organisational settings. In his review of the 
literature, Vinten (2003) concludes that there is very little research on whistleblowing 
outside the United States. Most of the literature on whistleblowing is predominantly 
North American in origin (Gobert & Punch, 2000; Miceli et al., 2008). Although there is 
growing interest in the subject matter in the Asian region, studies have been limited to 
Hong Kong (Chiu, 2002, 2003), China (Zhuang, Thomas, & Miller, 2005) and Taiwan 
(Hwang et al., 2008). Miceli et al. (2008, p. 3) acknowledge that, “more research is 
needed before we can know the full answer to some particular question about whistle-
blowing”. Furthermore, the present study is needed as it is said that the mindset towards 
whistleblowing in Asia is the major barrier in developing company policies on it (Teen 
& Vasanthi, 2006). As such, understanding factors influencing the decision to 
whistleblow among internal auditors in Malaysian listed companies is significant for 
both management and organisations.  
 
1.3. Research Questions and Research Model 
 
The purpose of the present study is to examine factors that will affect Malaysian internal 
auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. The broad question this study addresses is: 
 
“What are the factors that influence the internal whistleblowing intentions of internal 
auditors who have knowledge of corporate wrongdoings and unethical acts within 
their own organisations?” 
 
In addressing this primary question, the study focuses on organisational, individual, 
situational and demographic variables and their impact on the internal auditors’ internal 
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whistleblowing intentions. Specifically, the study intends to answer the following 
additional questions: 
 
1. Do organisational factors such as ethical climate, size of organisation and job level 
influence internal whistleblowing intentions among Malaysian internal auditors? 
 
2. Do individual factors such as ethical judgment, locus of control and organisational 
commitment influence internal whistleblowing intentions among Malaysian internal 
auditors? 
 
3. Do situational factors such as seriousness of wrongdoing and status of wrongdoer 
influence internal whistleblowing intentions among Malaysian internal auditors? 
 
4. Do demographic factors such as gender, age and tenure influence internal 
whistleblowing intentions among Malaysian internal auditors? 
 
5. Which one of the organisational, individual, situational and demographic factors has 
the strongest influence on internal whistleblowing intentions among Malaysian 
internal auditors? 
 
The following basic theoretical model is used in this study. 
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Figure 1-1: Theoretical Framework of the Research 
 
1.4. Rationale of the Study 
 
The purpose of the present study is to examine factors that will affect internal auditors’ 
whistleblowing intentions. The focus of the study will be members of the Institute of 
Internal Auditors of Malaysia (IIA Malaysia) who are internal auditors of Malaysian 
listed companies. Through their work, these internal auditors have directly or indirectly 
seen or confronted many opportunities for corporate wrongdoing and unethical acts to 
occur. The responsibility of disclosure of any wrongdoing is embedded in their job 
description (Near & Miceli, 1985). Internal auditors may also face situations that 
involve conflict of interest while executing their dual-role duties. A study of 
whistleblowing in Malaysia by Patel (2003) has only examined external auditors as 
subjects. Prior studies have shown that there are limited whistleblowing studies that 
have used internal auditors as subjects (e.g. Arnold & Ponemon, 1991; Miceli, Near, & 
Schwenk, 1991; Seifert et al., 2010; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008). The present study will be 
able to fill the gap in the literature by examining internal auditors in Malaysia. 
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Ayers and Kaplan  (2005) have emphasised that further research is required to examine 
how individuals within organisations form their reporting intentions. Past 
whistleblowing studies have focused on the interplay of organisational, individual and 
situational variables as the factors that may contribute to the propensity to whistleblow 
(Oh & Teo, 2010). Researchers contend that individual variables alone are not able to 
explain sufficiently individual ethical behaviour (Wittmer & Coursey, 1996). 
Organisational variables were found to have more effect on the individual decision to 
whistleblow (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli & Near, 1984). Situational 
variables have also been found to be associated with the likelihood of whistleblowing  
(G. King, 1997). Despite the fact that demographic variables to date, have not provided 
consistent evidence on the direction of the relationships with whistleblowing behaviour 
(Zhang et al., 2009a), studies need to be conducted to ascertain such evidence in 
Malaysia. At present there is no empirical study in Malaysia that has examined the 
effects of these four factors on the internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. 
 
On a theoretical level, the current study investigates organisational and individual 
theory that can be used to explain internal auditors’ ethical decision making with 
regards to their internal whistleblowing intentions. Organisational ethical climate theory 
that describes the ethical climate of an organisation is incorporated along with prosocial 
behaviour theory that explains the behaviour of a whistleblower as an individual. 
Ethical climate has proven to be a significant factor in shaping the behaviour of 
employees (Barnett & Vaicys, 2000; Fritzsche, 2000; Vardi, 2001). By grasping the 
relationship between ethical climates and employees’ behaviours (such as 
whistleblowing), it should enable the organisational members to understand, evaluate 
and resolve ethical dilemmas (Wimbush, Shepard, & Markham, 1997b). Individual’s 
prosocial behaviour theory on the other hand, can be used to explain the action 
undertaken by whistleblowers as individuals. A prosocial behaviour is briefly defined as 
any action by an organisational member that attempts to benefit the person(s) to whom 
it is directed (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986). Seifert et al. (2010) characterise employee’s 
internal whistleblowing as a prosocial behaviour that includes both voluntary and role-
related disclosures of wrongdoing.  As internal auditors are members of a profession 
that is role-prescribed to mitigate wrongdoing, prosocial behaviour theory could help to 
further understand the motivations for these employees to actually whistleblow. In the 
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present research, these two theories are used to explain the behaviour for internal 
whistleblowing intentions in Malaysian organisational settings. 
 
1.5. Significance of the Study 
 
Understanding factors that motivate internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions 
will yield both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, the present study 
will be able to provide additional empirical evidence concerning the existence and 
description of different dimensions of ethical climate with regard to internal auditors’ 
reporting intentions in Malaysian organisations. Rothwell and Baldwin (2007a) reported 
that ethical climate theory has never been tested in whistleblowing behaviour studies 
and their study is considered the first to do so. Practically, the identification and 
predictability of ethical climate is important for management in Malaysian 
organisations. Once the type of ethical climate within the organisation is identified, 
management may be able to develop proper policies to promote ethical conduct among 
its employees, specifically for its internal auditors. Similarly, prosocial behaviour theory 
has not been considered in literature concerning the internal audit profession, 
specifically in the study of internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. Dozier 
and Miceli (1985) propose that the decision to blow the whistle is a subjectively rational 
process in which the observer of corporate wrongdoing weighs the perceived cost and 
benefits of blowing the whistle. Should the perceived cost outweigh the benefits, no 
whistleblowing will result. As the profession of internal auditors is unique and 
consistent with the notion of prosocial behaviour theory, the relationships of these two 
theories with internal whistleblowing intentions is worth exploring.  
 
Miceli et al. (2008) identified that, the body of empirical literature concerning 
whistleblowing outside the dominant North American region is still in its infancy stage. 
As the current study is conducted in Malaysia, the outcomes will be able to make a 
significant contribution to the limited literature by examining factors that will affect 
internal whistleblowing intentions among internal auditors in Malaysian listed 
companies. Previous studies have examined various issues related to whistleblowing, 
primarily in the area of psychology, organisational behaviour, culture, business ethics 
and organisational theory. Unfortunately, the issue has received little attention within 
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auditing research (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Patel, 2003; Read & Rama, 2003). The 
results of the current study will help to further contribute to the much needed literature 
particularly in the internal auditing field. It is essential to examine the effects of these 
factors as there is limited information about the complexities underlying internal 
auditors’ decisions to blow the whistle (Arnold & Ponemon, 1991). 
 
The availability of whistleblowing as a form of organisational internal structure is 
fundamental as it is an important mechanism to prevent and deter corporate wrongdoing 
and questionable acts (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007). Organisations that foster 
whistleblowing will be able to deter corporate losses (Somers & Casal, 1994) and to 
improve their effectiveness and efficiency (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007). Near and Miceli 
(1995) found that due to the unavailability of a reporting channel that enables 
employees to report their concerns internally, the majority of employees who became 
aware of corporate wrongdoings never report or disclose their observations to anyone. 
Therefore, the findings of this study could guide Malaysian practitioners and the 
authorities concerned in the design of policies and practices which could encourage 
employees to expose organisational wrongdoing committed within the organisation. The 
result of this study will have implications for the types of action that should be taken by 
management should there be actual whistleblowing occurring in their organisations. 
Implicitly, to the extent practicable, organisations and policy makers in Malaysia would 
have an interest in whistleblowing and its effects on the implementation of a 
whistleblowing policy as part of the organisations’ internal control mechanism.  
 
1.6. Definition of Key Terms 
 
Whistleblowing: The key term that is used in this study is ‘whistleblowing’. The widely 
used definition of whistleblowing (Brennan & Kelly, 2007) is given by Near and Miceli 
(1985, p. 4) as: 
 
“... the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may 
be able to effect action.”  
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This definition however, has generated various debates and is discussed further in 
Chapter 2 of the thesis.  
 
Whistleblower: According to Gobert & Punch (2000, p. 27), in the social and 
managerial literature, the term whistleblower refers to: 
 
“... an individual within an organisation who reveals negative information about the 
organisation, its practices or its personnel. The information may relate to abuse of power, 
fraud, mismanagement, waste, corruption, racial or sexual harassment, or health and safety 
dangers. 
 
1.7. Thesis Organisation 
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides discussion on 
the theoretical and research background for the study. The research issues are outlined, 
concluding with the argument that there are key areas of research that are missing from 
the field, as well as establishing the current study’s research framework. Chapter 3 
presents the development of the hypotheses tested in this study. Chapter 4 outlines the 
data collection procedures and the research design described for this study. This chapter 
also discusses methodological issues, the selection of samples as well as the statistical 
analyses used for data analysis. Chapter 5 discusses findings from analyses of data, 
including the results of the statistical analyses and results of hypotheses testing. Finally, 
discussions of findings, conclusions, limitations of the current study and future research 
directions are presented in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORETICAL BASIS AND RESEARCH 
BACKGROUND ISSUES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews general literature on whistleblowing. First, it highlights the 
theories that explain the behaviour of individual and organisational climates that 
permeate the whistleblowing act. Secondly, discussion on key arguments with regards 
to whistleblowing behaviour and the channels to report are presented. The following 
section explains the internal auditing profession and its role in whistleblowing research. 
Then, some reviews of previous empirical whistleblowing studies are also provided, 
incorporating early research in whistleblowing as well as studies from other parts of the 
world. This is essential in order to understand the complexity of this issue. The final 
section justifies the need for a whistleblowing study to be undertaken in a Malaysian 
environment.  
 
2.2. Theoretical Base for the Study  
 
Researchers have advocated that there is no comprehensive theory of whistleblowing 
(Miceli & Near, 1988; Miceli, Near, & Dozier, 1991; Near & Miceli, 1985; Zhang et al., 
2009b). However, Near and Miceli  (1985) explained that researchers can draw from the 
research on behavioural studies that are to some extent similar to the act of 
whistleblowing. The theories underpinning the current study are derived from prosocial 
behaviour theory and ethical climate theory. Prosocial behaviour theory explains the 
behaviour of whistleblowers as individuals while, the climate in the organisation that 
supports whistleblowing can be best described by ethical climate theory. 
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2.2.1. Prosocial behaviour theory 
 
The prosocial approach of whistleblowing has motivated much empirical and 
conceptual research on whistleblowing (see Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Brief & 
Motowidlo, 1986; Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Miceli & Near, 1988; Miceli, Near, & 
Dozier, 1991; Near & Miceli, 1995). Specifically, Brief and Motowidlo (1986, p. 711) 
defined prosocial behaviour as: “behaviour which is (a) performed by a member of an 
organization, (b) directed toward an individual, group, or organization with whom he or 
she interacts while carrying out his or her organizational role, and (c) performed with 
the intention of promoting the welfare of the individual, group, or organization toward 
which it is directed.” With regards to whistleblowing, it is considered as a positive 
social behaviour (Miceli et al., 2008) whereby, the whistleblower takes action to stop 
the wrongdoing within the organisation with the intention of benefiting persons within 
and outside the organisation. Dozier and Miceli (1985) explained that whistleblowing is 
a form of prosocial behaviour as the act involves both selfish (egoistic) and unselfish 
(altruistic) motives on the part of whistleblowers. In other words, whistleblowers’ acts 
are not purely altruistic but to a certain extent the actors may also have motives to 
achieve personal gain or glory.  
 
Specifically, the prosocial approach of whistleblowing is based on Latane and Darley’s 
(1968) work on the bystander intervention model. The model proposes that a bystander 
will respond by helping in an emergency situation. According to Latane and Darley 
(1968), the decision process for whistleblowing behaviour goes through five steps and 
each step is critical in making the whistleblowing decision. The five steps are: (1) the 
bystander must be aware of the event; (2) the bystander must decide that the event is an 
emergency; (3) the bystander must decide that he or she is responsible for helping; (4) 
the bystander must choose the appropriate method of helping; and (5) the bystander 
implements the intervention. These are the five processes in ethical decision-making for 
the would-be whistleblower and in doing so highlight the ethical dilemmas inherent in 
the decision to whistleblow (Brennan & Kelly, 2007). 
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Figure 2-1: The Prosocial Decision-making Process Associated with 
Whistleblowing 
Source: Greenberger et al., (1987), Figure 1, pg. 530 
 
The above decision process for whistleblowing behaviour is clearly explained by 
Greenberger et al., (1987) in Figure 2.1. The figure depicts the whistleblowing decision 
process that may be taken by a focal member in determining whistleblowing actions and 
its outcomes. Greenberger et al., (1987) claimed that the figure represents a complete 
model of whistleblowing and it incorporates the theoretically-based predictions 
concerning the whistleblowing decision processes. Citing the work of Dozier and Miceli 
(1985), Greenberger et al., (1987) explained the whistleblowing processes that 
organisation members may use.  In Step 1, the focal member considers whether the 
focal activity is wrong. In Steps 2 and 3, the member decides whether the situation is 
deserving action and then, whether the member feels responsible to act. In Step 4, the 
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member considers whether these actions are appropriate (Step 5), and finally, whether 
the expected benefits of action outweigh the expected cost (Step 6). The decision 
process stops when the outcome reaches a step which is not affirmative. A “no” answer 
to Step 6 will cause the process to return to Step 4. A “yes” answer in Step 6 will result 
in whistleblowing action (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). It can be seen that the decision model 
advocated by Greenberger et al., (1987) is more or less similar to the Latane and 
Darley’s (1968) bystander intervention model in explaining employees’ prosocial 
behaviour towards whistleblowing.  
 
2.2.2. Ethical work climate theory 
 
Based on moral philosophy and the theory of cognitive moral development, Victor and 
Cullen (1988) developed a model of ethical climate to describe the determinants of 
ethical climates in organisations. The model theorises that ethical work climates in 
organisations varies along two dimensions – an ethical approach dimension and an 
ethical referent dimension.  
 
Table 2-1: Victor and Cullen’s (1988) Theoretical Ethical Climate Types 
Ethical criteria Locus of analysis 
 Individual Local Cosmopolitan 
Egoism Self-interest Company profit Efficiency 
Benevolence (Utilitarian) Friendship Team interest Social responsibility 
Principle (Deontology) Personal morality Rules, standard 
operating procedures 
Laws, professional 
codes 
 
The first ethical dimension suggested by Victor and Cullen (1988) looks at the ethical 
approach dimension used by organisations in the decision making processes, (a) egoism, 
or maximising self-interest; (b) benevolence, or maximising joint interests; and (c) 
principle. In brief, ethical climate theory states that in an organisation that is 
characterised primarily by the use of the egoistic criterion, employees would consider 
particularly their own self-interest in decision-making when facing an ethical dilemma. 
In a benevolence type of organisation, employees would mostly consider the welfare of 
others in solving their ethical decisions, while where the organisation predominantly 
uses a principle criterion, employees would consider the application of rules, principles 
and laws in making their ethical decisions.  
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Meanwhile, the ethical referent dimension of the Victor and Cullen (1988) model refers 
to the locus of analysis, which is represented by (a) individual, (b) local and (c) 
cosmopolitan referents. If the locus of analysis is individual, the basis for the 
individual’s ethical decision-making comes from within the individual’s personal moral 
belief; local locus of analysis refers to expectation that comes from within the 
organisation such as the organisation’s code of practice; and finally, cosmopolitan locus 
of analysis refers to ethical decision-making that is external to the individual and 
organisation such as a code of ethics established in professional associations. Cross 
tabulation of these two dimensions produces nine possible theoretical ethical climate 
types as shown in Table 2.1. These nine theoretical climates would influence the 
decision-making process in an organisation (Cullen, Parboteeah, & Victor, 2003). 
 
To elaborate the effect of these two cross tabulated dimensions, within the egoism 
criterion, an individual locus of analysis signifies that organisational members make 
ethical decisions mostly for their self-interest. At the local level of analysis, 
considerations are for organisations’ interest (e.g. company profit). Finally the 
cosmopolitan locus of analysis considers larger society interests (e.g. efficiency) (Victor 
& Cullen, 1988). Meanwhile, in the context of the benevolence criterion, an individual 
locus of analysis is defined as consideration for other people, regardless of 
organisational membership (e.g. friendship). At the local locus of analysis, the ethical 
climate considers the organisational collective (e.g. team play). The cosmopolitan locus 
of analysis considers others outside the organisation (e.g. social responsibility) (Victor 
& Cullen, 1988). Lastly, in the context of principle criterion, an individual locus of 
analysis signifies that the morals are self-chosen, guided by their own personal ethics. 
At the local locus of analysis, the source of morals lies within the organisation through 
its own rules and regulations. Finally, at the cosmopolitan locus of analysis, the source 
of morals is external to the organisations (e.g. law, professional codes of ethics) (Victor 
& Cullen, 1988). 
 
Using the 3 x 3 matrix of the nine theoretical ethical climates shown in Table 2.1, Victor 
& Cullen (1988) developed an ethical climate instrument where the questions were 
written to capture all the nine ethical climate types and placed the respondents in the 
role of observers, requiring them to report perceived organisational expectations 
(Cullen, Victor, & Bronson, 1993). Respondents were asked to indicate on Likert-type 
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scales (ranging from completely false to completely true) how accurately each of the 
items in the instrument described their general work climate. The ethical climates’ 
variables are further discussed in Chapter 3 of this study.  
 
2.3. Debates on Whistleblowing   
 
The literature then proceeds with providing some understanding on the pertinent issues 
in the whistleblowing literature, beginning with what whistleblowing is all about. There 
is no agreed definition of whistleblowing (Brennan & Kelly, 2007, p. 62). One 
consistent element that researchers agree on is that whistleblowing is an act to report 
and expose wrongdoings. The ‘whistleblowing’ term has been rigorously defined and 
debated in various literatures. The debates surround which channels (internal vs. 
external whistleblowing) to report as well as whether auditors (internal or external), 
should be regarded as whistleblowers.  
 
2.3.1. Debates on channels of whistleblowing 
 
There are two channels of reporting wrongdoings – internal and external whistleblowing 
(Eaton & Akers, 2007; Near & Miceli, 2008). Near and Miceli (1985, p. 3) reported that 
there is “substantial disagreement” in the literature on whether internal reporting of 
corporate wrongdoing  should be considered as whistleblowing. Some researchers argue 
that whistleblowing is an action where reporting of the wrongdoing is only to outside 
parties (e.g. Courtemanche, 1988; Elliston, Keenan, Lockhart, & Van Schaick, 1985; 
Jubb, 1999). Jubb (1999, p. 78) thus defines whistleblowing as:  
 
“... a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which gets onto public record and is made by 
a person who has or had privileged access to data or information of an organisation, about 
non-trivial illegality or other wrongdoing whether actual, suspected or anticipated which 
implicates and is under the control of that organisation, to an external entity having potential to 
rectify the wrongdoing.”  
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Jubb (1999) came out with the above definition from reviews of previous 
whistleblowing literature, which include Near and Miceli’s (1985) most widely used3 
definition (defined in section 1.6 earlier). Jubb (1999, p. 91) asserted that, 
“whistleblowing is an ethical dilemma because it necessitates a breach of trust”.  This is 
because the whistleblower has violated his loyalty not only to his own organisation but 
to the professional association he represents as well as to the general public. To Jubb 
(1999), an internal disclosure on the other hand, is considered as discreet and the 
intention is only to get the attention of internal management and not to the general 
public and hence fails to create the notion of an ethical dilemma. Jubb (1999) further 
explained that though internal disclosure may breach the reporting individual’s loyalty 
to his/her own organisation, the act does not affect the organisation’s privacy and 
property rights, hence it should not be regarded as whistleblowing. 
 
However, to Near and Miceli (2008), the definition provided by Near and Miceli (1985) 
covers both internal and external whistleblowing.  Brennan and Kelly (2007) stated that 
Near and Miceli’s (1985) definition does not exclude internal reporting, which suggests 
that organisation members may blow the whistle either internally or externally. This is 
interpreted from the phrase that describes “persons or organisations that may be able to 
effect action” in Near and Miceli’s (1985) definition. Furthermore, Near and Miceli 
(1996) indicate that a genuine whistleblower reports wrongdoings to someone capable 
of stopping the wrongdoing. That “someone” could be internal or external parties to the 
said organisation. 
 
Consistent with Near and Miceli’s (1985) definition of whistleblowing, Dworkin and 
Baucus (1998) and Read and Rama (2003) stated that whistleblowers have a choice on 
whether to whistleblow  either internally or externally, while Miethe (1999) and Vinten 
(1992b) reported that whistleblowers are distinguished according to the nature of their 
disclosures; i.e. internal and external whistleblowers. Internal whistleblowers disclose 
the wrongdoing to another person within the organisation who can take immediate 
action while, external whistleblowers expose the wrongdoing to outside parties. Several 
researchers have contended that the act of whistleblowing incorporates both internal and 
external reporting (see Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Dasgupta & Kesharwani, 2010; Eaton & 
                                                     
3 Near and Miceli (2008) reported that studies using this definition include samples of nurses, employees 
in for-profit organizations, federal employees and internal auditors in various forms of organizations. 
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Akers, 2007; Miceli & Near, 1992; Miceli et al., 2008; Miethe, 1999; Rothwell & 
Baldwin, 2006; Tsahuridu & Vandekerckhove, 2008; Vinten, 1992b) and state that a 
distinction between internal and external whistleblowers is important in understanding 
the whistleblowing process (Eaton & Akers, 2007; Miceli & Near, 1992; Miethe, 1999; 
Somers & Casal, 1994). Miceli et al. (2008) explained that the separation between those 
channels is legally important as some state and federal statutes in United States protect 
whistleblowers depending on whether they use internal or external channels. Therefore 
Miceli et al. (2008, p. 9) state that, “using the term “whistle-blower” when referring to 
internal complaints and to external complaints is consistent with legal usage”. Another 
important reason why internal and external reporting should be regarded as 
whistleblowing is highlighted by Miethe (1999, p. 16) who contends that, “internal 
whistleblowing is often regarded as a precursor to external whistleblowing”. This is 
consistent with Miceli et al. (2008) who assert that whistleblowers resort to disclose 
externally after first using an internal channel, that failed to rectify the wrongdoing. 
 
On the contrary, MacNab, Brislin, Worthley, Galperin, and et al. (2007) argued that 
internal whistleblowing and internal reporting are two different phenomenon, and so are 
external whistleblowing and external reporting (see Table 2.2 below for detailed 
explanation). MacNab et al. (2007) stressed that the major difference between the act of 
‘whistleblowing’ and ‘reporting’ is that, the former is unauthorised by normal 
organisational processes, while the latter is authorised internally. However, the current 
study adopts the view of Near and Miceli (1985) and G. King (1999) who argue that 
internal and external reporting of corporate wrongdoing are basically the same process. 
Both types of reporting represent a direct challenge to management’s authority structure 
and thus, both types should be considered as whistleblowing (G. King, 1999; Near & 
Miceli, 1985). However, as mentioned previously, it is acknowledged that the effect of 
reporting externally is more costly and disastrous than reporting internally. As such, 
Vinten (1996) suggested that internalising whistleblowing as a type of internal 
communication can minimise this risk.  Furthermore, internal whistleblowing will allow 
organisations to rectify their internal matters before they are made public (Barnett, 
1992a). 
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Table 2-2: Basic Varieties of Ethics Management Reporting 
Ethics 
management 
reporting 
 
Primary distinguishing feature(s) 
 
Example 
External 
whistleblowing 
1. Unauthorised by target organisation. 
2. Reported externally in relation to 
target organisation. 
3. Organisationally passive (ethics 
management passive/reactive) 
An employee communicates the 
improper organisational accounting 
practices directly to SEC or other 
government regulatory body. 
Internal 
whistleblowing  
1. Unauthorised by target organisation. 
2. Reported within target organisation. 
3. Organisationally passive (ethics 
management passive/reactive) 
An employee unexpectedly announces 
the improper organisational accounting 
practices during a board of directors 
meeting. 
External 
reporting 
1. Authorised by target organisation. 
2. Reported externally in relation to 
target organisation. 
3. Organisationally proactive (ethics 
management proactive/responsive) 
An employee reports the improper 
organisational accounting practices to 
an organisationally endorsed, third 
party such as an external auditor or 
ethics consultant. 
Internal reporting 1. Authorised by target organisation. 
2. Reported within the target 
organisation. 
3. Organisationally proactive (ethics 
management proactive/responsive) 
An employee reports the improper 
organisational accounting practices via 
an established ethics hotline or to an 
established, internal ombudsman. 
Source: MacNab et al. (2007, p. 9) 
 
2.3.2. Debates on auditors as whistleblowers 
 
Another point of argument is whether an auditor can be regarded as a whistleblower. 
Jubb (1999, 2000) argued that reporting or disclosures made by internal and external 
auditors are role-prescribed and should not be regarded as whistleblowing acts. Jubb 
(2000) explained that the disclosures on corporate wrongdoings made by these auditors 
are within the ambit of their profession and should be considered as reporting or 
informing rather than whistleblowing. Courtemanche (1988) advocated that 
whistleblowing be regarded as a gratuitous act which is unrelated to an individual’s 
official obligations. Thus, in order to distinguish between whistleblowing and 
informing, the disclosure has to be non-obligatory for it to be considered as 
whistleblowing (Jubb, 1999).  
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However, the definitions of “whistleblowing” as provided by Near and Miceli (1985) 
and Jubb (1999) suggest that, the actor (the whistleblower) is an organisation member 
who has access to vital corporate information. Similarly, Tsahuridu and 
Vandekerckhove (2008) highlighted that, one of the characteristics that constitutes an 
act of whistleblowing is that the whistleblower has privileged access. Tsahuridu and 
Vandekerckhove (2008) further explained that the whistleblowers know exactly what is 
going on at work and their jobs enable them to access specific information about their 
organisation. Therefore, this study contends that reporting by internal auditors within 
the organisation should be regarded as internal whistleblowing acts. Internal auditors’ 
scope of work enables them to access and hold such important corporate information 
and require them to report any form of corporate wrongdoing. It is said that internal 
auditors are responsible to disclose any organisational wrongdoing as it is embedded in 
their job description (Dasgupta & Kesharwani, 2010; Near & Miceli, 1985; Seifert et 
al., 2010). Moreover, this was what Cynthia Cooper (an internal auditor herself) did in 
the WorldCom case and her act was considered as whistleblowing by internal auditors. 
Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008, p. 324) acknowledged Cooper’s action by stating that “the 
recent example in the WorldCom incident shows that the public may perceive the 
internal auditor as a whistleblower”.  
 
Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991, p. 114), supported the notion by stating that “internal 
auditors should be considered whistle-blowers when they report wrongdoing”. Dozier 
and Miceli (1985) explained that individuals whose job role requires whistleblowing 
can in fact be whistleblowers as unstated norms of altruistic (unselfish) behaviour may 
be more influential than organisational policy that requires the reporting of corporate 
wrongdoings. Such altruistic behaviour can be seen in the internal auditing profession 
(Arnold & Ponemon, 1991), and researchers have agreed that internal auditors, whose 
roles require them to report corporate wrongdoings, should be regarded as 
whistleblowers (Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991; Near & Miceli, 1986; Xu & 
Ziegenfuss, 2008). Various whistleblowing studies have since associated the definition 
provided by  Near and Miceli (1985) with both internal auditors (see Arnold & 
Ponemon, 1991; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991; Seifert et al., 2010; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 
2008) and external audit professions (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Patel, 2003). Specifically, 
internal auditors who disclose organisational wrongdoings are thus described as internal 
whistleblowers; consistent with the suggestion given by  Miceli et al. (2008) and Miethe 
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(1999) stating that internal whistleblowers report to persons within the organisation who 
can take necessary actions.  
 
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) also acknowledges that whistleblowing is 
associated with internal auditors. IIA (1988, p. 16) defines whistleblowing as “the 
unauthorized dissemination by internal auditors of audit results, findings, opinions, or 
information acquired in the course of performing their duties to anyone outside the 
organization or to the general public”. However members of IIA are obliged to adhere 
to the requirement of the IIA’s Standards and Code of Ethics, which requires them to 
report the matters internally utilising sufficient mechanisms without the need to bring 
the matters outside their organisations. Specifically, the IIA Code of Ethics (IIA, 2009) 
requires that members “shall observe the law and make disclosures expected by the law 
and the profession”; and “shall disclose all material facts known to them that, if not 
disclosed, may distort the reporting of activities under review”. This IIA Code of Ethics 
requirement seems to be consistent with the acknowledgment that internal auditors 
indeed should be considered as internal whistleblowers.  
 
2.4. Internal Audit Profession and Whistleblowing 
 
The internal auditing profession has evolved remarkably and has gained an important 
role within organisations. From merely having a traditional role focussing on 
compliance procedures, the profession has then evolved by having a larger value adding 
role (Ramamoorti, 2003). The role of internal auditors is encapsulated in the definition 
of the profession provided by the IIA. Internal auditing is thus defined as: 
 
“... an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and 
improve an organization's operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by 
bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control, and governance processes.” (IIA, 2007) 
 
This broad definition covers a wide scope of internal auditing services that includes 
consulting activities, value added services, evaluation and improvement of the 
effectiveness of the risk management and governance process (Abdolmohammadi, 
Burnaby, & Hass, 2006). The definition also highlights the growing responsibilities of 
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internal auditors in assisting risk management and promoting effective corporate 
governance procedures within their organisations (Krogstad, Ridley, & Rittenberg, 
1999). The responsibilities to ensure sound corporate governance practices actually 
include the need for internal auditors to internally whistleblow within their 
organisations should the need arise. IIA in its position paper cautioned that 
whistleblowing should not be brought by internal auditors externally as internal auditors 
are actually equipped with sufficient mechanisms to solve any matters that arise in the 
course of their duties (IIA, 1988). 
 
Unfortunately, there have been limited whistleblowing studies that have used internal 
auditors as their subject of interest. It is an irony that a profession that is said to have a 
unique position in organisations to prevent, deter and detect corporate wrongdoings and 
malpractices (Hillison, Pacini, & Sinason, 1999; Pearson, Gregson, & Wendell, 1998) 
was not being fully studied on their propensity for whistleblowing behaviour. Their 
unique position actually allows them to know more about their own organisation than 
anyone else.  Miceli et al. (2008) highlighted a finding from their previous study that, 
compared to other professions, the highest reported observation of wrongdoing was 
reported by internal auditors (see Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991). Internal auditing 
profession is indeed an important role in organisations as most frauds were detected by 
internal audit, as evidenced from the findings of the latest survey, The Global Economic 
Crime Survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCooper (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009).  
 
Such a gap could be due to some researchers arguing that the reporting of internal 
auditors is merely role-prescribed (as discussed earlier), hence the act of reporting is not 
considered as whistleblowing (see Jubb, 1999, 2000). However, some studies advocated 
that due to the uniqueness of the profession, internal auditors may also be potential 
whistleblowers (Arnold & Ponemon, 1991; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991; Pearson et 
al., 1998; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008).  Pearson et al. (1998) advocate that the reporting of 
illegal activities within organisations by internal auditors to higher management, boards 
of directors or government agencies be referred to as an act of whistleblowing. 
Meanwhile, a survey by Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991) demonstrated that internal 
auditors were more likely to report wrongdoing if it was judged to be part of their role 
responsibility. 
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The more pressing matter for internal auditors actually, is to decide whether or not to 
whistleblow should they discover organisational wrongdoings. Internal auditors may 
face situations that involve conflict of interests while executing their dual-role duties 
(Arnold & Ponemon, 1991; E. Z. Taylor & Curtis, 2010). Basically, internal auditors are 
employed by the organisation and are subject to the needs and requirements of their 
employment, but on the other hand, as members of a professional body, they are also 
required to adhere to the profession’s ethical requirements, as well as the needs of other 
stakeholders. Ahmad and Taylor (2009) shared the same view with regards to this type 
of conflict of interest. They assert that the role of internal auditors in providing auditing 
tasks for their organisations may cause ongoing conflicts.  Ahmad and Taylor (2009) 
explained that internal auditors need to balance their role towards being independent of 
management while executing their duties, and at the same time, balancing their roles 
within their own professional association (i.e. the Institute of Internal Auditors) that 
demands them to uphold the directives that may be incompatible with the demands and 
accountabilities of internal auditors to their employing organisations. It is therefore 
essential for the current study to examine factors affecting internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions as Arnold and Ponemon (1991) stated that there is limited 
information about the complexities underlying the internal auditors’ whistleblowing 
decisions. 
 
2.5. Review of Past Empirical Whistleblowing Studies  
 
The literature review continues by examining some previous empirical whistleblowing 
studies. This is essential in order to appreciate and understand thoroughly what had been 
done in the relevant field.  
 
2.5.1. Earlier whistleblowing studies – the MSPB studies 
 
The United States Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB4) survey was the earliest 
known empirical study conducted in the whistleblowing literature (Near & Miceli, 
                                                     
4 The MSPB was established by the Civil Service reform Act of 1978 (Miceli & Near, 1984). The MSPB 
data were archival in nature and in the public domain. The data were gathered from the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management and from the Offices of Inspector General at each participating department or 
agencies (Miceli & Near, 1985). 
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2008). The purpose of the survey, which was first conducted in 1980, was to ascertain 
whether prohibited personnel practices were occurring in the United States’ civil 
service. Miceli and Near (1984, 1985, 1988) utilised the MSPB data sets and the 
outcomes of their studies provide valuable information in explaining organisational 
members’ whistleblowing behaviour.  
 
The first study conducted by Miceli and Near (1984) utilised data collected in 1980. 
Among their findings in this study, one suggested that the profiles of internal 
whistleblowers were found to be professionals, powerful organisational members, 
highly educated, and held supervisory positions and/or in positions where internal 
whistleblowing was role-prescribed. This group believed that blowing the whistle 
internally is less threatening than blowing it externally. Then, in their follow-up study, 
Miceli and Near (1985) found that observers of wrongdoing will be more likely than 
inactive observers to blow the whistle, depending on the level of seriousness of the 
wrongdoing. Consistent with their earlier study in 1984, Miceli and Near (1985) 
suggested that internal whistleblowers’ actions are role-prescribed and they are usually 
part of the management team. The third and final study on MSPB by Miceli and Near 
(1988) utilised another set of data collected in 1983. Their findings explained that 
whistleblowing is consistent with a type of prosocial behaviour that occurs in 
organisations, as “whistle-blowers call attention to questionable practices in order to 
help the present and potential victims or to benefit the organization because they believe 
the activity is not consistent with the organization’s stated values” (Miceli & Near, 
1988, p. 268). 
 
Near and Miceli (2008) advocated that the outcome of MSPB surveys have influenced 
researchers on the development of theory and encourage more research on the topic of 
whistleblowing. Specifically, Miceli and Near’s (1984, 1985, 1988) studies have 
indirectly acknowledged the existence of three important factors affecting individual 
whistleblowing decisions, namely: organisational, individual and situational factors. 
Furthermore, Miceli and Near’s (1988) study has shown that whistleblowing behaviour 
can be explained by prosocial behaviour theory. As such, Near and Miceli (2008) 
contended that the MSPB data have been useful in providing preliminary knowledge 
about whistleblowing. 
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However, the most apparent weakness of MSPB data sets utilised by Miceli and Near 
(1984, 1985, 1988) is that they concentrated on United States federal government and 
agencies employees and did not take into consideration private sector companies. As 
such, Miceli and Near (1984, 1985, 1988) cautioned that the findings of secondary 
analyses using the data from these surveys may not be relevant to private sector 
employees and its employers. Miceli and Near (1985) then suggested that future studies 
should utilise diverse samples to determine whether their findings were consistent 
across samples. Another apparent weakness was that, the MSPB surveys required the 
respondents to personally report (self report) whether or not they had observed any form 
of wrongdoing in their organisations.  Whistleblowing is a sensitive issue to some 
organisational members, that may cause them not to respond to the questionnaire 
(Miceli & Near, 1988) and there is a possibility that some respondents who had actually 
observed the wrongdoing, would choose not to report it (Miceli & Near, 1984), thus 
making the data flawed. This indicates that future research needs to consider the most 
appropriate method in tackling sensitive issues such as whistleblowing behaviour. 
 
2.5.2. Whistleblowing in Asian countries 
 
The incidence of the infamous American corporate debacles in 2001, has also led to a 
substantial number of whistleblowing studies being conducted in countries such as 
China  (Chiu, 2002, 2003),  Taiwan (Hwang et al., 2008), South Korea (Park & 
Blenkinsopp, 2009; Park, Rehg, & Lee, 2005) and Japan (Davis & Konishi, 2007; 
Ohnishi, Hayama, Asai, & Kosugi, 2008). Interestingly, these studies have emphasised 
the importance of national and cultural differences in examining whistleblowing issues. 
According to the Wikipedia encyclopaedia (Confucius, n.d.), countries like China, 
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan share a common belief in Chinese virtues and 
Confucianism5 values.  
 
There is actually a different perception with regards to whistleblowing behaviour among 
Asians as compared to their western counterparts. While Vinten (1992a) stated that 
western countries acknowledged their whistleblowers as an organisation’s model 
                                                     
5 Confucius (551 BC – 479 BC), was a Chinese thinker and philosopher, whose teachings and philosophy 
of Confucianism have deeply influenced the Chinese, Taiwanese, Korean, and Japanese way of life. 
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employees, Asian researchers on the other hand, explained that by Chinese virtues, 
whistleblowing is regarded as an unacceptable and unethical behaviour and as an act 
against the teachings of Confucianism (Chiu, 2002, 2003; Hwang et al., 2008; Ohnishi 
et al., 2008; Park et al., 2005). Confucianism values encourage social conformity and 
harmony by maintaining good relationships with people, be it with family members or 
within organisations (Ohnishi et al., 2008). As such, the act of whistleblowing would be 
considered as breaking close relationships between employees and employers (Chiu, 
2002) as it will also affect harmony within the organisation (Ohnishi et al., 2008).   
 
The Chinese virtues in preserving relationships and maintaining harmony within their 
groups are consistent with Hofstede’s (1980a, 1991) collectivism dimension. 
Collectivism is one of the cultural traits of Asian society (Park et al., 2005). Hofstede 
(1980a, 1991) explained that, collectivism emphasises group-based values such as 
loyalty, harmony, cooperation, unity, conformity and the unquestioning acceptance of 
norms. In this respect, Park et al. (2005) added that the attitudes of collectivist societies 
are considerably different from those in individualist societies (especially among 
westerners), in which conflict between employees is regarded as acceptable. 
Confrontation and conflict in organisations within a collectivist society is considered as 
undesirable (Hofstede, 1991) and the act of confrontation is considered as seriously 
unacceptable within the norms of organisations (Park et al., 2005). That is the reason 
why Asian researchers highlighted that the act of whistleblowing is not acceptable 
within their communities. 
 
However, there are contradictory findings in some empirical Asian whistleblowing 
studies. Chiu (2002) found that his subjects, part-time Chinese MBA students, viewed 
whistleblowing as ethical. Chiu (2002), however pointed out that his Chinese subjects 
are actually exposed to the effect of capitalism, which includes possessing materialistic, 
egoistic and self-centred behaviour, and suggested that their actions for blowing the 
whistle are consistent with a need to protect their own interests and rights.  Chiu (2002) 
further explained that such behaviour is also due to the influence of Communist values, 
which require faithful party members or responsible citizens in China to report the 
wrongful acts of others, which Chiu (2002) likened as an act of prosocial behaviour. A 
study in Taiwan by Hwang et al. (2008) was also found to be consistent with Chiu’s 
(2002) study in China. Using professionals from CPA firms, corporations and 
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professional associations and universities as their study subjects,  Hwang et al. (2008) 
found that whistleblowing is judged as ethical and is positively related to 
whistleblowing intentions in Taiwan. Hwang et al. (2008) suggested that, this could be 
due to their respondents having a higher level of morality since the recent cases of 
global accounting and auditing failures. 
 
In a nutshell, an act of reporting on someone’s wrongdoing in Asian organisations 
would trigger a debate as such behaviour is not permissible in Asian cultural values and 
norms. Potential whistleblowers that are embedded deeply within Asian cultural virtues, 
the teachings of Confucius and collectivism dimension may discourage whistleblowing 
behaviour within organisations. Generally, Asians view the whistleblower negatively as 
a betrayer of organisation. Thus, researchers have acknowledged that having a sound 
reporting mechanism is essential if Asian organisations are to combat corporate fraud. 
 
2.5.3. Whistleblowing and cross-cultural studies 
 
Apart from acknowledging national and cultural differences, prior whistleblowing 
studies have also examined cross-cultural effects. Keenan  (2007) noted that previous 
whistleblowing studies concentrated only on culturally-bound perspectives and did not 
focus on cultural and international differences. Researchers have suggested that 
acknowledging the cultural and societal differences, i.e. between countries being 
examined, would provide a better understanding of differences in individual 
whistleblowing tendencies (Keenan, 2002a, 2007; MacNab et al., 2007; Schultz, 
Johnson, Morris, & Dyrnes, 1993; Sims & Keenan, 1999).  Comparative studies 
between different nations have been conducted to determine the differences in cross-
cultural ethics towards the act of whistleblowing.  
 
Previous comparative whistleblowing studies undertaken have relied on Hofstede’s 
(1980a, 1991) Theory of International Cultures (see Keenan, 2002a, 2007; Patel, 2003; 
Schultz et al., 1993; Sims & Keenan, 1999). Hofstede’s theory suggests that every 
country has different work-related values which can be distinguished into four primary 
dimensions: Masculinity (versus Femininity), Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, 
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and Individualism (versus Collectivism)6. Hofstede advocates that these dimensions 
could differentiate the cultures of our world and Sims and Keenan (1999) stated that 
those dimensions may help in the understanding of differences in whistleblowing 
tendencies.  
 
Schultz et al. (1993) initiated comparative cross-cultural whistleblowing studies by 
incorporating Hofstede’s dimensions of cultural differences into their study which  
examined whether subjects from France, Norway and United States, differ on their 
attitude to reporting. Then, Sims and Keenan (1999) explored cultural differences 
between samples of managers from America and Jamaica with respect to their 
whistleblowing tendencies. Other cross-cultural whistleblowing studies have 
investigated the propensity to whistleblow between Indian and American samples of 
managers (Keenan, 2002a), Chinese and American managers (Keenan, 2007), 
Australian, Indian and Chinese-Malaysian accountants (Patel, 2003), as well as between 
American, Canadian and Mexican executives (MacNab et al., 2007).  All studies, except 
for Keenan (2002a)7, have found that there are significant differences between subjects 
of different nations with regards to their likelihood to blow the whistle. These studies 
acknowledged that Hofstede’s dimensions of work-related values do indeed provide an 
explanation for cultural and societal differences on individual whistleblowing 
propensity. 
 
Though Hofstede’s work is one of the most cited sources in the Social Science Index 
and the most influential in the study of cross-cultural management (Fang, 2003; 
Sondergaard, 1994), his theory is not without criticism. Critics argue that his work-
related values dimensions derived from 117,0008 questionnaires administered in 66 
countries were exclusively taken only from a single company – IBM (Baskerville, 2003; 
McSweeney, 2002b; Sondergaard, 1994). Baskerville (2003) argues that the data that 
formed the basis of Hofstede’s (1980a) analyses were not representative of people in 
                                                     
6 Hofstede later added the fifth dimension in his later research, Long-term Orientation (versus Short-term) 
(Hofstede & Bond, 1988). 
 
7 Sims and Keenan (1999) explained that though Hofstede’s (1980a, 1991) Theory of International 
Cultures could not explain all differences between two cultures, the theory may help to explain and 
predict differences in whistleblowing behaviour. 
 
8 The figures were combined from two rounds of surveys. Although the survey covered 66 countries, only 
40 countries were used in Hofstede (1980a) study (McSweeney, 2002b). 
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those 66 countries being studied. Furthermore, McSweeney (2002b) stated that the data 
derived by Hofstede to construct national cultural comparisons were limited to 
responses from marketing-plus-sales employees and yet, Hofstede (1980b, p. 44) 
claimed the data “have the power to uncover the secrets of entire national cultures...”. 
Hofstede claimed that the term national culture refers to the culture of a country or state 
and not necessarily of a nation (Baskerville, 2003; McSweeney, 2002b) and each 
country/states or nations have different cultures. 
 
Researchers argued that the attribution of the institution (IBM) or nation as a national 
culture is a weak move which has methodological flaws (Baskerville-Morley, 2005; 
Baskerville, 2003; McSweeney, 2002a, 2002b). Baskerville (2003) stressed that culture 
does not equate with nations citing the Encyclopaedia of World Culture, by saying that 
various different cultures could even be identified within a single country, and 
“Hofstede did not adequately address these basic problems” (Baskerville, 2003, p. 6). 
The Encyclopaedia identified that, in the Middle East, there are 35 different cultures in 
14 nations and 98 different cultures identified in 48 countries in Africa. Western Europe 
has 81 cultures in 32 countries, while in North America, there are 147 Native American 
cultures and 9 North American folk cultures (Baskerville, 2003). Jacob (2005) further 
emphasised that there is no such thing as homogeneous cultural entities within a 
country. She even explained that “even a small country like Switzerland, with a 
population of only 7.5 million, is not culturally homogenous” (Jacob, 2005, p. 515).  
 
As most whistleblowing studies are derived from the United States (Vinten, 2003), it is 
expected that Americans will be compared with their counterparts from other countries 
in determining the differences towards whistleblowing tendency. This is essentially 
what has been done by previous researchers (see Keenan, 2002a, 2007; MacNab et al., 
2007; Schultz et al., 1993; Sims & Keenan, 1999). However, these studies do not take 
into consideration the fact that the United States is also culturally diverse. G. King 
(2000) reported a diverse racial composition in the American workforce which includes 
African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans and Anglo Americans, with 
each race having different cultural attitudes and styles of communication in reporting 
unethical behaviour by employees. Therefore, extreme care and alternative 
methodologies need to be undertaken and Jacob (2005) has suggested that researchers 
need to employ more robust methodology in cross-cultural studies. Apart from the 
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methodological concerns, due to the nature of previous comparative whistleblowing 
studies, the findings are case-specific and cannot be simply generalised to other 
countries. 
 
2.5.4. Internal auditors in prior empirical whistleblowing studies 
 
Arnold and Ponemon (1991) were the first that had used internal auditors in their 
whistleblowing study. Specifically, their study examined internal auditors’ perceptions 
of whistleblowing and its effects on three variables: (1) the level of moral reasoning of 
the individuals, (2) the possible retaliation imposed by the management against the 
whistleblower, and (3) the position of whistleblower in an organisation (external 
auditors, internal auditors and marketing analysts). Using experimental methods 
incorporating a case scenario, the internal auditors were required to predict the 
likelihood of another person disclosing wrongdoing. Arnold and Ponemon (1991) found 
that internal auditors with lower levels of moral reasoning were unlikely to blow the 
whistle on wrongdoing, due to fear of management retaliation, that the position of the 
prospective whistleblower has a significant influence on whistleblowers’ behaviour, and 
external auditors are most likely to whistleblow compared to internal auditors and 
marketing analysts.  
 
Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) then extended the study on internal auditors whistleblowing 
intentions by exploring the impact of reward systems and its effect on individual’s 
moral reasoning. Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) suggest that reward systems (cash rewards 
or continued employment contracts) may have a positive impact on whistleblowing 
behaviour. They proposed that internal auditors with lower levels of moral reasoning are 
more sensitive to reward and are more willing to whistleblow when reward incentives 
are provided. Adapting a case scenario from Arnold and Ponemon’s (1991) study, the 
internal auditors were required to indicate the likelihood of reporting the wrongdoing to 
higher authorities. Xu & Ziegenfuss (2008) found that reward systems have a significant 
influence on internal auditors’ likelihood of whistleblowing behaviour, with internal 
auditors possessing lower levels of moral reasoning more likely to be affected by 
reward incentives than those with higher levels of moral reasoning.  
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Both studies by Arnold and Ponemon (1991) and Xu & Ziegenfuss (2008) have used 
moral reasoning variables contributed by Kohlberg’s (1969) moral development theory 
and the Defining Issues Test (DIT)9 instrument developed by Rest (1979). However, 
there are some concerns as the application of such an approach in a cross-cultural study 
(e.g. as in Malaysia) is likely to be problematic (Ma, 1984). Ma cautioned that some of 
the dilemma scenarios used in the DIT instrument to measure the individual’s moral 
development level “... are concerned with some of the political situations commonly 
occurred in America” (Ma, 1984, p. 53), and as such, these scenarios are culturally-
specific and cannot be understood by subjects from other cultures.   
 
Other studies that have examined internal auditors’ reporting of wrongdoing were 
conducted by Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991) and recently by Seifert et al. (2010). 
Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991) examined whether internal auditors’ whistleblowing 
behaviours could be predicted based on literatures on prosocial behaviour and bystander 
intervention theory. Their study examined a number of individual and situational 
variables to determine the likelihood of internal auditors towards whistleblowing. 
Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991) found that internal auditors were less likely to report 
when they felt that they are not morally compelled or prescribed by their role to do so, 
when they have a lower job performance level and if their organisations are highly 
bureaucratic. On the other hand, internal auditors are more likely to whistleblow if they 
feel that the public and their co-workers are harmed by the act of wrongdoing, the 
wrongdoer is a lower level employee, when there are few observers, and when their 
organisations are highly regulated.  The study by Seifert et al. (2010) on the other hand, 
utilised a group of internal auditors and management accountants. Their study 
represents an experimental approach (via use of vignettes) to identify actions of policies 
that encourage internal reporting of wrongdoing. Their results suggest that management 
can increase the likelihood of these auditors and accountants to internally report 
financial statement fraud by incorporating organisational justice in the design and 
execution of whistleblowing policies. 
 
The methodological approach used by Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991) requires their 
subjects to self report based on their own actual work experience. This was also in exact 
                                                     
9 The DIT provides a surrogate measure of an individual’s ethical reasoning and judgement. It contains a 
self administered questionnaire that contains a series of six hypothetical moral conflicts. 
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contrast to studies by Arnold and Ponemon (1991), Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) and 
Seifert et al. (2010) which undertook experimental methods utilising case scenarios. 
Miceli and Near (1988, p. 279) cautioned that “retrospective, self-reported data can be 
problematic because of memory distortion and post-decisional justification, and other 
processes, and cause-effect relations are difficult to trace”. Furthermore, Miceli and 
Near (1984) added that when self-reported data are used there will always be 
possibilities for bias, especially for employees who actually observed a wrongdoing, but 
decided not to act or report it. The variables and method for this study in conducting the 
research are further explained in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.  
 
2.5.5. Methodological concerns 
 
Patel (2003) states that whistleblowing is a difficult topic to research, as researchers can 
only examine their respondents’ behavioural intentions rather than their  actual 
behaviour.  The whistleblowing intention variable refers to respondents’ probability to 
report unethical behaviours represented in hypothetical case scenario(s) or vignettes. 
This method is commonly used in previous research investigating respondents’ 
whistleblowing intentions (see Arnold & Ponemon, 1991; Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; 
Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Chiu, 2002; Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Keenan, 2002a, 2002b; 
Patel, 2003; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008).  
 
Though the approach has been widely used, some studies have acknowledged its 
limitations. Brennan and Kelly (2007) and Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) reported that 
hypothetical scenarios are not able to capture exact information about the real world, 
thus the validity and generalisability of the findings need to be questioned. Miceli et al. 
(2008) doubt that respondents who responded in the hypothetical situations would 
actually act if they were faced with the real situation. Furthermore, if these respondents 
did respond, they would then possibly be susceptible to social desirability bias (Miceli 
et al., 2008). 
 
However, Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran (2005) state that previous researchers have 
advocated the use of whistleblowing intention as a research variable. They cite that it is 
due to: “(1) ... difficulty of carrying out investigations into unethical conduct in actual 
organizations, (2) suggesting that actual whistleblowers censor the information they 
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provide to investigators due to the perception that data gathered in actual organizations 
preclude their confidentiality or anonymity, (3) illuminating the difficulty of locating 
actual whistleblowers for questioning, or (4) citing the inherently flawed nature of such 
data (e.g., self-reports of past events)” (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005, pp. 
278-279 ). Ayers and Kaplan  (2005) contend that an experimental approach (by using 
hypothetical scenarios or vignettes) is particularly useful for the study of 
whistleblowing intentions as it allows for greater control over competing explanations, 
thus enhancing internal validity. Kaplan and Shultz (2007) supported that, suggesting 
that an experimental approach allows for a high level of control and provides a stronger 
basis to evaluate cause–effect relationships.  
 
Previous research has acknowledged that, other types of research design such as 
interview, field-experimental and longitudinal survey design may not be workable in 
whistleblowing research. Although some researchers recognise that it is essential to 
measure actual whistleblowing behaviour in order to understand whistleblowing 
tendencies (Gundlach, Martinko, & Douglas, 2008; Sims & Keenan, 1999), it is 
however not practical in social science research. Miceli and Near (1988, p. 277) stated 
that, “... because of obvious ethical concerns, one cannot randomly select employees to 
witness manipulated wrongdoing in order to determine which individual or situational 
characteristics are associated with whistle-blowing”. Furthermore, due to the sensitivity 
of the nature of wrongdoings, participants may not be willing to be identified and may 
not respond to the questionnaire, hence making the data become invalid (Miceli & Near, 
1988).  
 
Therefore, the use of hypothetical scenarios or vignettes allows the researcher to 
approach highly sensitive issues by posing hypothetical situations to which the 
participants may respond. The approach of using vignettes is considered as appropriate 
and effective for acquiring data in whistleblowing studies (Gundlach et al., 2008) and it 
provides a more realistic context for the respondents (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990). It is 
therefore apparent that the majority of whistleblowing studies have used vignettes or 
scenario-based approaches to examine their respondents’ ethical behaviours.  
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2.6. Whistleblowing Issues in Malaysia 
 
Malaysia is a multi-racial and multi-cultural country situated in Southeast Asia with a 
current population of about 28 million. The population consists of many ethnic groups 
with Malays, Chinese and Indians among the largest ethnic groups in Malaysia. The 
Malays, Malaysia's largest ethnic group, make up 50.4% of the population. It is then 
followed by Chinese with 23.7%, Indian with 7.1% and the remainder consisting of a 
myriad of other ethnics groups (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia). Each of these 
ethnic groups are free to practice and maintain their separate ethnic identities, cultures, 
languages as well as their own norms, values and beliefs. This has turned Malaysia into 
a mosaic of cultures with a diverse and colourful heritage, thus making Malaysia unique 
and not directly comparable with other nations. 
 
2.6.1. Cross-cultural issues in Malaysia 
 
The differences in cultures, norms, values and beliefs possessed by these three major 
ethnic groups could also lead to differing views of what is acceptable and what is 
unacceptable in business ethics (Rashid & Ibrahim, 2008). Prior studies that have 
examined these three major ethnic groups in Malaysia have shown that there were 
significant differences among the Malays, Chinese and Indians with respect to their 
judgments on business ethical practices (see Rashid & Ho, 2003; Rashid & Ibrahim, 
2008; Zabid, 1989). These studies however, were limited to examining unquestionable 
business ethics practices and did not incorporate complex and sensitive issues such as 
whistleblowing. Although Rashid and Ho (2003) acknowledged that there were 
influences of ethnic groups on perceived business ethics, such differences however, 
were limited. They then suggested that, the influence of culture is dependent on the 
situational context, thus if the ethical situation is complex, the more likely the influence 
of culture would be. 
 
This would suggest that, as whistleblowing is also a very complex issue to be studied, 
culture would impact on the individual Malaysians’ whistleblowing tendencies. Though 
Malaysia is located in the same Asian region as China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, 
as well as having its own Chinese population, the corresponding research findings in 
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whistleblowing studies cannot be generalised to Malaysia for very apparent reasons. As 
Malaysia is culturally diverse, this study is not interested in determining whether 
cultural differences existed among the three major ethnics with regards to their 
whistleblowing intentions.  
 
Such a study, if ever incorporated, could lead to various methodological concerns 
should it not be properly undertaken. The concerns have been highlighted rigorously in 
the previous section which discussed cultural and cross-cultural studies in previous 
empirical research. McDonald (2000) highlighted that methodological concerns in 
cross-cultural research include variable identification, operational definitions, 
instrument design, sample selection, sample treatment and analysis. The current study’s 
concern is basically on its instrument design and the issue is described in Chapter 4 
(Research Method) of the thesis (refer section 4.4.4.2). Hence, cultural differences 
between the Malays, Chinese and Indians with regards to their ethical decisions in 
examining their whistleblowing intentions will not be examined. 
 
2.6.2. Corporate fraud issues in Malaysia 
 
As with any other nation, Malaysia has not been spared its own cases of corporate 
unethical practices, financial frauds and scandals. Such cases were said to be one of the 
primary causes of the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Haron, 2010). Furthermore, in the 
latest Corruption Perception Index 2009 issued by Transparency International, Malaysia 
is ranked 56th out of 180 nations surveyed with a score of 4.50 out 10, a fall of 0.60 
(from 5.10) from the previous year (where 0 means highly corrupt and 10 is the best 
possible score). The decline from the 47th spot in 2008 is the steepest among the Asian 
countries, with Malaysia ranked below countries such as South Africa and Latvia as 
shown in the 2009 index. Haron (2010) implied that the decline was due to poor internal 
and external auditing procedures that failed to detect red flags of increasing fraud 
incidence. 
 
Locally, in May 2009, KPMG Forensic Malaysia distributed a fraud survey 
questionnaire to a total of 1,125 companies comprising all listed companies on Bursa 
Malaysia as well as 100 private companies (which were ranked as Malaysia’s top 1,000 
companies). The survey, known as KPMG Malaysia Fraud Survey Report 2009, which 
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was conducted on the top management of the companies, provided an insight into 
contemporary fraud issues being faced by organisations in Malaysia (KPMG, 2009). 
The survey revealed that, nearly half (49%) of the Malaysian companies have been hit 
by fraud and this is expected to worsen in the next two years as a result of the financial 
crisis. Other key findings of the report were that, 47% of the respondents disclosed that 
the total losses suffered during the survey period (January 2006 – December 2008) 
totalled RM63.95 million, while the remaining respondents were unsure of the amount. 
The KPMG report showed that the threat of fraud comes mostly from within 
organisations, with internally-perpetrated fraud by management and non-management 
employees accounting for 88% of the total reported fraud value of over RM60 million. 
 
The latest findings from the Transparency International and the KPMG Forensic 
Malaysia survey proved that corporate fraud and wrongdoing are an ongoing reality and 
a major concern. Tighter rules and legislation are very much needed in order to enhance 
corporate governance practices in the Malaysian corporate scenes. This has lead to 
amendments to Malaysian securities laws with the introduction of provisions governing 
whistleblowing. 
 
2.6.3. Whistleblowing legislation in Malaysia 
 
Whistleblowing provision in Malaysia is basically contained in Section 174 (8) of the 
Companies Act, 1965, where auditors are placed under obligation to report to the 
Registrar of Company breaches of company law. The law however, does not provide 
any kind of protection for would-be whistleblowers (Khan, 2009) and the obligation is 
only directed to external auditors of the organisation.  In the light of numerous financial 
scandals which have occurred in recent years, as well as the introduction of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 in the United States, amendments to the Securities Industry Act 1983 
(SIA) came in 2004 with the introduction of novel whistleblowing provisions into 
Malaysian securities law. The whistleblowing provisions are set out in sections 99E and 
99F respectively. There are two key components of the whistleblowing provisions 
which include:  
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 A mandatory duty for auditors to report to relevant authorities breaches of 
securities law and listing requirements. This requirement supplements existing 
requirements in the Companies Act 1965; and  
 
 Protection against retaliation for specific categories of persons, namely chief 
executive officers, company secretaries, internal auditors and chief financial 
officers who report to the authorities on cases of fraud and corporate 
wrongdoing. The protection against retaliation includes protection against 
discharge, discrimination, demotion and suspension by the company on the 
whistleblower. 
 
The SIA provisions are the first Malaysian legislative initiatives on whistleblowing 
(Pascoe & Bidin, 2008) and generally apply to breaches of securities laws and stock 
exchange rules. Later, in September 2007, the Companies Act 1965 was amended to 
incorporate a new section 368B which provides protection to officers of a company for 
any report made to the Registrar of Companies of any contravention of the Companies 
Act or a serious offence involving fraud or dishonesty against the company committed 
by other officers in the company. In addition to the newly amended Companies Act 
1965, a new Capital Market and Services Act 2007 (CMSA) has been introduced. 
CMSA had repealed the Securities Industry Act 1983 and Future Industry Act 1993 
(Pascoe & Bidin, 2008). The whistleblowing provisions which was previously under 
SIA are now embodied in CMSA (Khan, 2009; Pascoe & Bidin, 2008).  
 
Generally, these newly amended provisions provide for the protection of breaches of 
securities laws to the relevant authorities and promote better corporate governance in 
Malaysian public listed companies (Khan, 2009). However, consistent with  the views 
held by the Securities Commission and IIA Malaysia, Pascoe and  Bidin (2008) have 
also suggested that it is appropriate for local companies to develop their own internal 
whistleblowing procedures. It would then be interesting to determine whether the recent 
legislative changes on whistleblowing provisions have some influence in internal 
auditors’ whistleblowing intentions.  
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2.6.4. Empirical whistleblowing study in Malaysia 
 
It is evident that further research on whistleblowing is needed in Malaysia. To date, 
study has been limited to the work of Patel (2003). His study examined cultural 
influences on professional judgments among Australian, Indian and Chinese-Malaysian 
accountants in relation to whistleblowing as an internal control mechanism. The 
samples of his study were confined to selected Chinese professional accountants hence 
limiting the generalisability of other potential respondents from other races.  It is hoped 
that the outcome of this study will address the gap in the study of whistleblowing 
intention as well as contributing to the much needed knowledge of whistleblowing 
literature in Malaysia.   
 
2.7. Summary 
 
Based on reviews of general literature related to whistleblowing, it is apparent that 
whistleblowing has become an increasingly important issue for behavioural research. 
Practically, management may be able to further understand their employees’ ethical 
behaviour for whistleblowing within organisations. Without any doubt, more study is 
warranted to understand this ethics management tool. While research on whistleblowing 
is abundant, empirical research is very much needed in Malaysia in relation to internal 
auditors’ influence on acts of whistleblowing.   
 
It is obvious now that, internal whistleblowing is different from external whistleblowing 
behaviour, as the former involves reporting to an entity within the target organisation 
while the latter involves reporting to an entity external to the organisation. This research 
effort focuses on the internal type of whistleblowing, which currently represents an 
important organisational requirement in whistleblowing studies. Many important 
questions are unanswered in relation to this behaviour, particularly in Malaysia. There is 
a need for better understanding of how certain factors may influence internal auditors’ 
internal whistleblowing decisions. The next chapter focuses on factors affecting 
individuals’ decision to whistleblow, which is the primary concern of this study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
FACTORS AFFECTING INTERNAL 
WHISTLEBLOWING INTENTIONS AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The decision to whistleblow on corporate wrongdoing is a difficult decision to be made 
(Brennan & Kelly, 2007) and involves an extremely complicated process (Miceli, 
2004). The decision to blow the whistle embraces different types of organisational, 
individual, situational and demographic factors (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Greenberger et 
al., 1987; Keenan, 2000; Miceli & Near, 1988; Near & Miceli, 1985; Oh & Teo, 2010). 
Because of the potential internal whistleblowing has for protecting organisations against 
external whistleblowing, and because of recent legislation requirements, it is important 
to understand how these four factors might influence internal auditors’ intentions to 
internally whistleblow on corporate wrongdoing occurring within their organisations 
(see Figure 1.1 that portrays the theoretical model for this study).  
 
3.2. Organisational Factors 
 
The research questions identified earlier examine the relationship between 
organisational factors and internal auditors’ willingness to whistleblow. Previous 
empirical studies have shown that organisational factors such as ethical climate 
(Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006, 2007a), size of organisation (Hooks, Kaplan, Schultz, & 
Ponemon, 1994; Keenan, 2000; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991) and job level (Keenan, 
2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2007; Miceli & Near, 1984) do influence subjects’ decision to 
whistleblow.  
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3.2.1. Ethical climate 
 
It has been argued that organisations have distinct ethical climates (Victor & Cullen, 
1988) that reflect common perceptions and beliefs concerning organisational ethical 
conducts. According to Victor and Cullen (1988, p. 103), ethical climate is simply “the 
ethical dimensions of organizational culture” that members perceive to be the 
organisation’s ethical identity. Specifically, Wimbush and Shepard (1994, p. 638) with 
reference to ethical climate, “... to the stable, psychologically meaningful, shared 
perceptions employees hold concerning ethical procedures and policies existing in their 
organizations”. Therefore, when organisations have identifiable ethical climates, 
employees are better able to recognize types of ethical dilemmas, to differentiate issues 
that are pertinent to the dilemmas and to identify a process that should be used to solve 
those dilemmas. 
 
Explanations regarding ethical climate theory have been provided in Chapter 2 
previously (refer section 2.2.2). The following sections discuss the outcomes of the 
Ethical Climate Questionnaire, the survey instrument used by Victor and Cullen (1988) 
and other researchers, its empirical dimensions and the relationship between ethical 
climates and organisational members’ ethical behaviour, including whistleblowing 
intentions. 
 
3.2.1.1. Dimensions of ethical climates 
 
In their preliminary ethical climate study,  Victor and Cullen (1988) studied a sample of 
872 employees from four firms; a small printing company, a savings and loan company, 
a manufacturing plant and a telephone company, to determine whether ethical work 
climates are multidimensional. Utilising the 26-item Ethical Climate Questionnaire 
(ECQ), five factors were loaded through factor analysis using a principal components 
solution with Varimax rotation. These five factors were then labelled as; (a) caring, (b) 
rules, (c) law and code, (d) independence, and (e) instrumental. The explanation for 
each factor is given below. 
 
Employees in a ‘caring climate’ are sincerely interested in the wellbeing of each other 
and their workgroup constituencies. In a ‘rules climate’, employees would be expected 
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to adhere strictly to the rules and mandates of the organisations. Employees in a ‘law 
and code climate’ are expected to adhere strictly to the codes and regulations of their 
profession or government. In an ‘independence climate’, employees are expected to be 
strongly guided by their personal moral beliefs. Finally, in an ‘instrumental climate’, 
organisation members look out specifically for their own self-interest (Victor & Cullen, 
1988). The major findings of this study substantiated that, a number of hypothesised 
ethical climates do exist and that organisations developed distinct forms of ethical 
climates. 
 
Later, Cullen et al. (1993) extended Victor and Cullen’s (1988) study by using a revised 
version of the ECQ with 10 more items added to the 26 items used previously. Using 
samples from four accounting firms, their study identified seven types of ethical 
climate, where two of the ethical climate types; company profit and social responsibility 
were previously not loaded in Victor and Cullen’s (1988) study. Based on their 
outcomes, Cullen et al. (1993) suggest that the ECQ construct is valid and the scales are 
reliable. However, they acknowledged that the samples used in their studies are small, 
representing only four organisations in each study.  Research examining a larger sample 
of organisations is needed to further validate organisational ethical climates (Cullen et 
al., 1993). 
 
Fritzsche (2000) extended the examination of the number of ethical climates existing in 
a high technology firm by testing both the longer (36-items) and the shorter (original 
26-items) version of the ECQ instrument. Using the 36-items, the factor analysis yielded 
eight factors. The study found factors describing the principle climate of independence, 
rules, and law and code, consistent with Cullen et al. (1993), as well as egoistic climate 
of efficiency. However, other factors were found to be mixed with other combinations 
of climate, making it difficult to interpret (Fritzsche, 2000). Fritzsche (2000) then used 
the original 26-items used by Victor and Cullen (1988) in order to gain parsimony in his 
analysis. The study found six factors and Fritzsche (2000, p. 130) state that “the 26-item 
scale yielded more factors which were interpretable without losing the essence of the 
factors from the larger scale”. 
 
Earlier, studies by Wimbush et al. (1997a; 1997b) also failed to replicate the same 
climates as identified by the Victor and Cullen (1988) study. Consistent with the 
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methodology used by Victor and Cullen (1988), Wimbush et al. (1997a, 1997b) applied 
factor analysis using a principal components solution with varimax rotation to 36 items 
of ECQ. Numerous rotations were made to obtain the best representation of the data 
(Wimbush et al., 1997a, p. 70). Their study identified only three out of five ethical 
dimensions similar as found by Victor and Cullen (1988) – law and rules, independence 
and instrumental. Another factor – ‘caring’, though  was found in Victor and Cullen 
(1988) study, the loaded items were also found mixed with Victor and Cullen’s 
instrumental ethical climate.  As such, this factor was then labelled as ‘service’ as it was 
a new ethical climate not identified in Victor and Cullen’s (1988) study and due to the 
fact that the content of the items referred mostly to customer service (Wimbush et al., 
1997a). 
 
The outcomes from these previous studies clearly show that Victor and Cullen’s (1988) 
empirically identified ethical climates are not expected to exist in all organisations. 
Studies that utilised the original 26-items have been able to identify either five (Victor 
& Cullen, 1988) or six factors (Fritzsche, 2000). On the other hand, those that used the 
extended version found five (Wimbush et al., 1997a, 1997b), seven (Cullen et al., 1993) 
and eight factors (Fritzsche, 2000). Peterson (2002b) states that it is uncertain how 
many ethical climate dimensions exist in a particular organisation as well as items of 
ECQ that are representative  of each dimension. Peterson (2002b) illustrates the result of 
five studies employing an explanatory factor analysis procedure on the 36-items of ECQ 
which is shown in Table 3.1.  Comparison of these studies showed that none of them is 
able to show all the nine hypothetical ethical climates to exist within organisations. 
 
3.2.1.2. Ethical climates and ethical behaviour 
 
Research has established that organisational climate may influence the behaviour of 
employees (Barnett & Vaicys, 2000; Deshpande, 1996; Fritzsche, 2000; Martin & 
Cullen, 2006; Vardi, 2001; Victor & Cullen, 1988; Wimbush & Shepard, 1994; 
Wimbush et al., 1997a, 1997b). This is due to, ethical climate perceptions potentially 
influencing behaviour “in facilitating both positive and negative organizational 
outcomes” (Martin & Cullen, 2006, p. 191). Wimbush and Shepard (1994) validated 
Victor and Cullen’s (1988) ECQ as a proven instrument to evaluate and compare the 
ethical climate dimensions within organisations. The questionnaire examines 
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employees’ perceptions concerning how they deal and confront ethical issues within 
their organisations. Studies have examined ethical climates’ relationship to 
organisational commitment (Cullen et al., 2003), deviant workplace behaviour 
(Peterson, 2002a), and ethical behaviour (Wimbush et al., 1997b). 
 
Table 3-1: Ethical Climate Questionnaire items and the factors they represent 
based on five investigations. 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 
1. People concerned for themselves (EI) SI SI F * SI 
2. Consider efficiency first (EC) E E F E * 
3. Follow personal beliefs (PI) PM PM PM * PM 
4. Further company’s interest (EL) * * SI * * 
5. Look out for each other’s good (BI) SI * F F * 
6. No room for personal morals (EI) PM * SI * SI 
7. Follow company’s rule (PL) R LR LR R * 
8. Hurts company’s interest (EL) * * SI * * 
9. Decide for themselves what is right (PI) PM PM PM PM * 
10. People protect their own interest (EI) SI SI F SI SI 
11. Each person’s sense of right and wrong (PI) PM * PM PM * 
12. Concern for all the people (BL) F F F F * 
13. Does decision violates any law (PC) * LR LR * LR 
14. Comply with the law (PC) L LR LR L LR 
15. Stick to company rules (PL) R LR LR R * 
16. Concern for what is best for others (BI) F F F * F 
17. Concern with the company’s interest (EL) * * SI * * 
18. Successful people go by the book (PL) R LR LR * * 
19. Efficient way is always the right way (EC) E E F E * 
20. Strictly follow legal standards (PC) L LR LR L LR 
21. What is best for everyone (BL) F F F F F 
22. Guided by their own beliefs (PI) PM PM PM PM PM 
23. Obey company rules (PL) R LR LR * * 
24. Law is a major consideration (PC) L LR LR * LR 
25. Expected to work efficiently (EC) E E SR E * 
26. Do what is right for the customer (BC) SR SR SR SR SR 
27. View team spirit as important (BL) * * F * * 
28. Strong responsibility to the community (BC) SR SR F SR SR 
29. View decisions in terms of profit (EL) * * SI * * 
30. Concerned about customers’ interest (BC) SR SR SR SR SR 
31. What is best for employees (BL) F * F F * 
32. Primary concern is for the organisation (BI) F F F F F 
33. What is best for themselves (EI) * SI F SI SI 
34. Customer is primary concern (BC) SR SR SR SR SR 
35. Care for each individual (BI) F F F F F 
36. Efficient solutions sought (EC) E * F E * 
* Did not load highly on any one factor. 
Values in parenthesis represent theoretical dimensions, E – Egoism, B – Benevolence, P – Principle, I – Individual, L – Local, and C 
– Cosmopolitan. 
Study 1: (Cullen et al., 1993) SI – Self Interest, E – Efficiency, F – Friendship, SR – Social Responsibility, PM – Personal Morality, 
R – Rules, L – Laws. Study 2: (Vaicys et al., 1996) F – Team Spirit, LR – Rules and Codes, SR – Social Responsibility, SI – Self 
Interest, E – Efficiency, PM – Personal Morality. Study 3: (Wimbush et al., 1997) F – Caring, LR – Law and Rules, SR – Service, 
PM – Independence, SI – Instrumental. Study 4: (Trevino et al., 1988) F – Employee Focus, SR – Community Focus, SI – Self 
Interest, E – Efficiency, R – Rules, PM – Personal Ethics, LR – Law and Professional Codes. Study 5: (Agarwal and Malloy, 1999) 
F – Individual Caring, SI – Machiavellianism, PM – Independence, SR – Social Caring, LR – Law and Code. 
 
Source: Peterson (2002b), Table 2, p. 317 
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Cullen et al. (2003) examined the effects of dimensions of ethical climates on 
employees’ organisational commitment. Their study examined the effects of ECQ on 
two separate samples, i.e. non-union employees from seven departments of a telephone 
company (study 1) and members of four accounting organisations (study 2). As 
hypothesised, Cullen et al. (2003) found that both studies 1 and 2 showed that egoistic 
climate is negatively related to organisational commitment, and that the perceptions of 
benevolent climate are positively related to organisational commitment. Finally, 
perceptions of principle climate are positively related to organisational commitment for 
study 2 but not for study 1. Cullen et al. (2003) suggested that this could be due to 
professional workers having internalised the value of principle reasoning while 
executing their tasks. 
 
Peterson (2002a) examined the possibility of predicting various types of deviant 
workplace behaviour utilising the ECQ instrument. Workplace deviance has been 
defined as voluntary disclosure that contravenes norms of organisations and the effect 
will threaten the well-being or organisations and its members (Peterson, 2002a citing 
Robinson & Bennet, 1995). The study clearly indicated that deviant workplace 
behaviour could be predicted from the ethical climate of the organisation. The clearest 
relationship was between Political Deviance10 and a caring climate. This implies that 
when an organisation is concerned with the welfare of its members, the employees will 
be less likely to experience problems associated with Political Deviance (Peterson, 
2002a). The second classification was the category of Property Deviance11. This form of 
deviant behaviour was related to the rule and law dimension (Peterson, 2002a). The 
study indicates that organisations that do not emphasise stringent adherence to the 
company’s rule and laws are more susceptible to Property Deviance. The significant 
predictors of Production Deviance12 were the instrumental, independence and caring 
climates. The instrumental climate was positively correlated indicating that in 
organisations where employees are concerned with protecting their own self-interest, 
                                                     
10 A minor form of deviance directed at members of the organisation such as favouritism, gossiping and 
blaming co-workers (Peterson, 2002a). 
 
11 A serious form of deviant behaviour such as stealing from the company, damaging company’ property 
or padding expense accounts (Peterson, 2002a).  
 
12 A minor form of deviant behavior such as taking longer break, unproductive labour and worked on 
personal matters instead of business matters (Peterson, 2002a). 
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they were more likely to experience such deviance. Conversely, independence and 
caring climates were negatively correlated with Production Deviance. The final 
category, Personal Aggression13 provided the least consistent result, suggesting that it 
might be better explained by the characteristics of the individual committing the act 
rather than organisational ethical climate (Peterson, 2002a).  
 
Wimbush et al. (1997b) examined the relationship between ethical climate and ethical 
behaviour for the employees in a retail organisation. The employees’ ethical behaviour 
was measured using four vignettes constructed from a series of ethical situations that 
commonly occur in an organisation; (1) stealing, (2) lying, (3) disobeying company 
rules, and (4) being an accomplice. Participants in their study were asked to assume the 
role of decision maker indicating how they would behave in each scenario. Wimbush et 
al. (1997b) found that independence, caring, law and code, and service climates were all 
negatively related to ethical behaviour of either being an accomplice, disobedience, 
lying, and stealing behaviours as hypothesised. On the other hand, instrumental climate 
was positively related only to behaviour of being an accomplice. The study suggests that 
there is a relationship between ethical climate and ethical behaviour. Wimbush et al. 
(1997b) state that once the exact climate is known, management may be able to take 
appropriate action to counter any unethical behaviour stemming from the climate. 
 
3.2.1.3. Ethical climates and whistleblowing intentions 
 
The ethical climate of an organisation would influence organisational members to 
manage conflicts and make ethical decisions. With regards to whistleblowing, 
organisational climate theory can be used to show how reporting intentions are 
influenced by the organisations’ climate (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006, 2007a). Rothwell 
and Baldwin (2006, 2007a) have attempted the first and only studies to investigate the 
relationships between whistleblowing and five forms of ethical climate - instrumental, 
caring, rule, independence, and law and code.  
 
In their first study, Rothwell and Baldwin (2006) have utilised Victor & Cullen’s (1988) 
original 26-item ECQ instrument and used police officers and civilians as their samples. 
                                                     
13 A serious form of deviance such as cursing, sexual harassment or intimidating through threats 
(Peterson, 2002a).  
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Rothwell and Baldwin (2006) found that only instrumental, caring and rule climates 
demonstrate significant relationships with whistleblowing intention and action. 
Whistleblowing intentions among the respondents were gauged using vignettes that 
placed the respondents in hypothetical situations involving various acts of misconduct. 
As such, Rothwell and Baldwin (2006) concluded that ethical climates may have limited 
capacity to affect whistleblowing due to the complexities and sensitivity associated with 
whistleblowing. They acknowledged that their study did not control social desirable 
response, and due to infrequent exposure to workplace misconduct by their respondents, 
this could be the reason why ethical climate was not a valid predictor for 
whistleblowing. Furthermore, the fact that their samples were drawn from employees in 
public organisations might have made the ethical climate theory less generalisable to 
such an organisation, suggesting that future studies need to be conducted in private 
organisations (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006).  
 
In another study, Rothwell and Baldwin (2007a) used the 36-item ECQ to investigate 
the relationship between ethical climates and police whistleblowing on forms of 
misconduct. The factor analysis then loaded five factors which are identified as law and 
rules, friendship or team-interest, social responsibility, company profit or efficiency, 
and independence. The results of multiple regressions showed that among the ethical 
climates, only friendship or team climate could predict the willingness to blow the 
whistle.  
 
Studies have suggested that organisational ethical climate can be a significant factor in 
shaping the behaviour of its organisational members. Researchers contend that 
individual variables alone are not able to explain sufficiently individual ethical 
behaviour (Victor & Cullen, 1988; Wimbush et al., 1997a). Organisational conditions 
may affect an individual’s decision to whistleblow (Miceli & Near, 1984) and 
organisational variables such as ethical climate may provide a criterion for 
understanding, evaluating and resolving individual ethical dilemmas (Barnett & Vaicys, 
2000). However, previous empirical studies have shown that no organisation is expected 
to exhibit all nine theoretical climates (see Cullen et al., 2003; Cullen et al., 1993; 
Fritzsche, 2000; Peterson, 2002a; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006, 2007a; Wimbush et al., 
1997b). This is due to the loci of analysis, which are most often combined in unique 
ways for different organisations (Cullen et al., 1993). As such, consistent with Cullen et 
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al. (2003), this study offers a proposition based on the three basic criteria of moral 
judgment: egoistic, benevolent and principle.  
 
As stated in the previous chapter (section 2.2.2), a climate characterised as egoism can 
be expected to promote the organisational member to consider what is in his/her own 
self interest. Egoism is primarily based upon the notion of maximisation of self interest 
or rewards to oneself. The organisational member first examines the situation in 
question to determine his/her own best interest, regardless of whether others are affected 
by the decision made (Cullen et al., 2003). An egoistic climate signals to internal 
auditors that the organisation is supporting and endorsing self interested behaviours, 
even at the expense of others and in such a climate they may view the act to 
whistleblow as potentially harmful and will choose not to engage in it. The following 
sub-hypothesis is offered: 
 
Hypothesis 1(a): 
In an organisation with an ethical climate characterised by egoism, internal auditors 
will be less likely to whistleblow. 
 
A benevolence climate is characterised by the expectation that organisational members 
are concerned with the well-being of others both within and outside the organisation 
(Victor & Cullen, 1988). Because of this promotion of well-being, an internal auditor, if 
confronted with a non-routine ethical dilemma, will choose to dissent. The decision to 
dissent would come primarily from the concern about others, the organisation, and the 
problem that the wrongful act is violating its own climate. Therefore, the second sub-
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1(b): 
In an organisation with an ethical climate characterised by benevolence, internal 
auditors will be more likely to whistleblow. 
 
A principled climate is based on the belief that there are universal principles of right 
and wrong and ethical decisions are based upon the application or interpretation of 
rules, laws and standards (Victor & Cullen, 1988). If the organisation or its members are 
engaging in unethical behaviour, another member would then likely feel compelled to 
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dissent. In this situation the principles adhered to are more salient than the activities of 
the organisation. Cullen et al. (2003) state that when an organisation develops a 
principled climate, professionals (such as internal auditors) will more likely behave in 
congruence with internalised professional norms and values. Therefore, the third sub-
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1(c): 
In an organisation with an ethical climate characterised by principle, internal 
auditors will be more likely to whistleblow. 
 
3.2.2. Size of organisation 
 
The size of organisation could have an effect on other organisational characteristics 
(Barnett, 1992a). However, there have been mixed and conflicting views in previous 
theoretical and empirical studies concerning the effect of size of organisation in 
explaining employees’ whistleblowing behaviours. Theoretically, the bystander theory, 
a construct of prosocial behaviour theory, suggests that the incidence of whistleblowing 
would be lower in larger organisations than in the smaller ones. According to the theory, 
the larger the group of bystanders, the less likely any one bystander is to engage in 
prosocial behaviour to help out a victim. Latane and Darley (1968) used the term 
“diffusion of responsibility” to explain that the likelihood of a person intervening in an 
emergency situation will decrease should there be other people witnessing the event. If a 
person is alone when they notice such an emergency situation, they are solely 
responsible to cope with it, but if they believe that there are other people present, they 
may feel less responsible to take action and are less likely to offer assistance. The 
bystander theory would then suggest that, whistleblowing (intervention to an emergency 
situation) would be more likely to occur in small organisations than in larger 
organisations due to this diffusion of responsibility.  
 
Some studies have agreed with this statement and have prescribed a negative 
relationship between the size of organisation and the likelihood of whistleblowing. 
Their arguments were centred on the structure of the organisation itself. Larger 
companies tend to have a complex hierarchical structure, hence, G. King (1999) 
suggests that whistleblowing may be influenced by the organisation’s structure. He 
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contended that larger organisations possess a hierarchical, authoritarian and bureaucratic 
environment that may suppress communication to higher managements. His view is in 
agreement with Miethe (1999, p. 66) when citing previous research by indicating that, 
“... small, less formalized, less bureaucratic, and more participatory work environments 
may have a higher rate of internal whistleblowing ...”.  
 
Miceli and Near (1985) provide two reasons why larger organisations could hinder the 
whistleblowing process. First, large organisations are less dependent on any single 
employee than in small organisations. Employees in larger organisations believe that 
retaliation would occur should they report the wrongdoing and therefore resulting in the 
whistleblowers losing their jobs. Secondly, small organisations have shorter and fewer 
communication channels, thus encouraging the act of whistleblowing. Due to such 
circumstances, whistleblowing would be more likely to happen in smaller organisations. 
Miceli and Near (1992) cited a reason why internal whistleblowers would be more 
likely in smaller organisations. They argued that, employees in smaller organisations are 
more concerned with the wellbeing of the company, and therefore choose to minimise 
potential harm by reporting the wrongdoing through internal means. Keenan (2000) who 
performed an empirical study among executives and managers shared the same feeling, 
stating that individuals in smaller organisations usually feel more personally involved 
and affected by wrongdoings, than those in larger organisations.  
 
Other studies have contended that whistleblowing would be more likely in larger rather 
than smaller organisations (Barnett, 1992a; Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Dozier & Miceli, 
1985; Elliston et al., 1985; Near, Dworkin, & Miceli, 1993; Read & Rama, 2003). 
Barnett (1992a) explained that as larger organisations need to cope with pressures from 
various stakeholder groups, it is very difficult for the said organisation to act in a 
manner that could satisfy all those stakeholders. As such, contrary to G. King (1999), 
Barnett (1992a) suggested that as larger organisations are associated with complex and 
bureaucratic structures that may stifle effective communication, organisational size may 
then harness a higher level of external whistleblowing.   
 
This supports the contention made by Miceli and Near (1992) who argued that members 
from bureaucratic organisations as opposed to those in an open organisations are more 
likely to whistleblow externally because, “external parties are more likely than internal 
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parties to bring about change (Miceli & Near, 1992, p. 157) . Furthermore, due to the 
nature of large organisations which are associated with these complex and bureaucratic 
structures, it could be difficult for its members to maintain close relationships among 
themselves as compared to in smaller organisations (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006, 
2007a). Therefore, it is said that whistleblowing in larger organisations is easier as 
members in these larger organisations have few empathetic relationships, and the 
whistleblowing activity does not threaten their work and personal relationships 
(Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006, 2007a).  Larger organisations are also said to have 
established procedures to manage employees’ ethical concerns. Brennan and Kelly 
(2007, p. 67) in their study of whistleblowing among trainee auditors stated that “… 
more whistleblowing is expected in higher quality larger audit firms”, as larger firms are 
more likely to have formal structures to support employees’ whistleblowing concerns.   
 
However, previous empirical findings have been found to be contrary to the beliefs of 
bystander intervention theory. Though their study predicted that, internal 
whistleblowing is more likely in smaller organisations, Miceli and Near (1985) found 
the opposite. Using the 1980 MSPB survey, the study found that whistleblowers were 
more likely than non-whistleblowers to be members of large organisations. In their later 
study utilising survey data from 1983, Miceli and Near (1988) found that more frequent 
whistleblowing occurred among organisational members in larger workgroups.  As an 
explanation for this finding, Miceli and Near (1985) suggested that employees in 
smaller organisations are more concerned with their ability to report anonymously than 
are employees in larger organisations. In addition, these employees may be influenced 
by the pressure to remain silent or possibly, are personally known by the wrongdoer. 
The same finding was also reported in Keenan’s (2000) study.  
 
It can be seen that, a review of the literature found mixed support for the effect of the 
size of organisation in explaining employees’ ethical decision process. It is also 
interesting to note that some researchers support both sides of the issue at various times. 
Furthermore, previous studies found conflicting results about the association between 
size of organisation and whistleblowing. Empirical research suggests that size of 
organisation is positively associated with whistleblowing (Barnett, 1992a; Hooks et al., 
1994; Miceli & Near, 1985; Near & Miceli, 1996). However, a number of studies have 
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failed to observe this positive relationship (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; 
Read & Rama, 2003; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006, 2007a).  
 
This is the first empirical study conducted in Malaysian public listed companies 
concerning internal auditors’ ethical behaviour. The study suggests that as size of 
organisation is typically associated with complex and bureaucratic natures that suppress 
effective communication, size of organisation may be associated with lower levels of 
internal whistleblowing. As such, consistent with the argument on bystander theory, the 
following hypothesis is suggested: 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
The internal auditors’ intentions to whistleblow will be negatively associated with size 
of organisations.  
 
3.2.3. Job levels 
 
Whistleblowing represents an influence process (Near & Miceli, 1995) as individuals 
may exercise their power in order to change the behaviour of other organisational 
members. Therefore, power theories seem to be useful in explaining this phenomenon 
(Miceli et al., 2008; Near & Miceli, 1995). The extent that an individual is able to 
highlight and mitigate the act of wrongdoing will partly depend on the power he or she 
possesses in the organisation (Graham, 1986; Near & Miceli, 1995). This may explain 
the findings from other studies as highlighted by Miceli and Near (1992) on why a 
majority of individuals who observe organisational wrongdoing chose not to report it, 
probably due to possessing lack of power. 
 
Based on the minority influence literature (one of the perspectives in power theories as 
highlighted by Near and Miceli (1995)), Greenberger et al. (1987) suggest that 
whistleblowers who have credibility, will have greater influence and are more likely to 
persuade others to terminate organisational wrongdoings. According to Near & Miceli 
(1990), credibility comes from the power that enables such individuals to react. Power, 
as defined by Etzioni (1961, p. 227) refers to as “an actor’s ability to induce or influence 
another actor to carry out his directives or any other norms he supports” that may be 
used to influence other organisational members.  Studies have demonstrated that 
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powerful members may influence the decision of other members whether to support 
whistleblowing (Greenberger et al., 1987). Another perspective of power theory was 
derived from French and Raven’s (1959) classic discussion of individual power bases 
(Near & Miceli, 1995). Consistent with the minority influence literature, whistleblowers 
who possess referent power or charisma, such as those at higher levels of organisations 
or those in role-prescribed whistleblowing positions such as internal auditors, may be 
seen as more credible organisational members than others (Near & Miceli, 1995). It is 
suggested that, individuals who hold important positions in an organisation may be 
more likely to whistleblow (Miceli, Near, & Dozier, 1991).  
 
As such, holding a supervisory status or higher managerial level in organisation may 
influence whistleblowing activity as Miceli and Near (1984) indicated that position 
reflects the degree of power and minimises risk to challenge organisational authority. 
Persons holding higher managerial levels are usually seen as persons who set the ethical 
climate and culture for their subordinates and have more power and authority than other 
employees in organisations (Keenan, 2000, 2002b; Keenan & Krueger, 1992). Apart 
from that, those who hold a supervisory position are often held responsible for 
regulating employees’ behaviour and enforcing standards (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006, 
2007a, 2007b). The role prescriptions of supervisors have mandated them to report 
misconduct, and blowing the whistle is said to be consistent with that role (Rothwell & 
Baldwin, 2007a). Therefore, it is expected that those who hold a supervisory status at 
higher managerial level are seen to be more responsible for reporting cases of 
wrongdoing and unethical acts than are employees at lower levels. 
 
Studies by Rothwell and Baldwin (2006, 2007a, 2007b) have investigated the 
willingness and actions of police officers in the State of Georgia in the United States 
regarding their propensity to blow the whistle. They found that supervisory status is the 
most consistent predictor of whistleblowing intentions and behaviour in reporting for 
minor violations, major violations and misdemeanours. Several studies of 
whistleblowing and supervisory status (Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 1989; Miceli & Near, 
1984) also reveal positive associations between these variables. Other than that, prior 
research by Keenan (2002a, 2002b, 2007) suggests that different managerial levels i.e. 
upper-level, middle-level and first-level managers have different perceptions towards 
whistleblowing. Keenan’s studies found that there existed significant differences across 
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the three managerial levels with upper-level managers being more positive about 
whistleblowing and more likely to whistleblow than their middle-level and first-level 
manager counterparts. Upper-level managers, by virtue of a position that is near to the 
top of organisations, have more authority and power than other types of managerial 
levels (Keenan, 2002b).  
 
The Keenan, and Rothwell and Baldwin studies, however, do not take into consideration 
the status of wrongdoers when examining the effect of supervisory status or managerial 
levels towards the organisational wrongdoings. This study seeks to understand whether 
the likelihood of internally blowing the whistle on various kinds of wrongdoing (as 
depicted by the various types of vignettes) as well as by various types of status of 
wrongdoer, differ according to internal auditors’ different job level. The study extends 
this line of research by examining the differences between junior level internal auditors, 
seniors, managers and those higher than the manager level with respect to their internal 
whistleblowing behaviours. It is thus expected that the likelihood to whistleblow will be 
positively associated with internal auditors holding higher job levels as compared to 
those who do not. Therefore, the following hypothesis is offered: 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
Internal auditors holding higher managerial positions are more likely to whistleblow 
than those in lower managerial positions. 
 
3.3. Individual factors 
 
Research has shown that characteristics of individuals are also relevant for influencing 
decisions about blowing the whistle (MacNab & Worthley, 2008; Mclain & Keenan, 
1999; Miceli & Near, 1984; Near & Miceli, 1990; Sims & Keenan, 1998). As 
whistleblowing is one option for individuals observing potential wrongdoing within an 
organisation, it is important to understand individual characteristics that may influence 
one’s propensity to whistleblow internally. Past studies have hypothesised a number of 
intrapersonal traits. The present study will examine individuals’ ethical judgment, locus 
of control and organisational commitment.  
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3.3.1. Ethical judgment 
 
Ethical judgment has been stated in many ethical decision-making models as a variable 
that may influence individuals’ behavioural intentions (Hunt & Vitell, 2006; Patel, 
2003; Trevino, 1986). Previous research however, has measured individual ethical 
judgment merely by using a single scale anchored by phrases such as “ethical/unethical” 
(Patel, 2003). The problem with using a single scale measurement in asking a complex 
question such as in ethics studies may question the validity of the results (J. R. Cohen, 
Pant, & Sharp, 1993).  
 
Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1990) noted this limitation and suggested that individuals 
use more than one rationale and may utilise a relativist, deontological, utilitarian or 
other criteria in making ethical judgments. Thus, by using merely a single measure, 
Reidenbach and Robin argued that researchers are not able to reveal this kind of 
information and advocate the use of a multidimensional approach. They assert that, 
“individuals use more than one rationale in making ethical judgments, and that the 
importance of those rationales is a function of the problem situation faced by the 
individual” (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990, p. 639). Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1990) 
then developed a Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) that comprises the following 
three dimensions; Moral Equity, Relativism and, Contractualism, each arranged 
according to their theoretical importance.  
 
Prior studies have suggested that the moral equity, relativism and contractualism 
dimensions provide an understanding of why a particular behaviour is judged as either 
ethical or unethical. In particular, these studies have shown that individuals have used 
these three philosophical dimensions for evaluating ethical contents. The selection of 
these three dimensions as noted by Reidenbach and Robin (1990, p. 640):  
 
“... encompass most of the “great” ideas for social survival, not just from the area of moral 
philosophy, but also from religion. Ideas of fairness, justice, contract, duty, consequence, 
greatest good and many others that come from the five philosophies can be found in the Bible, 
the Koran, the writings of Buddha, and in other religions”. 
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Various empirical studies have justified the use of MES as the instrument provides 
greater explanatory power than the single-attribute measure (McMahon & Harvey, 
2007; Patel, 2003; Reidenbach & Robin, 1990) and is capable of eliciting complex 
judgments such as behavioural intentions (Flory, Phillips, Reidenbach, & Robin, 1992; 
Reidenbach & Robin, 1990; Tuttle, Harrell, & Harrison, 1997; Tuttle, Harrell, & 
Jackson, 1997) including whistleblowing behaviour (Chiu, 2002, 2003; Patel, 2003).   
 
3.3.1.1. Ethical judgment and ethical behaviour 
 
The MES was originally developed by Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1990) to 
understand an individual’s ethical decision-making in marketing activities. Since then, 
the MES is one of the most commonly used variables in ethics research (Ayers & 
Kaplan, 2005; Ellis & Griffith, 2001; Flory et al., 1992; Nguyen, Basuray, Smith, 
Kopka, & McCulloh, 2008a, 2008b). 
 
In a study examining individuals’ reporting intentions subsequent to the discovery of 
wrongdoing by information systems consultants, Ayers and Kaplan  (2005) examined 
their subjects’ reporting intentions under both anonymity and non-anonymity 
conditions. The Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1990) MES model was utilised in order 
to determine the ability of this model to explain individuals’ reporting intentions. The 
moral equity dimension was found to be significantly associated with a normal reporting 
channel, but not with the anonymous channel. Neither the relativism nor the 
contractualism dimensions appeared to influence reporting intentions under either 
reporting channel. Ayers and Kaplan  (2005) concluded that the MES has less ability to 
explain individual behaviour, contrary to the findings from previous studies. 
 
Similarly, Nguyen et al. (2008b) asked undergraduate students to provide ethical 
judgment in their study by incorporating three ethical dilemmas. The study found that 
their participants were consistent in applying the moral equity and relativism 
dimensions when judging the ethicality of the said dilemmas, however, these 
participants were not consistent in judging the contractualism dimension. Nguyen et al. 
(2008b) suggest that this was due to these participants putting least weight on the 
contractualism dimension when judging the ethicality of an action.  
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Such outcomes in both Ayers and Kaplan  (2005) and Nguyen et al. (2008b) studies 
could be attributed to the type of ethical dilemmas that they utilised in their studies. 
Ellis and Griffith (2001), who had the same inconsistent MES results in their study, 
have clarified that the MES could be useful in cases where there are strong, clear and 
obvious legal issues perceived by subjects. Such inconsistent results were, however, 
apparent in accounting or auditing studies.    
 
Since its inception, the MES has been useful in business ethics research, but its 
application in accounting ethical issues has been very limited (Lin & Ho, 2008). Flory et 
al. (1992) were perhaps the pioneers in the use of MES in accounting research. They 
used MES to study how and why accountants made certain ethical judgments. Their 
study provided evidence that the moral equity, relativism and contractualism 
dimensions were being implicitly drawn by accountants in evaluating ethical issues in 
accounting.  More importantly, they found that the scales for each dimension on each of 
the four scenarios used in their research have high reliability coefficients and high 
content validity for the three-multidimensional measure. In addition, in each of the four 
scenarios used in the research, the MES “accounted for more “explained” variance than 
the univariate measure by 7 to 12 percentage points” (Flory et al., 1992, p. 296). 
Consequently, Flory et al. (1992) recommended the use of the MES for future research 
on ethical judgement in accounting studies. 
 
Thereafter, to further adapt the MES to accounting ethics research, researchers have 
extended the MES with accounting-specific scenarios to examine accountants’ or 
accounting students’ ethical decision making about performing questionable actions 
(see J. R. Cohen et al., 1993; J. R. Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1996, 1998, 2001; Patel, 2003; 
Shawver, 2008; Shawver & Clements, 2008; Shawver & Sennetti, 2009). There is still, 
however, a dearth of research in which MES has been applied to compare internal 
auditors’ ethical perceptions. 
 
3.3.1.2. Ethical judgment and whistleblowing intentions 
 
Reidenbach and Robin’s (1990) MES scale was also used by Chiu (2002, 2003) in  
studies investigating the individual and joint influences of ethical judgment of a 
behaviour on whistleblowing intentions of Chinese managers and professionals.  Chiu 
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suggests that the individual’s evaluation of the ethicality of whistleblowing may 
influence his or her decision whether or not to engage in such behaviour. Utilising the 
summed total of Reidenbach and Robin’s ethical judgment scale, results of those studies 
indicate a strong positive relationship between judgments of the ethicality of 
whistleblowing and whistleblowing intentions. Patel (2003) extended the 
multidimensional measure of MES in examining the cultural influences of professional 
judgments of Australian, Indian and Chinese-Malaysian accountants in relation to 
whistleblowing. Using two whistleblowing scenarios adapted from the previous study, 
Patel found that the MES would provide insight into complex elements involved in 
ethical and professional judgments in cross-cultural settings. 
 
As a summary, previous studies have shown all the dimensions of ethical judgment to 
be significantly associated with behavioural intentions in the various types of scenarios 
examined (J. R. Cohen et al., 1996; Flory et al., 1992; Reidenbach & Robin, 1990; 
Tuttle, Harrell, & Harrison, 1997). The relationship between dimensions of ethical 
judgment and whistleblowing or reporting intentions have also been examined 
empirically in studies conducted by Ayers and Kaplan  (2005), Patel (2003) and Chiu 
(2002, 2003). These studies found that the moral equity, relativism and contractualism 
dimensions show a positive association with other types of behavioural or 
whistleblowing intentions.  
 
The most complex of the three dimensions, Moral Equity, is derived from the ethical 
philosophy of justice theory (Patel, 2003). Moral equity is defined as the individual 
perception of fairness and justice as well as what is right and wrong, in its broadest 
sense (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990). This dimension measures individuals’ perceptions 
about whether such behaviour is fair, just, morally right and acceptable. This dimension 
is grounded in Aristotle’s principle of formal justice that holds that equals ought to be 
treated equally whereas unequals ought to be treated unequally (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005, 
p. 125).  
 
The pioneer study by Reidenbach and Robin (1990) indicates that the moral equity 
dimension was significantly associated with individual behavioural intentions in each of 
the three business scenarios examined. Subsequently, in an accounting related study, 
Flory et al. (1992) found that the moral equity dimension was significantly associated 
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with the individuals’ behavioural intentions in each of four management accounting 
scenarios they examined. J. R. Cohen et al. (1996) found that the moral equity 
dimension was significantly associated with behavioural intentions in seven of the eight 
business vignettes they tested. Similarly, Tuttle, Harrell, and Harrison (1997) found that 
the dimension was significantly associated with intentions to implement an information 
system with known problems.  Finally, Ayers and Kaplan  (2005) found the moral 
equity dimension to be significantly associated with a normal reporting channel but not 
with the anonymous reporting channel. Based on this collection of findings, the study 
proposes a sub- hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4(a): 
The higher the moral equity dimension in ethical judgment, the more likely internal 
auditors will whistleblow. 
 
Relativism is defined as perception of what is right versus wrong based on guidelines or 
parameters embedded in the social or cultural culture system rather than individual 
consideration (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990). The relativism dimension consists of two 
attributes: “Culturally acceptable/Unacceptable” and “Traditionally acceptable 
/Unacceptable” that are also ranked in theoretical importance. The essence of relativism 
is that cultural values are important in defining individual ethical beliefs (Patel, 2003).  
 
Reidenbach and Robin (1990) indicate that the relativism dimension was significantly 
associated with individuals’ behavioural intention in two of the three business scenarios 
they examined. Results from Flory et al. (1992) and Tuttle, Harrell, and Jackson (1997) 
also indicate strong support for this association. J. R. Cohen et al. (1996) found support 
in five of the eight vignettes examined, while in Ayers and Kaplan’s  (2005) study, the 
relativism dimension did not appear to influence reporting intention under either 
reporting channel. Such an explanation could be attributed to the vignettes employed in 
Ayers and Kaplan’s  (2005) study, as explained by Ellis and Griffith (2001), which do 
not pose individual harm. As such, the following hypothesis proposes that: 
 
Hypothesis 4(b): 
The higher the relativism dimension in ethical judgment, the more likely internal 
auditors will whistleblow. 
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The last dimension, contractualism, is defined as individual perception of what is right 
versus wrong based on notions of an implied contract that exists between business and 
society (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990). This dimension comprises two attributes ranked in 
terms of theoretical importance: “Violates/Does not violate an unwritten contract” and 
“Violates/Does not violate an unspoken promise”. These attributes are derived from the 
philosophy of deontology and focus on the importance of ethics in social contracts 
(Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Patel, 2003).  
 
The results from Reidenbach and Robin (1990), Flory et al. (1992) and J. R. Cohen et 
al. (1996) all found strong support for the association between the contractualism 
dimension and individuals’ behavioural intentions. Tuttle, Harrell, and Jackson (1997) 
and Ayers and Kaplan  (2005) however report that such an association does not exist in 
their studies. Ellis and Griffith (2001) explain that, the contractualism dimension will 
provide useful information in cases where there appear to be strong, clear and obvious 
legal issues. This could be the reason for the findings in both, Tuttle, Harrell, and 
Jackson’s (1997) and Ayers and Kaplan’s  (2005) studies. As such: 
 
Hypothesis 4(c): 
The higher the contractualism dimension in ethical judgment, the more likely 
internal auditors will whistleblow. 
 
3.3.2. Locus of control 
 
Another individual characteristic that may explain the probability of individual 
whistleblowing behaviour is Rotter’s (1966) locus of control. Locus of control, also 
known as “internal versus external control of reinforcement”, is one of the most studied 
variables in psychology and the social sciences (Rotter, 1990) and is considered as an 
important personality variable for the explanation of human behaviour in organisational 
settings (Donnelly, Quirin, & O'Bryan, 2003; Spector, 1982). Rotter (1966) explains 
that, locus of control is a bipolar one-dimensional construct where the internal and 
external locus of control are opposites.   
 
Internal versus external control refers to the degree to which individuals expect that a 
reinforcement or an outcome of their behaviour is contingent on their own behaviour or 
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personal characteristics versus the degree to which individuals expect that the 
reinforcement or outcome is a function of chance, luck or fate, is under the control of 
powerful others, or is simply unpredictable (Rotter, 1966). In a simpler explanation, a 
person with “internal” locus of control is more likely to rely on his/her own 
determination of what is right and wrong and is more likely to accept responsibility for 
the consequences of his or her behaviours. Meanwhile, a person with “external” locus of 
control believes that life is beyond one’s control as it is due to fate, luck or destiny, and 
is less likely to take personal responsibility for the consequences (Trevino, 1986). 
Briefly, external locus of control is typically associated with a less ethical perspective 
on life, while internal locus of control has been linked to more ethical decisions 
(Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). 
 
3.3.2.1. Locus of control and ethical behaviour 
 
Spector (1982) discusses locus of control within the context of organisation. He 
predicted that, internals exert more control over their surroundings when this leads to 
desired ends and are more likely to hold higher expectations and possess higher levels 
of self-esteem. Externals, in contrast, are expected to be more compliant with social 
demand and directive supervision. The theory of locus of control has proven to be a 
successful measure to test differences in predicting individuals’ behaviour in many 
different populations (Rotter, 1990) and has been used with success in examining 
individuals’ behaviour in numerous studies (see Cherry, 2006; Donnelly et al., 2003; 
Siu, Spector, Cooper, & Donald, 2001; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990).  
 
In a cross-cultural study, Cherry (2006) incorporated the locus of control construct to 
understand the dynamics of ethical decision-making among Taiwanese and U.S. 
businessmen. He posited that as Taiwan is a collectivistic society which posseses the 
Individual/Collectivism dimension of Hofstede’s (1980a, 1991) well-known Theory of 
International Culture, it exerts more externally oriented control (Cherry, 2006). By 
using a vignette requesting respondents to pay a bribe to gain entry into a foreign 
market, the Taiwanese were found to have a higher external locus of control than their 
U.S. counterparts. The study found significant differences of ethical decision-making 
between these two sample groups.  The Taiwanese were found to have a favourable 
attitude towards the requested bribe compared to the U.S. respondents, consistent with 
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Trevino and Youngblood’s (1990) suggestion that externals traits are associated with 
less ethical behaviour. 
 
The examination of the role of locus of control in auditing study, according to  Donnelly 
et al. (2003), has remained very limited. Donnelly et al. (2003) examined the 
characteristics of auditors towards another form of ethical concern, dysfunctional audit 
behaviour14, which is a great concern to the auditing profession. Donnelly et al. (2003) 
suggested that there was a positive correlation between an individual’s external locus of 
control and his/her willingness to engage in a dysfunctional audit behaviour. Utilising a 
total of 205 auditors from a cross-section of ten public accounting firms, their study 
found a significant positive association. They then suggested that locus of control is an 
important attribute in determining the needs of individual auditors in mitigating the 
audit quality reduction behaviours (Donnelly et al., 2003).  
 
In a study examining the mechanisms by which age could be related to work well-being, 
Siu et al. (2001) found that older managers reported fewer sources of stress, better 
coping and a more internal locus of control, than their younger colleagues. They 
acknowledged that the locus of control variable is a significant explanatory variable for 
examining organisational members’ behaviour, consistent with prior theory and research 
in ethics studies. 
 
3.3.2.2. Locus of control and whistleblowing intentions 
 
Locus of control might have an influence on the decision of employees to whistleblow. 
In whistleblowing studies, Curtis and Taylor (2009, p. 192) stressed that “the personal 
characteristic of locus of control is a significant antecedent of likelihood to 
whistleblow”. As whistleblowing is considered as an ethical act, it is expected that a 
would-be whistleblower is likely to have internal locus of control traits. Moreover, past 
researchers have associated that internals are more likely than externals to engage in 
prosocial behaviour (Miceli, Near, & Dozier, 1991; Spector, 1982). Therefore, 
researchers (Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Miceli, Near, & Dozier, 1991; Miceli et al., 2008; 
                                                     
14 Dysfunctional audit behavior is a form of audit quality reduction behavior such as prematurely signing 
–off an audit report or underreporting of audit findings. 
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Near & Miceli, 1985) predict that internal locus of control will be more likely to 
whistleblow.  
 
Miceli, Near, and Dozier (1991) attempted to measure the relationship of locus of 
control to whistleblowing in a controlled field experiment. They predicted that internal 
locus of control would be negatively related to whistleblowing because of its association 
with prosocial behaviour. However, no significant relationship was found. The relation 
between locus of control and intention to blow the whistle contradicts their proposition, 
in which locus of control had no main effect on students’ propensity to report 
wrongdoing by a ‘research assistant’ to their university’s ‘research committee’ 
representative. Miceli, Near, and Dozier (1991) suggest that the distinction between 
internals and externals in their study appeared to be irrelevant under the condition of 
threat of retaliation.  
 
Chiu (2003), in his study of whistleblowing intentions among Chinese managers, used 
locus of control within the context of theory of planned behaviour as the measure of 
perceived behavioural control. He found that Chinese managers with an internal locus 
of control were more likely to blow the whistle compared to those with an external 
locus of control. Chiu (2003) explained that the Chinese managers in his study would 
more likely whistleblow when they believed that the situation was deemed as unethical 
and if they were in control of the situation. This is an exact contrast with the finding in 
Cherry’s (2006) study regarding ethicality, as discussed earlier. However, the major 
difference in the attitudes regarding the ethicality of an issue between the Chinese and 
Taiwanese sample in both studies could be due to the type of vignettes used in their 
studies. Chiu (2003) used a vignette about a manager about to whistleblow regarding a 
major corruption that he observed in his company, while Cherry’s (2006) vignette was 
about paying a bribe to gain entry into a foreign market. Moreover, Chiu’s (2003) study 
is consistent with a more recent study conducted by Curtis and Taylor (2009).  Curtis 
and Taylor (2009) found that locus of control was a significant antecedent to 
whistleblowing intentions among U.S. public accountants. Auditors with internal traits 
were more likely to whistleblow than auditors with external traits. 
 
Relevant studies have advocated that as whistleblowing is a prosocial behaviour (Dozier 
& Miceli, 1985; Miceli, Near, & Dozier, 1991), the individual who has internal locus of 
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control is more likely to engage in whistleblowing behaviour (Chiu, 2003; Curtis & 
Taylor, 2009; Miceli et al., 2008). Those with external locus of control are said to be 
less likely to take personal responsibility for the consequences. Therefore, based on the 
relevant literature concerning locus of control, the study expects that internal auditors 
will demonstrate similar behaviour and offer the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: 
Internal auditors with internal locus of control will be more likely to whistleblow. 
 
3.3.3. Organisational commitment 
 
Research has also extensively examined the relationship between the organisational 
commitment variables and individuals’ ethical behaviour. Organisational commitment is 
defined as the relative strength of an individual’s identification and involvement in a 
particular organisation (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979). Accordingly, organisational 
commitment can be characterised by three factors: “(1) a strong belief in and acceptance 
of the organization’s goals and values, (2) a willingness to exert considerable effort on 
behalf of the organization, and (3) a definite desire to maintain organizational 
membership” (Porter, Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974, p. 604). Porter et al. (1974) 
developed a 15-item questionnaire to measure levels of organisational commitment 
among individuals, which is an important measure used in behavioural studies. 
 
Theoretical and conceptual works on organisational commitment have pointed out that 
individuals showcasing higher organisational commitment basically resemble prosocial 
behaviour directed to organisations (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Mowday, Porter, & 
Steers, 1982).  Mowday et al. (1982, p. 27) justified that organisationally committed 
individuals “are willing to give something of themselves in order to contribute to the 
organization’s well-being”. As such, studies involving a variety of professions, 
including management accountants (Somers & Casal, 1994), MBA executives (Pool & 
Pool, 2007), senior managers (Y.-J. Chen, 2007) as well as internal auditors (Kwon & 
Banks, 2004), have shown that various types of ethical behaviours are related to 
organisational commitment.  
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3.3.3.1. Organisational commitment and ethical behaviour 
 
Studies have indicated that organisational commitment is a viable predictor for many 
behaviours, including turnover intentions (Donnelly et al., 2003), job satisfaction  (Y.-J. 
Chen, 2007), motivation levels (Pool & Pool, 2007) and whether the variables 
impacting organisational commitment differ from those influencing professional 
commitment (Kwon & Banks, 2004) .  
 
Organisational commitment has also been used as an antecedent in studies predicting 
employees’ turnover intentions. Donnelly et al., (2003) found that auditors who report 
lower organisational commitment are more likely to express intention to leave their 
organisations. With regards to the effect on job satisfaction, Chen’s (2007) study 
exploring the impact of service orientation, employed by Taiwan’s international tourist 
hotels, found that job satisfaction is positively corrrelated with organisational 
commitment. Meanwhile, work by Pool and Pool (2007) showed that there was a 
significant and positive relationship betweeen MBA’s executives’ organisational 
commitment and their motivation level, thus enabling them to pursue organisational 
goals for the business.  
 
Kwon and Banks (2004) examined factors that lead internal auditors to become 
committed to their organisation and profession. Kwon and Banks (2004) interests were 
spurred by relatively little research having been directed to the internal auditing 
profession in this area. Results showed that factors influencing internal auditors’ 
organisational commitment were different from those influencing their professional 
commitment. Their study found that there are a different set of variables that affect 
internal auditors’ organisational commitment and that these also differ from the findings 
for other professions. It appears that respondents, with internal auditor certification, 
have less organisational commitment to their organisation than their commitment to 
their profession. Kwon and Banks (2004) suggested that it could be due to such internal 
auditors having more job mobility than those who do not have internal auditor 
certification. 
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3.3.3.2. Organisational commitment and whistleblowing intentions 
 
Street (1995) has attempted to directly link the concept of organisational commitment to 
the likelihood of whistleblowing. He contended that theoretical models of 
whistleblowing studies have acknowledged the potential influence of such a variable 
(see Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Graham, 1986; Miceli & Near, 1988; Near & Miceli, 
1985). There was little empirical research on organisational commitment in 
whistleblowing studies (Street, 1995). Street (1995) argued that if individuals have a 
high organisational commitment, they are more likely to display prosocial behaviour of 
whistleblowing than those having  a lower organisational commitment. However, Street 
(1995) only proposed a theoretical relationship and argues for the development of an 
empirical study to test such proposition. 
 
Somers and Casal (1994) had empirically examined the direct relationship between 
organisational commitment and the willingness of management accountants to 
whistleblow.  Using Mowday et al.’s (1979) Organisational Commitment Questionnaire 
to measure organisational commitment, they found that their subjects’ organisational 
commitment affects the probability that an observed wrongdoing is reported to internal 
targets (persons to whom organisational wrongdoing is reported), but such commitment 
was unrelated to reporting to external targets. More specifically, the relationship 
between commitment and the propensity to whistleblow takes the form of an inverted U, 
suggesting that moderate levels of organisational commitment are most likely to result 
in whistleblowing. Somers and Casal (1994) suggested that organisational commitment 
increases the likelihood of whistleblowing as the whistleblowers that are characterised 
as reformers15 wish to put their organisations back on course. Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran (2005) also tested that theory. They expected organisational commitment 
to be positively related to both reporting intention and actual reporting. Their study 
failed to find significant results. Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) reported that 
differences between internal and external reporting may account for their results.  
 
Theoretical and empirical studies of whistleblowing have acknowledged that 
organisational commitment can directly influence willingness to whistleblow (Dozier & 
                                                     
15 Reformers are committed employees who wish to stop organisational wrongdoings from damaging the 
organisation (Somers & Casal, 1994). 
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Miceli, 1985; Miceli & Near, 1988; Near & Miceli, 1985; Street, 1995). This is because 
individuals who have a high organisational commitment level  will be more likely to 
display prosocial behaviour than those who have low organisational commitment (Brief 
& Motowidlo, 1986). Near and Miceli (1985) suggest that internal reporters will 
demonstrate high levels of firm loyalty in their initial decision to report. Furthermore, 
Kwon and Banks (2004) have acknowledged that, little research has examined the 
application of the organisational commitment and its impact on the behaviour of internal 
auditors. More research in this area will increase the importance of the internal audit 
function within the organisation, hence fulfilling the shortfall. Thus, the next hypothesis 
is: 
 
Hypothesis 6: 
Internal auditors with higher organisational commitment will be more likely to 
whistleblow. 
 
3.4. Situational Factors 
 
Research shows that situational factors also contribute to the likelihood of 
whistleblowing. The two specific factors that will be examined in this study are 
seriousness of wrongdoing and status of the wrongdoer.  
 
3.4.1. Seriousness of wrongdoing 
 
One important example of situational criteria is the nature and severity of the 
wrongdoing (Miethe, 1999). The seriousness of the wrongdoing is akin to one of the six 
components in Jones’s (1991) moral intensity model. The seriousness of the 
wrongdoing item was identified by Jones (1991) in his model as a magnitude of 
consequences. Jones (1991) suggested that the magnitude of consequences is related to 
the extent of the consequences of a moral issue, and proposed that the moral intensity of 
an issue is high if the consequences are greater, rather than fewer. Though not 
specifically testing the Jones model, other studies have found that, the more serious the 
issue, the greater the likelihood of whistleblowing behaviour (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; 
Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Miceli & Near, 1985; Near & Miceli, 1996; Schultz et al., 
1993). Specifically, type of wrongdoing and its perceived severity have been found to 
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be significantly related to whistleblowing (Miceli & Near, 1985; Miceli, Near, & 
Schwenk, 1991; Near & Miceli, 1996; Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004).  Each 
type of wrongdoing is in some way unique (Miceli et al., 2008, p. 47) and Miceli, Near, 
and Schwenk (1991, p. 118) suggest that, “organizational members may have different 
reactions to different types of wrongdoing”. In their survey of a large military base, 
Near et al.’s, (2004) study found that employees who observed perceived wrongdoing 
involving mismanagement, sexual harassment, or unspecified legal violations were 
significantly more likely to report it than were employees who observed stealing, waste, 
safety problems, or discrimination. 
 
Whether or not organisational members react to report any form of wrongdoings may 
depend on who is gaining from such acts.  Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991) added that 
if a wrongdoing is undertaken merely to benefit the individual, such as theft, this may 
evoke organisational members to respond. This is due to the act of theft being 
considered as only enriching the culprits themselves, as well as potentially damaging 
the organisation’s bottom-line. However, if the wrongdoing is committed for the benefit 
of the organisation, it may lessen the likelihood for organisational members to report. A 
good example is the release of a fraudulent corporate financial report, as it may be seen 
as an initiative to polish corporate image or to increase profit in order to facilitate 
employees’ bonus payments. Therefore, the facts of the case may influence the 
individual’s propensity to blow the whistle. The case refers to the type of wrongdoing 
that allegedly occur within an organisation and may range from petty theft to misleading 
financial statements (Near & Miceli, 1990). Near and Miceli (1990) found that 
whistleblowing effectiveness was associated with types of wrongdoing that benefited a 
small group of employees, such as stealing and embezzlement committed by employees. 
Such acts are much easier to address through termination of employment compared to 
trying to correct organisational activities that may enhance profits.   
 
As such, previous studies using case scenarios have shown that whistleblowing 
behaviour is related to the facts of the case (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Kaplan & Schultz, 
2007; Schultz et al., 1993). Kaplan and Shultz (2007) provided evidence that 
individual’s reporting intentions are influenced by the nature of the case. Their study 
focused primarily on the characteristics of the wrongdoing and investigated the 
reporting behaviour across three different cases involving financial fraud, theft and poor 
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quality work. Kaplan and Shultz (2007) found that economic and non-economic factors 
shown in the three cases resulted in significant differences in their subjects reporting 
intentions. In an earlier study, Schultz et al. (1993) used an experimental approach to 
examine the reporting intentions of managers and professional staff members in three 
different countries (France, Norway and United States).  For each of six hypothetical 
scenarios, participants were required to assess the seriousness of the act and then 
indicate their reporting intentions. Schultz’s et al. (1993) results showed that seriousness 
was significantly related to the reporting intentions of the pooled sample containing all 
participants from these three countries. 
 
Similar results were also found in Ayers and Kaplan’s  (2005) study. Using a similar 
experimental approach (via hypothetical case scenarios) they found that perceptions 
about the seriousness of wrongdoings are related to reporting of such wrongdoing in 
both anonymous and non-anonymous reporting channels. Other ethics studies utilising 
case scenarios or vignettes have consistently shown that seriousness of the case is 
significantly related with individuals’ reporting or whistleblowing intentions (see 
Curtis, 2006; E. Z. Taylor & Curtis, 2010). Therefore, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7: 
The more serious the wrongdoing, the higher the influence on internal auditors’ 
intentions to whistleblow.  
 
3.4.2. Status of wrongdoer 
 
The status of organisational members who commit corporate wrongdoings or illegal acts 
may also influence the propensity of observers to whistleblow (Miceli, Rehg, Near, & 
Ryan, 1999; Miethe, 1999).  Miethe (1999) states that the propensity for observers to 
report the wrongdoing may depend on the observers’ perception that the reporting will 
result in corrective action and the particular position held by the wrongdoer in the 
organisational hierarchy. Wrongdoing committed by organisational members of a higher 
status, such as top management, may not easily be addressed through termination of 
employment (Near & Miceli, 1990). If the wrongdoer sits at a higher hierarchical level 
within an organisation, he or she may have enough power to suppress whistleblowing. 
72 
 
As such, Miceli et al. (1999) match the importance of the power of the wrongdoer to the  
observer’s intentions to whistleblow. Miceli et al. (1999) alluded to the importance of 
power by drawing on Black’s (1976) sociological theory of justice: 
 
“The theory considers the act of a subordinate blowing the whistle on a supervisor as deviant 
behavior and a more serious offense in a socially stratified society. According to Black (1976, p. 
28), “upward deviance” (that is directed from a person of lower status toward one higher in 
status) is the most serious kind of deviant behavior; it is most likely to evoke the greatest 
sanction.” (Miceli et al., 1999, p. 147).  
 
More specifically, Cortina and Magley (2003) cautioned that exposing the misbehaviour 
of a higher status individual in organisational hierachy actually questions that hierachy. 
Near et al. (1993) added that the dominant coalation in organisational hierachy, 
including the wrongdoer, may retaliate against the whistleblower to correct this 
challenge against organisational higher authority. Furthermore, other organisational 
members who are close and supportive of the whistleblower would respond with 
distance and rejection, particularly when a powerful wrongdoer is involved, as they may 
fear reprisals for aligning with the less powerful (and thus more deviant) whistleblower. 
This group may also retaliate as a means of signaling to the whistleblower that he or she 
has deviated from behavior prescribed by social-structural norms (Miceli & Near, 
1992). 
 
Another point that also needs to be considered is that, organisational wrongdoing 
conducted by higher level wrongdoers may mean that it was merely done for strategic 
purposes (Rehg, Miceli, Near, & Van Scotter, 2008). Such wrongdoing is necessary to 
enable the organisation to remain competitive. This is consistent with Brief and 
Motowidlo’s  (1986) argument that organisational members’ belief about whether the 
organisation is the beneficiary or victim of wrongdoing may affect their reactions to 
whistleblowers. Miceli and Near (1994) added that if the wrongdoing enhances the 
organisation’s performance, the organisation may rely heavily on the wrongdoing, and 
as such may retaliate against the whistleblowers to discourage further whistleblowing. 
This actually reflects the resource dependency theory as described by Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978). The theory posits that when one party possesses resources upon which 
another is dependent, that party will be more powerful. As such, Miceli and Near (1994, 
73 
 
p. 777) describe that, “the resource dependency perspective thus suggests that an 
organization may depend on wrongful activity when organizational leaders do not 
perceive that alternative activities are available.”  
 
It can be seen that individuals may be less likely to whistleblow on powerful 
wrongdoers for several reasons: (1) fear of retaliation from these powerful wrongdoers, 
(2) the organisation is dependent upon the wrongdoer for its survival, and (3) the 
negative consequences associated with exposing the powerful wrongdoer may be more 
significant. Preliminary findings show that the likelihood of an observer blowing the 
whistle on organisational wrongdoing decreases when the status of wrongdoer is higher 
than lower (Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991). As higher level wrongdoers have power in 
their organisations, whistleblowers are likely to suffer retaliation when they pursue such 
people  (Cortina & Magley, 2003). Therefore, with regards to this situational factor, the 
study hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 8: 
The higher the status of wrongdoers in the organisational hierarchy, the less the 
influence on internal auditors’ intentions to whistleblow 
 
3.5. Demographic Variables 
 
Previous literature suggests that demographic characteristics such as gender (Near & 
Miceli, 1985), age (Brennan & Kelly, 2007) and working tenure (Miceli & Near, 1988) 
may be related to respondents’ whistleblowing intentions. Although there have been 
consistently mixed results to date regarding the direction of the relationships between 
these demographic variables and whistleblowing, any possible effect of these factors in 
the current study should be investigated. 
 
3.5.1. Gender 
 
With regards to gender, studies have shown that men and women differ significantly in 
making ethical judgments. Specifically, evidence has indicated that men and women 
differ in terms of ethics, beliefs, values, and behaviour (Schminke, Ambrose, & Miles, 
2003), with women theorised to be more ethical in their judgment and behaviour than 
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men (Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2008). Judging from these statements, women are 
expected to be more willing to whistleblow. However, to the contrary, in 
whistleblowing studies, women are found to be less likely than men to engage in 
whistleblowing acts (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998; Miceli & Near, 1988; Miceli, Near, & 
Dozier, 1991; Sims & Keenan, 1998). Men are more likely to whistleblow as they tend 
to occupy higher managerial positions in organisations and have more credibility than 
women (Near & Miceli, 1995). Furthermore, women whistleblowers are said to 
experience more retaliation than men (Rehg et al., 2008), thus making them more 
reluctant to risk their careers. It is expected that similar findings would occur with 
regard to internal auditors’ reporting intentions in this study.  
 
3.5.2. Age 
 
With regards to age, older organisational members would tend to have a greater 
understanding of the authority and control systems within their organisations and have 
minimal restraints to whistleblow as compared to new members (Keenan, 2000; Sims & 
Keenan, 1998). Brennan and Kelly (2007) found that older subjects are more concerned 
about the effect of reporting on their own career. Previous studies generally support 
these statements (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Keenan, 2000; Miceli & Near, 1988). 
However, some studies also found that age is not a significant predictor of the intention 
to whistleblow (Sims & Keenan, 1998).   This study proposes that older employees have 
a greater tendency to report wrongdoings to the management.   
 
3.5.3. Tenure 
 
Organisational tenure can also be expected to be related to the likelihood of 
whistleblowing. Senior employees are more likely to whistleblow because they are 
closer to retirement, possess high levels of power and organisational commitment 
(Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Near & Miceli, 1995). New employees on the 
other hand, may not know how corporate culture operates and are less concerned with 
stopping the wrongdoing (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998). Furthermore, a newcomer may be 
less familiar with appropriate channels for whistleblowing (Miceli & Near, 1992). 
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This study expects that these demographic variables in general may be associated with 
the internal auditors’ tendency to whistleblow, leading to the following set of 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 9: 
Internal auditor is more likely to whistleblow if the person: (a) is male; (b) is older; 
and (c) has a longer tenure in the organisation. 
 
3.6. Summary 
 
Based on the review of prior theoretical and empirical whistleblowing literature, five 
general research questions were developed for investigation of internal auditors’ 
decisions to whistleblow within their organisations: 
 
1. Do organisational factors such as ethical climate, size of organisation and job level 
influence internal whistleblowing intentions among Malaysian internal auditors? 
 
2. Do individual factors such as ethical judgment, locus of control and organisational 
commitment influence internal whistleblowing intentions among Malaysian internal 
auditors? 
 
3. Do situational factors such as seriousness of the case and status of wrongdoer 
influence internal whistleblowing intentions among Malaysian internal auditors? 
 
4. Do demographic factors such as gender, age and tenure influence internal 
whistleblowing intentions among Malaysian internal auditors? 
 
5. Which one of the organisational, individual, situational and demographic factors has 
the strongest influence on internal whistleblowing intentions among Malaysian 
internal auditors? 
 
As such, four groups of hypotheses are offered to investigate the research questions 
presented above (See Table 3.2 for summary). The first three hypotheses listed test the 
influences of organisational factors on internal auditors’ intentions to internally 
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whistleblow. The fourth, fifth and sixth hypotheses are offered to test the influence of 
individual factors on internal auditors’ intentions to internally whistleblow. The seventh 
and eighth hypotheses listed are offered to test the influences of the situational factors 
on internal auditors’ intentions to internally whistleblow. The final hypothesis tests the 
influences of the demographic factors on internal auditors’ intentions to internally 
whistleblow.  
 
Figure 3.1 presents the proposed model of internal whistleblowing intentions, indicating 
all hypothesised relationships for the predictor and criterion variables. The positive (+) 
or negative (-) signs indicate the expected direction of these relationships. The next 
chapter reports the methods that were used to test this hypothesised model on internal 
whistleblowing. 
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Figure 3-1: Internal Whistleblowing Intentions Model – The Hypothesised 
Relationships
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Locus of Control 
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(H6) (+) 
Managerial status 
(H3) (+) 
Organisational 
size (H2) (-) 
Ethical climate 
(H1) 
Status of 
wrongdoers 
(H8) (-) 
Seriousness of 
wrongdoing 
(H7) (+) 
 
 
 
Internal 
auditors’ 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
Moral Equity (H4a) (+) 
Relativism (H4b) (+) 
Contractualism (H4c) (+) 
Egoism (H1a) (-) 
Benevolence (H1b) (+) 
Principle (H1c) (+) 
Gender (H9a) (+) 
Age (H9b) (+) 
Tenure (H9c) (+) 
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Table 3-2: List of Hypotheses To Be Tested 
Factors Lists of Hypotheses 
Organisational H1a: In an organisation with an ethical climate characterised by egoism, 
internal auditors will be less likely to whistleblow. 
H1b: In an organisation with an ethical climate characterised by benevolence, 
internal auditors will be more likely to whistleblow. 
H1c: In an organisation with an ethical climate characterised by principle, 
internal auditors will be more likely to whistleblow. 
H2: The internal auditors’ intentions to whistleblow will be negatively 
associated with size of organisations.  
H3: Internal auditors holding higher managerial positions are more likely to 
whistleblow than those in lower managerial positions. 
Individual H4a: The higher the moral equity dimension in ethical judgment, the more 
likely internal auditors will whistleblow. 
H4b: The higher the relativism dimension in ethical judgment, the more likely 
internal auditors will whistleblow. 
H4c: The higher the contractualism dimension in ethical judgment, the more 
likely internal auditors will whistleblow. 
H5: Internal auditors with internal locus of control will be more likely to 
whistleblow. 
H6: Internal auditors with higher organisational commitment will be more 
likely to whistleblow. 
Situational H7: The more serious the wrongdoing, the higher the influence on internal 
auditors’ intentions to whistleblow.  
H8: The higher the status of wrongdoers in the organisational hierarchy, the less 
the influence on internal auditors’ intentions to whistleblow 
Demographic H9a: Male internal auditors will be more likely to whistleblow. 
H9b: Older internal auditors will be more likely to whistleblow. 
H9c: Longer tenure internal auditors will be more likely to whistleblow. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the research methods adopted for testing the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. This chapter begins by describing the research 
design appropriate for addressing the study’s research objectives in section 4.2, 
followed by explanations of its sampling procedure in section 4.3. Questionnaire and 
variables development are presented in sections 4.4 and 4.5 respectively. Next, section 
4.6 describes the study’s data collection method. Then the issues of reliability, validity 
and normality are provided in section 4.7. Finally, section 4.8 outlines the analytical 
techniques used in this study.  
 
4.2. Research Design 
 
Research design is “a master plan specifying the methods and procedures for collecting 
and analysing the needed information” (Zikmund, 2003, p. 65). In simple words, 
Sekaran (2006, p. 117) explained that it is “... a way that the requisite data can be 
gathered and analyzed to arrive at a solution”. The research questions highlighted in 
Chapter 1 earlier, addressed issues that most survey participants will likely find 
sensitive. The study requires these participants to describe their actual organisations’ 
ethical work climate, disclose whether behaviours as depicted in the given vignettes are 
ethical and whether they will actually take the decision to whistleblow. Therefore, this 
study should be able to preserve the confidentiality and the anonymity of its survey 
participants. As the participants in this study were required to disclose their own ethical 
beliefs, the use of a mail questionnaire survey will allow them to safeguard their identity 
and at the same time, enable them to provide honest and reliable answers.  
 
The use of a mail questionnaire survey is the most appropriate method of inquiry to 
address the study’s research questions, as it is a common approach used in business 
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ethics research (Randall & Gibson, 1990) and is appropriate for research questions 
asking about participants’ self-reported beliefs or behaviours (Neuman, 2006). The steps 
of research design are indicated in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Research Process Used in the Study 
 
The study combines the use of questionnaire and vignettes design (short, hypothetical 
cases), similar to those utilised in previous whistleblowing and ethics studies (see 
Arnold & Ponemon, 1991; Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Patel, 2003; Sims & Keenan, 1998; 
Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008; Zhang et al., 2009a).  
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4.3. Sampling Procedure 
 
Population as defined by Sekaran (2006, p. 265) refers to “the entire group of people, 
events, or things of interest that the researcher wishes to investigate”. The population 
for this study consist of all registered members of the Institute of Internal Auditors 
Malaysia (IIA Malaysia). IIA Malaysia offers three main types of membership: 
Individual membership, Corporate membership and Audit Committee membership. 
 
4.3.1. Sampling frame 
 
A sampling frame is “a listing of all the elements in the population from which the 
sample is drawn (Sekaran, 2006, p. 265). The sampling frame for the study was drawn 
from the Individual membership statistics of IIA Malaysia as at 31 July 2009. As at that 
date, the figures showed that the Institute has a total of 2,048 individual members in 
various types of categories (Refer Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4-1: IIA Malaysia’s individual membership statistics as at 31 July 2009 
  Renewal New Unpaid Total 
Honorary 3 - - 3 
Fellow 35 - 5 40 
Professional 738 1 70 809 
Associate 963 31 176 1,170 
Student 5 - 4 9 
Audit Committee 14 - 3 17 
Total  1,758 32 258 2,048 
Source: IIA Malaysia 
 
According to IIA Malaysia’s website (www.iiam.com.my), the Institute offers six types 
of individual membership, namely: Honorary, Fellow, Professional, Associate, Student 
and Audit Committee members. For the purpose of this study, the sampling frame was 
restricted to IIA Malaysia’s individual members who were registered in “Professional” 
and “Associate” member categories. These groups were selected due to their on-field 
nature of work and experience that affords them the opportunity to confront corporate 
wrongdoings in their organisations. The samples in these groups held internal auditors 
positions at various managerial levels within their organisations and were considered 
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suitable for the purpose of this study. Further explanations about these two groups are 
discussed in the following section.  
 
4.3.2. Sample elements 
 
An element is “a single member of the population” (Sekaran, 2006, p. 265). The sample 
element for this study is the individual internal auditor, who is registered under either 
“Professional” or “Associate” member categories. 
 
IIA Malaysia’s "Professional Member" refers to a class open to persons in private and 
government employment who are performing internal audit functions, no matter what 
the titles such persons or departments are designated, provided that: (1) they have at 
least 3 years of professional working experience and training in internal auditing, 
possess tertiary education recognised by the Institute and have satisfactorily passed the 
Qualifying Examination conducted by the Institute, or, (2) they have at least 5 years of 
professional working experience and training in internal auditing, possess at least a 
diploma qualification recognised by the Institute and have satisfactorily passed the 
Qualifying Examination conducted by the Institute, or, (3) have at least 3 years of 
professional working experience and training in internal auditing and possess any of the 
professional qualifications from CPA, CIMA, ACCA, CISA, AlA, ICSA (This list may 
be varied, as approved by IIA Inc.). IIA Malaysia’s "Associate Member" on the other 
hand, refers to a class open to persons who are engaged in fields related to internal audit 
or have such interests but who do not qualify for membership under "Professional 
Member".  
 
4.3.3. Response rates 
 
A total of 1,000 questionnaires were sent to registered individual internal auditors in 
the Professional and Associate member categories. Out of these, 186 questionnaires 
were returned. However, only 180 questionnaires were usable for the study (an 18% 
response rate). Despite the extreme care taken in the survey administration, such low 
response rates from Malaysian respondents were expected and not considered as 
unusual. Previous Malaysian studies have noted that such a phenomenon is typical of 
Malaysian respondents coming from a developing country who are very reluctant to 
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participate in any mail surveys (see Jusoh, Ibrahim, & Zainuddin, 2008; Jusoh & 
Parnell, 2008; Ming-Ling, 2008; Salleh & Dali, 2009; Smith, Abdullah, & Abdul 
Razak, 2008). These studies, in various research fields, have reported response rates of 
12.3% (Jusoh et al., 2008; Jusoh & Parnell, 2008), 18.8% (Salleh & Dali, 2009), 19.6% 
(Smith et al., 2008) and 22.7% (Ming-Ling, 2008) respectively. A recent study by 
Ahmad and Taylor (2009) who utilised IIA Malaysia members, managed to get a 
17.9% response rate.  
 
Smith (2011) viewed that response rates of less than 25 percent are now common in 
accounting research. Furthermore, the sensitivity and confidential nature of the 
information requested by this study may contribute to the overall low response rate 
(Jusoh & Parnell, 2008; Miceli & Near, 1988; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008) as the internal 
auditors in this study were required to disclose various forms of sensitive information. 
There were questionnaires that were returned to the researcher totally incomplete by the 
survey participants stating that they declined to participate in this study since they were 
bound by the ethical requirements of their employers.  
 
4.4. Questionnaire Development 
 
The development of the questionnaire was based on reviews of past literatures, with the 
objective of identifying appropriate instruments to measure the selected variables of the 
study. The primary issue in questionnaire development is that it should adequately 
capture all the information needed to answer the study’s research questions (Dunn & 
Huss, 2004) and “... forms an integrated whole” (Neuman, 2006, p. 277).  A structured 
questionnaire was developed from existing instruments on whistleblowing and ethics 
studies to avoid problems of validity and reliability of the measures. 
 
The following sections describe further the development and design of the 
questionnaire, the choice of scale and response format, the source and development of 
ethical vignettes and ways to control the problems of non-response bias, social 
desirability bias and vignettes’ order-effect bias.  
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4.4.1. Questionnaire design 
 
The design of the questionnaire covered four factors i.e., Organisational, Individual, 
Situational and Demographic factors that directly affect the internal auditors’ 
whistleblowing intentions. The questionnaire was divided into five major sections. The 
first section starts with Mowday, Steers, and Porter’s (1979) Organisational 
Commitment questions. This was followed by the second section, comprising Rotter’s 
(1966) Locus of Control instrument. The third section comprises Victor and Cullen’s 
(1988) Ethical Climate Questionnaire. Section four requires respondents to judge four 
types of ethical vignette, followed by responding to several univariate scales derived 
from Reidenbach and Robin’s (1988, 1990) Multidimensional Ethical Scales for each of 
the given vignettes. The last section requests demographic information from the 
respondents (refer Appendix 3 for the questionnaire). 
 
4.4.2. Scale and response format 
 
Scales assist in the conceptualisation and operationalisation of research processes and 
produce quantitative measures which can be used to test hypotheses (Neuman, 2006).  
There are various types of scales but Likert scales are the most commonly used scales in 
survey research (Neuman, 2006), with either five or seven-point scale alternatives being 
adequate for most items (Hinkin, 1995).  
 
A five-point categorical Likert scale, was used for all scaled question items that denote 
specific ordered categories, i.e. “Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither, Agree and 
Strongly Agree” or “Completely False, False, Neither, True and Completely True”. The 
five-point Likert scale was employed in the questionnaire for the following reasons: 
firstly, it allows “respondents to indicate how strongly they agree or disagree with 
carefully constructed statements that range from very positive to very negative toward 
an attitudinal object” (Zikmund, 2003, p. 312); secondly, the simplicity and ease of use 
of the Likert scale is its strength. When several items are combined, more 
comprehensive multiple indicator measurement is possible (Neuman, 2006, p. 210); and 
finally, coefficient alpha reliability with Likert scales has been shown to increase when 
the point in the scale is increased to five points , but the reliability level will drop when 
more than five points are used (Lissitz & Green, 1975). 
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Some of the items in the research questions use reversed scales. This is apparent in 
Mowday et al.’s (1979) Organisational Commitment and Rotter’s (1966) Locus of 
Control items. Having negatively worded scales could minimise mechanical and 
unreliable responses should a person check only one end of the response for all 
questions (Grove & Savich, 1979) and would further avoid having problems of 
“response set”. This “response set” problem, which is also known as response bias, 
could occur due to the tendency of the survey participants to provide their answers in 
the same manner due to laziness or a psychological disposition (Neuman, 2006).   
 
4.4.3. Vignettes development 
 
The questionnaire includes four whistleblowing vignettes to measure internal auditors’ 
internal whistleblowing intentions. Vignettes are defined as, “short descriptions of a 
person or a social situation which contain precise references to what are thought to be 
the most important factors in the decision-making or judgement-making processes of 
respondents” (Alexander & Becker, 1978, p. 94). The vignettes approach, borrowed 
from ethics research (Ellis & Griffith, 2001) requires respondents to rate the ethics of a 
subject in a vignette using a single scale item with endpoints specified as “ethical” and 
“unethical”, for example. Issues regarding the use of vignettes in whistleblowing 
research have been discussed in Chapter 2 previously (refer section 2.5.5).  
 
Vignettes (scenarios) may be developed from practice knowledge, previous research or 
preliminary studies (B. J. Taylor, 2006). Randall and Gibson (1990) suggested that 
vignettes need to be developed with a greater concern for realism in order to mitigate 
the problems of ambiguity and vagueness. A realistic context of a given vignette allows 
the respondents to put themselves in the position of a character portrayed in a 
hypothetical situation (Patel, 2003). Researchers are also able to manipulate their 
variables of interest, making such an approach advantageous (O'Fallon & Butterfield, 
2005). However, Weber (1992) recommends the use of scenarios from previous studies 
as it avoids the need to test for their validity and reliability. Therefore, using previously 
developed vignettes, the study can enhance the research instrument’s construct validity.  
 
This study has selected four vignettes that have been utilised in previous studies, and 
tested with various groups and settings. These four vignettes were chosen for the 
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following reasons. First, they cover a wide range of ethical issues that internal auditors 
may face within their work settings. Second, previous research suggested that 
individuals do not view moral issues generically but may respond to the type of moral 
issues (Weber, 1990). Evidence has shown that reporting intentions are case sensitive 
(Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991; Near & Miceli, 1995; Near 
et al., 2004; Schultz et al., 1993) and these prior research studies have indicated that the 
nature or type of wrongdoing can affect observers’ reactions to it. Third, using vignettes 
from similar studies (even though modified) allows for cross-study comparisons 
(Weber, 1992). The choice for utilising these four vignettes is deemed as appropriate for 
this study as O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005) cautioned that, the use of too many 
vignettes may cause respondents to experience overload and getting fatigue while with 
too few vignettes, it may limit the chance to manipulate the study’s variables of interest, 
thus resulting in response biases. 
 
The first vignette concerning a Marketing Executive taking unreported paid time off 
was modified from an unpublished dissertation by Wortman (2006). The second 
vignette with regards to an act of overstating purchases amount was developed by 
Brennan and Kelly (2007). Next, a vignette about a request for reduction in doubtful 
debts by the Chief Executive Officer was adapted from J. R. Cohen et al. (1996). The 
last vignette, about a request from a Chief Financial Officer to ignore an amount of 
unrecorded liabilities to be recorded in the financial statements, was adapted from 
Knapp (1985). The full versions of these vignettes are available in the questionnaire in 
the Appendix section (see Section 4 of Appendix 3). In a generic fashion, the vignettes 
ask the respondent to indicate how likely they would be to whistleblow in their 
company (internal whistleblowing) in the given hypothetical situations. 
 
4.4.4. Controlling measurement errors 
 
A common problem associated with any mail survey questionnaire is the problem of 
non-response bias. Meanwhile, another type of problem that needs to be addressed in 
any ethics and behavioural research is social desirability bias. Order effect bias on the 
other hand, is connected with the order of vignettes in the questionnaire. All these forms 
of bias need to be controlled in order to enhance the validity of the study. 
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4.4.4.1. Non-response bias 
 
Non-response bias poses a threat in all survey method studies as it weakens the survey 
results, hence a study is not able to generalise its results (Neuman, 2006). In order to 
minimise the problem of non-response rates, the following guidelines were considered 
(see Dillman, 2000; Fowler, 1993; M. F. King & Bruner, 2000; Neuman, 2006; 
Sekaran, 2006).  
 
1. Each questionnaire was professionally printed and accompanied with a covering 
letter explaining clearly the research purposes and written instructions to complete 
the questionnaire. 
 
2. A letter of support from IIA Malaysia was also enclosed to enhance response rates 
from participants. According to Fowler (1993), anything that will make a mail 
questionnaire look professional may enhance respondents’ response rates. 
 
3. Written assurance was provided to guarantee confidentiality and ensure 
respondents’ anonymity. Maximising participants’ anonymity would minimise the 
problem of social desirability bias (M. F. King & Bruner, 2000).  
 
4. The questionnaire has a reasonable number of pages (8 pages) that suits the selected 
group of participants (internal auditors) chosen for this study. Neuman (2006) states 
that using questionnaires of up to 15 pages is appropriate for well-educated 
respondents.  
 
5. The questionnaire is printed in a booklet form, with paper folded in the middle and 
stapled along the spine. This is a basic format that is acceptable for use with multi-
page questionnaires, as people are used to starting on the first page and then turning 
to the second page, and so forth (Dillman, 2000).  
 
4.4.4.2. Social desirability bias 
 
As in any empirical ethics research that requests the use of sensitive information from 
respondents, the issue of social desirability bias needs to be addressed and controlled. 
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The bias refers to chances that, “... respondents give a “normative” response or a 
socially acceptable answer rather than a honest answer” (Neuman, 2006, p. 285). For 
that reason, Bernardi and Guptill (2008) explain that individuals have the tendency to 
overstate (understate) reports that are deemed to be culturally desirable (undesirable) 
behaviours. A majority of previous studies have infrequently controlled social desirable 
response bias in ethics research (Bernardi & Guptill, 2008; Randall & Gibson, 1990) 
and this could have an impact on the validity of these studies if such bias is not 
controlled for (M. F. King & Bruner, 2000; Nyaw & Ng, 1994). 
 
The present study adopted three measures to minimise social desirability bias. First, as 
mentioned in the previous section, the study assured the confidentiality of information 
provided and the anonymity of participants in the study. The second approach is to use 
the first-person approach in each scenario. The participants were asked whether they 
themselves would consider whistleblowing on the wrongdoing as described in each 
vignette. This is contrary to the approach undertaken by Patel (2003) who used a third-
person approach. The reason for using a first-person instead of a third-person approach 
is due to the fact that Malaysia is a multi-racial country. Referring to the name of the 
wrongdoer in the vignettes either as Ahmad (Malay), Lim (Chinese) or Raju (Indian), 
for example, may seriously threaten the validity of the questionnaire if answered by 
participants of different ethnic background from the wrongdoer in the vignette. The use 
of first-person approach may also avoid possibility of gender bias, as the sample names 
mentioned earlier are all referring to males. It would be possible that gender of the 
whistleblower may interact with the gender of the wrongdoer (Miceli, Near, & Dozier, 
1991), hence making the results become invalid especially when gender is also a 
variable of interest in this study for determining respondents’ internal whistleblowing 
intentions. 
 
The final approach to minimise social desirability bias was by asking two additional 
questions to the participants. The questions were, (1) “Rate the likelihood YOU would 
report to internal parties in your organisation”, and (2) “Rate the likelihood that YOUR 
COLLEAGUES would report to internal parties in your organisation”. Such an 
approach was consistent with the method adopted in previous whistleblowing studies 
(Patel, 2003; Zhang et al., 2009b). The difference between these two questions provides 
a measure of social desirability bias (J. R. Cohen et al., 1996). Consequently, the present 
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study made an attempt to measure the magnitude of social desirability bias if any, 
among the participants. 
 
4.4.4.3. Vignettes order effect bias 
 
This study employed four sets of vignettes presented in sequence order. Each vignette 
though is different in terms of its contents, types of wrongdoing and the actor of 
wrongdoer, but it has a similar set of Likert-scales questions at the end of it. However, 
methodologically, there is strong evidence that the order in which information presented 
in surveys significantly affects the answers that respondents provide (LaSalle, 1997; 
Malhotra, 2009). An order effect bias, as it is known as, is considered a potential source 
of bias (Greenstein & Bennett, 1974; LaSalle, 1997) and it can affect the validity of the 
research instrument (Dillman, 2000) and has resulting invalidity in many forms of social 
research studies (Greenstein & Bennett, 1974). 
 
In the cognitive psychology literature, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) have proposed a 
theory that specifies the condition in which the order of information has an effect on 
individual’s decision-making behaviour. Specifically, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) 
stipulate that information processed early in sequence will have greater or less influence 
than information processed later. If the information processed at the beginning has 
greater influence on a final belief, than the order effect is known as a primacy effect. If 
the information received later has greater influence, the effect is known as a recency 
effect. In the current study, it is a concern whether Vignette 1 will have greater 
influence in the internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing decision than Vignette 4 or 
vice versa. Specifically, the study would like to determine whether the order of 
vignettes in the questionnaire influence their ethical choices. This argument follows 
Asch (1946) who found that, first impressions do matter: the first personality traits 
listed for an individual influenced people’s impressions about that individual 
significantly more than ones that were listed later.  
 
The phenomenon of order effects has been observed across a number of disciplines (see 
Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; LaSalle, 1997; Malhotra, 2009), however, the effect of 
vignette order on survey responses has received little attention in the whistleblowing 
research literature. Except in the work of Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) and Zhuang et al., 
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(2005), none of the whistleblowing studies employing ethical vignettes or scenarios has 
examined the potential for presentation order effect bias. The majority of these studies 
have not acknowledged such an effect though they were using a group of vignettes or 
scenarios sequentially in examining their respondents’ whistleblowing decisions.  This 
could possibly be due to their studies utilising large number of samples and their 
respondents were selected at random, hence it was not easy to undertake a test to 
conduct the effect of such bias.   
 
In the Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) and Zhuang et al., (2005) studies however, their 
respondents were given surveys that contained vignettes or scenarios that had earlier 
been random-ordered to remove the potential order effects bias, without even testing 
whether such effects do exist. The current study tested if such an order effect bias 
existed prior to the actual mail questionnaire survey. This is very important in order to 
ensure that, the internal validity of the questionnaire is not endangered. If an order effect 
does exist, Eisenberg and Barry (1988) cautioned that, proper procedures need to be 
employed to ensure that the bias does not influence studies on relevant judgments. 
Further discussion and test of order effects are described in detail in section 4.6.2 of this 
thesis. 
 
4.5. Variable Development 
 
This section discusses measures used to operationalise the selected variables for this 
study. As previously discussed in section 4.4.1, the variables of the study (dependent 
and independent) were all adopted from previous studies in the related whistleblowing 
field. Such an approach was undertaken as the variables have been tested for their 
reliability and validity measures. More importantly, since the same variables have been 
utilised in previous whistleblowing studies, it is safe to expect that the study’s variables 
are able to measure a particular concept (to counter for the validity issue) and, such 
measures are stable and consistent across time (to counter for the reliability issue) 
(Sekaran, 2006). Dependent variable measurement is discussed first, followed by the 
four groups of independent variables; Organisational, Individual, Situational and 
Demographic variables. 
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4.5.1. Dependent variable 
 
4.5.1.1. Internal whistleblowing intention 
 
Hunt and Vitell (1986) proposed that individual behavioural intentions can be measured 
by asking the probability that the persons would actually perform behaviours described 
to them. Participants in the present study were asked to read all the four vignettes first 
and then indicated the likelihood that they would engage in internal whistleblowing 
behaviour. The four vignettes allowed for sufficient variability in the dependent 
variable, thus allowing for more consistent and reliable observations on internal 
whistleblowing intentions. 
 
The approach used for measuring internal whistleblowing in this study examines the 
respondents’ intentions. Since it has been acknowledged that whistleblowing is a 
sensitive and risky act, involving issues such as legality and confidentiality, it is not 
easy to develop a direct measure. Hence, the use of vignettes is deemed as most suitable 
for this study (refer discussion in section 4.4.3). Internal whistleblowing intention will 
be measured using two items. One will be in the first person (The probability the 
respondent will engage in the action, i.e. internal whistleblowing). The other will be in 
the third person (The probability that his/her peers and colleagues would take the 
action). A five-point Likert type scale was used with the following endpoint: 1 = “Less 
likely” and 5= “Very likely” to determine the internal auditors’ and their colleagues’ 
willingness to whistleblow internally. The reporting-intention measures were similar to 
ones used by Kaplan and colleagues (see Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Kaplan, 1995; Kaplan 
& Schultz, 2007; Kaplan & Whitecotton, 2001),  except that the number of Likert scales 
has been reduced to 5-point from 7-point for methodological reasons (refer section 4.4.2 
for details). 
 
4.5.2. Organisational variables 
 
4.5.2.1. Ethical climate  
 
Victor and Cullen’s (1988) Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ) was used to assess the 
dimensions of ethical climate perceived by the participants. The study used the original 
92 
 
26-item ECQ scale rather than their 36-item scale to avoid participant fatigue. The items 
are descriptive statements originally designed to describe the various dimensions of 
ethical work climate as conceptualised by Victor and Cullen (1988). The ECQ is a 
practical instrument for evaluating and comparing ethical climate dimensions in an 
organisation and in different levels within the organisation itself (Wimbush & Shepard, 
1994).  
 
The ECQ items were administered on a 5-point scale with responses ranging from 
“completely false” to “completely true”. Participants were asked to evaluate the extent 
to which each item is true about their company. The instrument places the participants 
in the role of observers reporting on the perceived ethical climate rather than focussing 
on whether participants perceive the ethical climates as being good or bad (Victor & 
Cullen, 1988). The responses given determined the type of ethical climate that these 
participants work in. Due to variability of ethical climates identified in previous studies, 
as well as uncertainties of how many ethical climate dimensions exist in a particular 
organisation (Peterson, 2002b), consistent with Cullen et al. (2003), this study was then 
based on the three basic criteria of moral judgment: egoistic, benevolent and principle. 
The items were added together and averaged to develop scale scores for each of the 
three dimensions. Such an approach was similar to that in the Rothwell and Baldwin 
(2006) study, who developed scores for five ethical climates: Independence, 
Instrumental, Caring, Rules, and Law and Code. 
 
4.5.2.2. Size of organisation 
 
Size of organisation is an ordinal data item measured in terms of the number of 
employees. The choice of using number of employees as a proxy for size of 
organisation is consistent with previous whistleblowing studies (see Rothwell & 
Baldwin, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) The number of employees was considered as the best 
measure of company size for this study as it suits the notion of Latane and Darley’s 
(1968) bystander theory. The size of organisation variable was measured by asking the 
respondents to indicate the number of employees in their organisations within the four 
sub-categories, (a) less than 500 employees, (b) 501 – 1,000, (c) 1,001 – 3,000, and (d) 
more than 3,001 employees. 
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4.5.2.3. Job level 
 
Job level of internal auditors is also an ordinal data item and was measured based on the 
response of respondents to their actual work designation. Four levels of job description 
were designated, (a) Junior (b) Senior (c) Manager, and (d) Others (Higher than 
managers). 
 
4.5.3. Individual variables 
 
4.5.3.1. Ethical judgments  
 
The measures for the moral equity, relativism, and contractualism dimensions are based 
on Reidenbach and Robin’s (1990) Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES). The MES 
instrument comprises a multi-item scale which is designed to allow respondents to 
evaluate the ethical nature of situations that are presented to them. The ethical 
judgments ratings were collected on all three ethics dimensions using a 5-point scale 
with endpoint labelled as 1 = “most unethical” and 5 = “least ethical”. The MES 
instrument has been validated by previous studies including in the accounting context 
(J. R. Cohen et al., 1996, 2001; Flory et al., 1992). Respondents were asked to indicate 
their perceptions of the degree of the action’s ethicality in each of the four vignettes. 
 
Overall, the MES instrument contains eight items. The Moral equity dimension is 
composed of four items, which are: “Unfair / Fair”, Unjust / Just”, “Not morally right / 
Morally right” and “Unacceptable to my family / Acceptable to my family”. Two items 
are used to measure Relativism dimension, which are: “Culturally unacceptable / 
Culturally acceptable” and “Traditionally unacceptable / Traditionally acceptable”. The 
last dimension, Contractualism, also consists of two items, which are: “Violates / Does 
not violate an unwritten social contract” and “Violates / Does not violate an unspoken 
social contract”. The mean response among each item within a dimension was 
calculated and used as the dimension score for each subject. 
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4.5.3.2. Locus of control 
 
The internal auditors’ locus of control was measured using a summed total of the 16-
item work locus of scale, consistent with previous studies (see Donnelly et al., 2003; 
Spector, 1988). The Rotter’s (1966) measure however, was not used due to its extremely 
general scope (Donnelly et al., 2003). The adopted scale consists of eight items 
measuring “internal” and eight items measuring “external” control over work specific 
issues (Siu et al., 2001). Respondents were asked to identify the relations between 
reward/outcomes and causes using a 5-point scale. 
 
Higher scores (strongly agree) on the work locus of control scale indicate a greater 
degree of external personality while lower scores (strongly disagree) are associated with 
internal traits. The instrument’s reliability and validity have been deemed acceptable in 
prior research (e.g., Donnelly et al., 2003; Spector, 1988). 
 
4.5.3.3. Organisational commitment 
 
A summed total of Mowday et al.’s (1979) 15-item instrument was used to measure 
organisational commitment. All items represent statements to which respondents 
answered on 5-point Likert scales, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. 
The wording of six items in the instrument was reversed in an attempt to reduce 
response set bias (Porter et al., 1974). Prior studies report acceptable levels of reliability 
and validity for the 15-item instrument (L. Y. Chen, 2004; Cullen et al., 2003). 
 
4.5.4. Situational variables 
 
The “seriousness of wrongdoing” and the “status of wrongdoer” were manipulated in 
each vignette. Respondents were asked to assess the degree of importance of these two 
variables in each vignette. Two 5-point Likert scales were recorded for each situational 
variable (seriousness of wrongdoing and the status of wrongdoer). Each five-point 
Likert type scale was used with the following endpoint: 1 = “Not at all serious/Not at all 
powerful” and 5= “Very serious/Very powerful” to determine the internal auditors’ 
decision-making behaviour. 
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4.5.5. Demographic variables 
 
Demographic variables were measured at the end of the questionnaire. Gender is 
measured as a dichotomous variable, while age and tenure both at ordinal level (see 
Appendix 3).   
 
4.6. Data Collection 
 
Data collection for the study has been conducted in three stages: pilot testing of the 
survey instrument, testing for potential order effect bias and mail survey administration. 
 
4.6.1. Stage one: General pilot testing 
 
The study replicated the measures other researchers have used in their previous studies. 
Therefore, the pilot study stage is essential to determine the understandibility of the 
survey instrument by Malaysian internal auditors at large. More importantly, a pilot test 
needs to be conducted to ensure that the vignettes and accompanying questions are 
understandable and present accurate portrayal of the situation. The results from the pilot 
testing will help in the determination of the reliability of the measured scales and if 
possible, the identification of the items on scales which would need to be deleted. 
Furthermore, by obtaining information such as comments or suggestions from the pilot 
study participants, further improvements to the contents of the survey instrument itself 
may result. Smith (2011) has suggested that extensive piloting of the survey instrument 
is essential to test whether the instrument is capable of generating the required 
responses from the respondents. Accordingly, three pilot tests were undertaken in order 
to refine the survey instrument prior to the actual survey administration to the IIA 
Malaysia members.  
 
The first draft was evaluated by two Research Consultants from Edith Cowan 
University, respectively a Language Editor and a Statistician. Several improvements as 
suggested by the Language Editor were made in some of the measurement items since 
the original version of the measurements had originally been developed from United 
States studies. Wordings in some of items have been tailored to suit Malaysian 
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respondents who are used to British English. This was not considered a major issue as 
all internal auditors who are registered with IIA Malaysia will at least be university 
graduates. The Statistician on the other hand, suggested employing a 5-point Likert 
scales consistently across all measurement items. She also recommended that for 
consistency purposes, the Likert scales should begin with negative items for the first 
point and end with positive items at the last points (e.g. unethical = 1; ethical = 5). This 
will smooth the flow for participants, in selecting their answer, as well as avoiding some 
potential confusion.  The suggestions put forward by these two Research Consultants 
were adopted in drafting out the mail questionnaire.  
 
After the survey had been amended, the second pilot test was conducted among four 
Malaysian postgraduate students enrolled in Faculty of Business and Law in Edith 
Cowan University. These students have diverse academic and professional 
backgrounds. Two of them have practical work experience in the auditing sector prior to 
joining the academic field and all of them are well versed in teaching auditing units. The 
purpose of this pilot test was to get their feedback on the understanding of the research 
instruments and whether they are practical and suitable to a Malaysian environment. 
Generally, the postgraduate students considered the research instrument as acceptable 
and suitable to Malaysian respondents. As such, no further change was required to the 
said questionnaire. 
 
The final pilot test was conducted among 15 Malaysian internal auditors in Kuala 
Lumpur. The sample selected for this pilot study was IIA Malaysia members who 
attended a 3-day training seminar for their Continuous Professional Development 
requirements. The researcher attended the first day training session with the consent of 
IIA Malaysia. Prior to that, permission was sought from the Technical Director of IIA 
Malaysia after explaining the purpose and importance of the pilot study stage. The 
members had been informed in advance that they had been selected as participants for 
the pilot survey. The researcher personally administered the pilot test, starting by 
introducing himself and explaining the purpose of the survey. During the briefing, all 
participants were informed of their rights and that their participation was entirely 
voluntary. Research instruments were distributed to the participants and the researcher 
then left the room. All completed research instruments were collected by the facilitator 
in-charge and handed over to the researcher at the end of the three-day seminar. This 
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approach has similarities with the actual mail survey process that will be conducted, in 
that it will give ample time for participants to provide much needed honest and reliable 
feedback. All 15 members participated in the study. In general, there were no major 
problems with regard to the contents of the research instruments or with its usability. 
All the vignettes were considered as appropriate to be used in the study. In the comment 
section that was provided at the end of the research instruments, a few of the members 
welcomed such research being conducted in Malaysia.  
 
4.6.2. Stage two: Pilot testing for potential order effect bias 
 
As discussed previously in section 4.4.4.3, the potential for order effect bias needs to be 
determined prior to the actual mail survey questionnaire collection. The test was 
conducted with another group of Malaysian internal auditors in Kuala Lumpur (a 
different group from those who involved in the pilot test session previously), who 
attended a one-day Continuous Professional Development seminar. The researcher did 
not attend the session but was assisted by the Technical Director of IIA Malaysia with 
the consent of IIA Malaysia. Prior to that, permission was sought from IIA Malaysia 
after explaining the purpose and the importance of conducting this order effect test.  
 
The researcher had been informed that a total of twenty IIA Malaysia members will 
attend the said session. Hence, as there were four types of vignettes, the order of 
vignettes presentation for these IIA Malaysia members were organised as follows: 
 
Table 4-2: Vignettes Presentation Order 
Version Vignette presentation order (Vignette No.) 
A 1 2 3 4 
B 2 3 4 1 
C 3 4 1 2 
D 4 1 2 3 
  
The test used 5 copies x 4 versions between-subjects design, totalling 20 copies 
altogether that were distributed at random. The purpose of randomising the presentation 
order of these four vignettes is to recognise the possibility of vignettes order influence 
on respondents’ internal whistleblowing intentions. Each respondent received one copy 
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of each of the four versions available. The respondents were requested to read through 
all the four vignettes presented sequentially before committing to answer questions 
accompanying them. Out of the total 20 copies distributed, only 18 copies were returned 
by mail from Malaysia to the researcher. According to the Technical Director, two of 
the respondents did not return the questionnaire after the completion of the one-day IIA 
Malaysia training seminar. Hence, there are only 5 copies received for Version A, 4 
copies for Version B, 4 copies for version C and 5 copies for Version D.  
 
The Friedman Test, a non-parametric alternative to the one-way repeated measures of 
analysis of variance is used. The test is used when the same sample of subjects are 
measured under three or more different conditions (Pallant, 2007). One variable from 
the vignettes, Seriousness of wrongdoing, was chosen to test the presence of order effect 
bias. The result of the Friedman Test indicated that there was no statistically significant 
difference in Seriousness of wrongdoings variable across the four version of vignettes, ᵡ2 
(3, n = 18) = 5.06, p > .167). To test further, another variable, Ethicality of the 
behaviour, was also chosen. Again, the result of the Friedman Test indicated that there 
was no statistically significant difference in Ethicality of the behaviour variable across 
the four sets of vignettes, ᵡ2 (3, n = 18) = 5.91, p > .116). As such, no order effect bias 
was found, suggesting that the section for vignettes response is free from order effects. 
 
4.6.3. Stage three: Mail questionnaire administration 
 
Contact was made again with the Technical Director of IIA Malaysia to gain permission 
to use members of IIA Malaysia for the purpose of the study.  The purpose of the study 
was also explained in order to secure cooperation from the Institute and to encourage 
their members to participate in the study. The Institute agreed to support the study 
provided that the final phase of the survey preparation - labelling for IIA Malaysia’s 
name lists onto the outgoing envelopes, was to be conducted in IIA Malaysia office in 
Kuala Lumpur. The major obstacle for this stage is that IIA Malaysia did not permit the 
researcher access to view and hold the complete list of its members. The reason given 
was due to the confidentiality of such a list, which precluded its release to the 
researcher. This restriction resulted in a lack of opportunity for the conduct of follow-up 
reminder. As such, the samples of participants chosen for the study were randomly 
selected by IIA Malaysia themselves. However, the researcher was able to explain to the 
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IIA Malaysia staff about the choice of a probability sampling design.  This was essential 
to ensure that the sample selected was representative of the IIA Malaysia’s population. 
Accordingly, IIA Malaysia agreed to distribute the survey instruments to their registered 
members. 
 
Despite having a total lack of control in the selection of respondents for this study, the 
support provided by IIA Malaysia may further enhance participation from their own 
members. Should the study be conducted without the support of the organisation that 
governs the conduct of its registered members, there will likely be lack of interest 
among IIA Malaysia’s members in participating in this study. As Fowler (1993) has 
indicated, anything that makes the survey look professional, may enhance respondents’ 
response rates. As such, this study gained a letter of support from IIA Malaysia as well 
as getting a written assurance that guarantees the confidentiality of information and the 
anonymity of the respondents. It is hopeful that this would minimise the problem of 
non-response bias. 
 
Each packet of the survey mailed to randomly selected internal auditors include, (a) a 
letter of support from IIA Malaysia – to encourage IIA Malaysia members to participate 
in the study, (b) a cover letter from the researcher which explains the purposes of the 
study as well as assuring participants’ anonymity, (c) a survey instrument, and (d) a 
postage-paid return envelope. Participants were reminded that participation was entirely 
voluntary and anonymous. A copy of each IIA Malaysia letter of support, cover letter 
and survey instrument is shown in the Appendix section (refer Appendix 1, 2 and 3).  
 
4.6.4. Ethical considerations 
 
Ethics in business and social science research refers to the application of expected 
societal norms of behaviour or code of conduct while conducting research. In dealing 
with research participants, the researcher fully understands his/her responsibility to 
protect participants from any physical harm, physical or mental embarrassment, pain or 
loss of privacy. The conduct of this study followed the guidelines provided by the Edith 
Cowan University Ethics Committee. The guidelines require that, research involving 
human participants needs an ethics clearance from the said Committee before 
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commencing primary data collection. The guidelines consider and protect the welfare of 
any person involved in the research in general. 
 
Based on ethical and professional principles, the researcher has to take primary 
responsibility for conducting this research. The ethical considerations in terms of 
confidentiality and anonymity of the research participants were fully observed and 
addressed in the process of sample selection and data collection, where each stage of the 
methodology has been approved by the Ethics Committee. Basically, the ethical conduct 
of the study follows the approach provided by Smith (2011) who stated that, any 
consideration of ethics would normally address at least appropriate written permission 
from participating organisations to conduct the study using their staff as respondents, 
informing participants of the motives for the research, providing feedback of the results 
to the participants, gaining permission from participating individuals (other than for 
mail surveys, where return of the questionnaire is taken to imply permission), 
guaranteeing and delivering both confidentiality and anonymity to the participants, 
granting the right of withdrawal to participants at any time and guaranteeing the storage 
of research data, usually for a period up to seven years. 
 
4.7. Reliability, Validity and Normality 
 
The estimates of reliability and validity are critical. The operationalisation of the 
construct is likely to be inadequate if an instrument has poor estimates of reliability and 
validity. Normality is also important in the sense that distributions of variables to be 
used in analysis should be normal, as it is one of the assumptions to be satisfied prior to 
using any inferential statistics. 
 
4.7.1. Reliability 
 
Reliability is defined as “the degree to which measures are free from error and therefore 
yield consistent results” (Zikmund, 2003, p. 300). It is the consistency of an instrument 
measurement, or the degree to which an instrument measures the same way each time it 
is used under the same condition with the same subjects. In other words, reliability is 
the extent to which measurements of a particular test are replicable. A reliable 
instrument works well at different times under different conditions. There are several 
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commonly used methods of measuring reliability – stability, equivalence, and internal 
consistency.  
 
The internal consistency approach is used to estimate the reliability of the measurement 
scales in this study. This approach measures the degree to which instrument items are 
homogeneous and reflect the same underlying constructs (Zikmund, 2003). The most 
widely used formulae to measure the internal consistency of the survey instrument is the 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Smith, 2011). The higher the coefficients, the better the 
measuring instrument. Generally a measure of Alpha coefficient above 0.7 is considered 
to be highly reliable. The result of the study’s internal consistency of the survey 
instrument is shown at section 5.3.3 of this thesis. 
 
4.7.2. Validity 
 
Validity refers to “the ability of a scale or measuring instrument to measure what it is 
intended to measure (Zikmund, 2003, p. 302). Validity features two major forms: 
external and internal validity. The external validity of research findings refers to the 
ability of the data to be generalised across persons, settings and times. The internal 
validity on the other hand, is the ability of a research instrument to measure what it 
purports to measure. Internal validity is discussed in detail as the focus of the current 
study is on whether the instrument actually measures what its designer claims it does.  
Three types of internal validity were considered – content validity, criterion-related 
validity and construct validity. 
 
Content validity: The content validity ensures that the measuring instrument provides 
adequate coverage of a set of items and the clarity of definitions and concepts used.  A 
major threat to content validity is the poor definition of terms and/or concepts. The 
variables measurement in the present study followed previous studies, hence any threat 
to content validity is minimised. Furthermore, various pilot testings have been 
conducted to ensure the content validity of this study’s survey instrument (see section 
4.6.1 earlier). 
 
Criterion-related validity: The criterion-related validity deals with the instrument’s 
ability to measure an item accurately. The major aspect of criterion-related validity is 
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performance measurement. According to Grove and Savich (1979), the type of response 
scale is an important factor in measuring performance. The study utilises a five-point 
Likert scale, which according to Grove and Savich (1979) tends to provide roughly 
equal frequencies. On the other hand, the use of a seven-point scale may provide 
significantly lower frequencies, and the use of a three-point scale may cause 
respondents to experience, “frustration at not being able to discriminate finely enough” 
(Grove & Savich, 1979, p. 529). This has been discussed in detail in section 4.4.2 on the 
choice for choosing the five-point Likert scales approach. 
 
Construct validity: Construct validity attempts to identify the underlying constructs 
being measured and determine how well the test represents them. It is assessed through 
convergent and discriminant validities. As the study have mostly used a set of published 
measures established for the instrument, it offers the “goodness of fit” of the measure 
(Sekaran, 2006).  
 
4.7.3. Normality 
 
The assumption of normality is a pre-requisite for many inferential statistical 
techniques. There are a number of different ways to explore this assumption 
graphically: histogram, stem-and-leaf plot, boxplot, normal probability plot and 
detrended normality plot. A number of statistical analyses are also available to test 
normality: Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, with a Lilliefors significance level, the 
Shapiro-Wilks statistic, and Skewness and Kurtosis.  
 
As such, data screening is useful to ensure that data have been correctly entered and the 
distributions of variables are normal. If variable distributions deviate dramatically, this 
may affect the validity of the results produced. Therefore, transforming the values of the 
variable may be needed in order to satisfy the distribution requirements for the use of a 
particular parametric statistic (Field, 2009). However, there are arguments on 
transforming variables to meet the assumptions of various parametric techniques, where 
some authors argued against it (see Field, 2009; Grissom, 2000; Pallant, 2007; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) point out that, although data 
transformations are feasible as a remedy for outliers and for failures of normality, they 
are not usually recommended. This is due to an analysis being interpreted from the 
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variables that are in it, and transformed variables are harder to interpret (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Field (2009), on the other hand, cautioned that transforming the raw data 
will not necessarily affect the residuals. Furthermore, Grissom (2000) reports that the 
means of transformed variables can occasionally reverse the difference of means of the 
original variables. Therefore, should a study fail to satisfy the assumptions for the 
parametric statistics, then Pallant (2007) states that the study needs to abandon 
parametric analyses and to use non-parametric alternatives instead.  
 
4.8. Analysis Plan 
 
Various statistical techniques were used in this study to test the stated hypotheses. 
Specifically, statistical analysis software, SPSS version 17.0 (for Windows) was 
employed.  The SPSS software is a tool that provides a wide variety of statistical 
methods for analysing data. Data analyses include both descriptive and inferential 
statistics.  
 
At the univariate level, descriptive statistics were computed for each of the study 
variables. Descriptive statistics include mean, standard deviation, frequencies and 
percentage where appropriate and will be provided in table form. First, it was used to 
assess the accuracy of data entry, missing data, and the distributions of the variables 
with respect to normality. Then, it was used to present the profiles of the study’s 
respondents and analysis of variables across all four vignettes. 
At the bivariate level, bivariate statistical techniques were used to investigate the study 
variables. Pearson’s correlations between all the study variables were calculated to 
investigate the degree of correlation as well as the direction of the correlation. Pearson’s 
correlations also assist in determining if any of the independent variables are highly 
correlated with each other. 
 
At the multivariate level, multiple regression statistical techniques were used to test the 
research hypotheses and investigate the relative influences of the study variables on 
internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. Multiple regression generally 
explains the relationship between multiple independent or multiple predictor variables 
and one dependent or criterion variable (Field, 2009). In the current study, a standard 
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multiple regression was used to estimate the extent to which each of the study variables 
influenced internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions while controlling for the 
influences of the other variables included in the regression model. The following 
equation illustrates the full regression model that is used to predict internal auditors’ 
internal whistleblowing intentions. 
 
Ŷ = α + β1 (Egoism) + β2 (Benevolence) + β3 (Principle) + β4 (Size of Organisation) + 
β5 (Job Level) + β6 (Moral Equity) + β7 (Relativism) + β8 (Contractualism) + β9 (Locus 
of Control) + β10 (Organisational Commitment) + β11 (Seriousness of Wrongdoing) + 
β12 (Status of Wrongdoer) + β13 (Gender) + β14 (Age) + β15 (Tenure) + ɛ 
 
Where, “Ŷ” is the predicted value for internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing 
intentions, “α” is the estimate of the Y – intercept, “β” is the slope of the regression line, 
and “ɛ” is the representative of the errors of prediction.  
 
4.9. Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the research method used in this study, which include the overall 
research design, variables used in this study and the development of the data collection 
survey instrument. This chapter also discusses the method used to test the proposed 
relationships among the hypotheses as explained in Chapter 3. A mail questionnaire 
survey was used to gather data from the internal auditors. Various statistical analyses 
were used in analysing the variables influencing the internal whistleblowing intentions 
behaviour. The next chapter, Chapter 5, presents detailed analyses of data and the 
presentation of the results from the survey. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain and present the results of statistical analyses 
used in testing the hypothesised relationships among the study variables. It begins with 
examining the descriptive characteristics of the sample, explaining the respondents’ 
profile and their responses in each vignette. Next, this chapter describes the results of 
various exploratory data analyses. It includes analysis of missing data, normality, 
reliability, social desirability response, and testing the assumptions of multiple 
regressions. Then, the correlation statistics among the independent and dependent 
variables are presented. The final section, discusses the results of multiple regression 
analysis.   
 
5.2. Descriptive Analysis 
 
Three types of descriptive analysis were provided. It begins with characteristics of the 
study’s respondents, their general responses to the vignettes and finally, comparisons on 
their internal whistleblowing intentions across demographic variables. 
 
5.2.1. Respondents profiles 
 
Table 5.1 below presents the profiles of the study’s respondents.   Descriptive statistics 
indicated that, the majority of internal auditors were male (i.e. 54.4%). The largest age 
group was represented by the 25–35 years old range (51.1%), and most of these internal 
auditors have lower working tenure (less than 5 years) with their current organisations 
(a total of 57.8%).  In terms of job level, the majority of them were at Senior and 
Manager levels (37.2% and 37.8%, respectively). The largest representation of 
respondents (34.4%) worked in smaller organisations (having less than 500 employees).  
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Table 5-1: Respondents’ Profile (N = 180) 
Variables N %
Gender Male 98 54.4
 Female 82 45.6
 Total 180
Age < 25 years old 6 3.3
 25 – 35 years old 92 51.1
 36 – 45 years old 49 27.2
 > 46 years old 33 18.3
 Total 180
Tenure < 2 years  46 25.6
 2 – 5 years 58 32.2
 6 – 10 years 31 17.2
 > 11 years  45 25.0
 Total 180
Job level Junior 23 12.8
 Senior 67 37.2
 Manager 68 37.8
 Higher than Manager 22 12.2
 Total 180
Size < 500 employees 62 34.4
 501 – 1,000 employees 27 15.0
 1,001 – 3,000 employees 37 20.6
 > 3,001 employees 54 30.0
 Total 180
 
5.2.2. Response across vignettes 
 
The descriptive statistics for the organisational, individual and situational variables as 
well as internal whistleblowing intentions (the dependent variables), are presented in 
Table 5.2. The table shows the descriptive analyses of all variables across all four 
vignettes. As such, discussions were centred on differences of reporting analyses across 
vignettes.  
 
5.2.2.1. Vignette 1 
 
An interesting observation can be made with Vignette 1. The vignette can be regarded 
as a non-financial wrongdoing since it involved a situation where a Marketing 
Executive (the wrongdoer) took paid-time off without reporting it to his superior. The 
internal auditors rated the situation as very unethical (M = 1.56, SD = .785) and as a 
serious type of wrongdoing (M = 4.14, SD = .806). Status of the wrongdoer (level of 
power) and the respondents’ intention to whistleblow were rated as moderate.   
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Previous studies have associated seriousness as being measured either in terms of 
materiality (Curtis, 2006; Miceli & Near, 1985), frequency the activity occurred (Near, 
Ryan, & Miceli, 1995) or that it involved safety or health consequences (G. King, 
1997). The scenario used in this study, however, captured a wrongdoing by the said 
wrongdoer in the form of violation of organisational policy. As the role of internal 
auditors is wider and different from external auditors whose job roles are limited to 
attesting to the “truth and fairness” of financial statements, the finding proved that 
internal auditors  are indeed aptly described as the “eyes and ears of management” (Xu 
& Ziegenfuss, 2008). Internal auditors in this study were concerned with the waste of 
organisational resources in paying for an unperformed task by the wrongdoer. 
 
5.2.2.2. Vignette 2 
 
The table shows that, overall, Vignette 2 was rated as very unethical (M = 1.16, SD = 
.541), the nature of wrongdoing was rated as very serious (M = 4.83, SD = .512) and 
the event was more likely to be whistleblowed either by respondents themselves or by 
their colleagues (M = 4.49, SD = .895 and M = 4.00, SD = 1.091 respectively). 
Vignette 2 involved a Production Manager (the wrongdoer) who overstated company’s 
cash purchases from a supplier and misappropriated the remaining cash balance for an 
amount of RM12,000. 
 
The wrongdoing conducted by the Production Manager clearly benefited him or her 
rather than the organisation.   Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991) explained that theft is 
an act that is only intended to benefit the individuals themselves and such an act will 
hurt the organisation’s bottom line. Therefore, the reason why internal auditors are more 
likely to internally whistleblow in Vignette 2 was due to the fact that, “... auditors might 
be more likely to blow the whistle on an act of an individual who is trying to illegally 
enrich himself or herself at the organization’s expense than someone who may appear to 
be acting on behalf of the organization” (Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991, p. 118). 
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Table 5-2: Descriptive Statistics for Scale Variables 
Variables N Mean Std Min Max 
Organisational Commitment  171 53.94 8.112 24.00 75.00 
Locus of Control  174 40.37 7.340 18.00 61.00 
Ethical Climate - Egoism Dimension 178 3.38 0.432 2.38 4.75 
Ethical Climate - Benevolence Dimension 178 3.48 0.531 2.00 4.80 
Ethical Climate - Principle Dimension 172 3.59 0.405 2.50 4.58 
Vignette 1:   
Ethical 180 1.56 0.785 1 4 
Seriousness 179 4.11 0.806 2 5 
Status of wrongdoer (level of power) 180 3.07 1.003 1 5 
Internal whistleblowing intention - You 179 3.74 1.050 1 5 
Internal whistleblowing intention - Colleagues 179 3.32 1.047 1 5 
Moral Equity Dimension 173 4.25 0.695 1.75 5.00 
Relativism Dimension 177 4.01 0.820 2.00 5.00 
Contractualism Dimension 179 1.86 0.799 1.00 4.00 
Vignette 2:   
Ethical 180 1.16 0.541 1 4 
Seriousness 180 4.83 0.512 1 5 
Status of wrongdoer (level of power) 180 4.09 0.821 1 5 
Internal whistleblowing intention - You 179 4.49 0.895 1 5 
Internal whistleblowing intention - Colleagues 179 4.00 1.091 1 5 
Moral Equity Dimension 175 4.78 0.551 2.00 5.00 
Relativism Dimension 178 4.66 0.678 2.00 5.00 
Contractualism Dimension 178 1.29 0.605 1.00 4.00 
Vignette 3:   
Ethical 180 1.99 0.918 1 5 
Seriousness 180 3.80 1.022 1 5 
Status of wrongdoer (level of power) 180 4.68 0.657 1 5 
Internal whistleblowing intention - You 179 3.56 1.328 1 5 
Internal whistleblowing intention - Colleagues 179 3.25 1.234 1 5 
Moral Equity Dimension 174 3.92 0.866 2.00 5.00 
Relativism Dimension 177 3.71 0.981 1.00 5.00 
Contractualism Dimension 179 2.25 1.064 1.00 5.00 
Vignette 4:   
Ethical 180 1.78 0.836 1 4 
Seriousness 180 4.30 0.845 1 5 
Status of wrongdoer (level of power) 180 4.41 0.789 1 5 
Internal whistleblowing intention - You 179 4.10 1.071 1 5 
Internal whistleblowing intention - Colleagues 179 3.63 1.175 1 5 
Moral Equity Dimension 173 4.14 0.789 2.00 5.00 
Relativism Dimension 177 3.90 0.906 1.00 5.00 
Contractualism Dimension 179 1.99 0.902 1.00 5.00 
 
5.2.2.3. Vignettes 3 and 4 
 
Other interesting observations were with regard to Vignette 3 and Vignette 4. The 
situation in Vignette 3 was about a request by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the 
organisation to the accountant to reduce the provision for doubtful debts in order to 
increase the company’s reported income. Vignette 4 on the other hand, was related to a 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) who was reluctant to record a substantial amount of 
unrecorded liabilities into the company’s financial statements, as the CFO argued that it 
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will affect the company’s current year’s bonus payment. Though both the wrongdoers 
were acknowledged as very powerful persons within the organisations (M = 4.68, SD = 
.657; M = 4.41, SD = .789), as compared to the other two wrongdoers in Vignette 1 and 
2, the means for whistleblowing were clearly lower than those in the other two 
vignettes, with Vignette 3 showing the lowest mean (M = 3.56, SD = 1.328) of internal 
whistleblowing.  
 
There are three good reasons for these two outcomes. First, the higher status of 
wrongdoers could have made them feel less obliged to whistleblow. Next, it could 
possibly be due to the reward that the internal auditors themselves, as employees of the 
organisation could reap in terms of bonus payments should they allow both the CEO 
and CFO to commit to such unethical behaviour. This brings us back to the argument 
put forward by Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991) on Vignette 1 earlier. The acts 
conducted by both the CEO and CFO were clearly not intended for their own benefit, 
but for the welfare of all members of the organisation. The final reason could be 
attributed to the fact that the situations as described in Vignettes 3 and 4 involved 
irregularities in the organisation’s financial statements (the main role of external 
auditors is to attest the truth and fairness of company’s financial statements). The 
internal auditors in this study seem to feel less obligated to whistleblow presumably 
because they perceived that the external auditors would potentially pick up such 
irregularities during their financial statement audit.   
 
5.2.3. Internal whistleblowing intentions across respondents’ profiles 
 
Table 5.3 below provides descriptive statistics for internal whistleblowing intentions in 
each of the four vignettes across five respondents’ profiles items: Gender, Age, Tenure, 
Job Level, and Size of organisation. The discussion centred on each individual 
respondents’ profiles with regards to the differences of internal whistleblowing 
intentions across the four vignettes.  
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Table 5-3: Analysis of Responses for Internal Whistleblowing 
Bold item = Highest mean 
N = 179 
 
5.2.3.1. Gender 
 
There were different reactions on the decision to internally whistleblow between 
genders. Female internal auditors were more likely to whistleblow in Vignettes 2, 3 and 
4, while their male counterparts more likely only in Vignette 1. Judging from the type of 
wrongdoings in each vignette, the situation in Vignette 1 only involved a minor type of 
organisational wrongdoing, i.e. taking unpaid time off by its Marketing Executive, 
unlike major types of wrongdoings in Vignettes 2, 3 and 4. As females are said to 
possess lower tolerance for illegal and unethical behaviours (Yu & Zhang, 2006), such 
behaviour is typified in this sample. This is also consistent with the theory put forward 
by studies suggesting that women are thought to be more ethical in their judgment and 
behaviour than men (Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
Variables N Vignette 1 Vignette  2 Vignette  3 Vignette  4 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Gender Male 98 3.80 1.074 4.38 .969 3.46 1.310 4.04 1.064 
Female 81 3.68 1.023 4.63 .782 3.69 1.348 4.17 1.082 
Age < 25 years old 6 3.17 1.472 3.83 1.472 2.83 1.602 3.17 1.835 
25 – 35 years old 91 3.51 1.047 4.51 .848 3.60 1.332 4.08 1.147 
36 – 45 years old 49 4.02 .989 4.55 .843 3.63 1.220 4.24 .723 
> 46 years old 33 4.09 .879 4.48 .972 3.48 1.439 4.12 1.083 
Tenure < 2 years  46 3.46 1.110 4.46 .912 3.74 1.357 4.04 1.192 
2 – 5 years 57 3.70 1.085 4.47 .966 3.40 1.462 4.23 1.069 
6 – 10 years 31 3.61 1.086 4.55 .810 3.71 1.071 4.00 1.033 
> 11 years  45 4.18 .777 4.51 .869 3.49 1.290 4.07 .986 
Job 
level 
Junior 23 3.52 1.275 4.48 .898 3.39 1.588 3.78 1.476 
Senior 66 3.50 .996 4.39 .909 3.48 1.256 4.00 1.081 
Manager 68 3.85 1.011 4.46 .984 3.57 1.331 4.21 .971 
Higher than 22 4.36 .790 4.91 .294 3.95 1.253 4.41 .734 
Orgn 
Size 
< 500 employees  62 3.82 1.124 4.52 .805 3.69 1.249 4.11 1.088 
501 – 1,000 27 3.67 1.038 4.67 .679 3.59 1.394 4.26 .903 
1,001 – 3,000 36 3.67 .926 4.50 .910 3.33 1.242 4.03 .971 
> 3,001 employees 54 3.74 1.067 4.37 1.069 3.56 1.449 4.06 1.204 
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5.2.3.2. Age 
 
The result showed that older internal auditors (more than 36 years old) are more likely 
to internally whistleblow than those in younger age categories (35 years old and lower). 
Basically, the notion as suggested by previous studies that older organisational members 
have minimal restraints to whistleblow appears to be true (Keenan, 2000; Mesmer-
Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Sims & Keenan, 1998). 
 
5.2.3.3. Tenure 
 
There were mixed results with regards to working tenure of the respondents and their 
internal whistleblowing intentions. By comparing the differences across the vignettes, it 
is clear that, internal auditors who possessed longer working tenure (6 years and more) 
are more likely to whistleblow on lower level wrongdoers such as the Marketing 
Executive in Vignette 1 and Production Manager in Vignette 2. Those who have shorter 
working tenure (5 years and below) are seen to be more likely to whistleblow on higher 
status wrongdoers such as CEO in Vignette 3 and CFO in Vignette 4. 
 
5.2.3.4. Job level 
 
All vignettes displayed the highest means of internal whistleblowing intentions in the 
“Higher than manager” level group. The table shows that organisational members 
holding a higher managerial level, i.e. higher than manager position, are most likely to 
internally whistleblow. Clearly, this group of organisational members are said to have 
more power and authority in their organisation and hence have greater responsibility to 
report any cases of corporate wrongdoings. 
 
5.2.3.5. Size of organisation 
 
The highest means for internal whistleblowing intentions were found in smaller size 
organisations. The results show that internal auditors in organisations having less than 
1,000 employees were more likely to whistleblow. This finding is consistent with 
bystander theory suggesting that the instance of whistleblowing would be lower in a 
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larger organisation, hence consistent with the notion of “diffusion of responsibility” by 
Latane and Darley (1968).  
 
5.3. Exploratory Data Analyses 
 
Prior to conducting any formal statistical analyses, preliminary steps to ensure the 
quality of data were conducted. It is important to ensure that the data have been 
correctly entered into the Data Editor of SPSS. This will provide an assurance that data 
to be examined are of good quality for further analysis (Sekaran, 2006). The process 
began with inspection of missing data, checking the distributions of variables with 
respect to normality, and conducting reliability analysis and the social desirability 
response analysis. 
 
5.3.1. Missing data 
 
It is essential to inspect the data file for the possibility for any missing data.  Missing 
data may cause problems in the study’s validity and reliability (Neuman, 2006). Missing 
values when randomly scattered are less problematic than those are not normally 
scattered because non-randomly missing values reduce the generalisability of the 
findings (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). If the missing data were found to have a 
systematic pattern (not normally scattered), then the results of research could be 
seriously flawed by non-response bias (Neuman, 2006).  
 
The patterns of the study’s missing data were examined using the SPSS MVA (missing 
value analysis) function to identify the existence of any potential systematic missing 
data. The SPSS MVA function provides a slightly different set of descriptive tools for 
analysing missing data. The statistics showed that none of the variables have missing 
values of over 5% of the sample. These missing data were further inspected to assess 
whether they occurred randomly or due to some systematic pattern. The correlations 
with Little’s MCAR (missing completely at random) test were conducted for all 
variables utilised to assess each vignette. The test showed that the probability that the 
patterns of cases deviates from randomness was greater than 0.05 in all vignettes 
(Vignette 1, p = 0.907; Vignette 2, p = 0.998; Vignette 3, p = 0.947; Vignette 4, p = 
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0.999). As a statistically non-significant result is desired, MCAR may be inferred for all 
variables in each vignette. 
 
5.3.2. Normality analysis 
 
Utilising Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics for each individual variable, the test of 
normality for all variables showed that only the Locus of Control variable was normally 
distributed. For all other variables, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics for testing 
normality is less than the required value of > 0.05 (see Table 5.4). As the current study 
fails to satisfy the assumptions for the required parametric statistics, Pallant (2007) 
states that the study needs to abandon parametric analyses and to use non-parametric 
alternatives instead. Using parametric statistical techniques on non-parametric data 
could provide inaccurate results (Field, 2009). Transformations were not undertaken due 
to arguments discussed in Chapter 4 earlier (refer section 4.7.3). 
 
Table 5-4: Tests of Normality 
Items Kolmogorov-Smirnov** Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
Organisational Commitment  .070 171 .038 .984 171 .052 
Locus of Control  .057 174 .200* .993 174 .601 
Ethical Climate - Egoism Dimension .073 178 .022 .986 178 .065 
Ethical Climate - Benevolence Dimension .100 178 .000 .978 178 .006 
Ethical Climate - Principle Dimension .070 172 .037 .985 172 .063 
Scenario 1: MES – Overall .156 171 .000 .922 171 .000 
Scenario 1: MES - Moral Equity Dimension .147 173 .000 .887 173 .000
Scenario 1: MES - Relativism Dimension .212 177 .000 .873 177 .000
Scenario 1: MES - Contractualism Dimension .223 179 .000 .844 179 .000
Scenario 2: MES – Overall .418 173 .000 .567 173 .000 
Scenario 2: MES - Moral Equity Dimension .429 175 .000 .454 175 .000 
Scenario 2: MES - Relativism Dimension .438 178 .000 .564 178 .000 
Scenario 2: MES - Contractualism Dimension .459 178 .000 .537 178 .000 
Scenario 3: MES – Overall .169 173 .000 .919 173 .000
Scenario 3: MES - Moral Equity Dimension .176 174 .000 .902 174 .000
Scenario 3: MES - Relativism Dimension .195 177 .000 .891 177 .000
Scenario 3: MES - Contractualism Dimension .199 179 .000 .873 179 .000
Scenario 4: MES – Overall .166 172 .000 .921 172 .000 
Scenario 4: MES - Moral Equity Dimension .186 173 .000 .872 173 .000 
Scenario 4: MES - Relativism Dimension .186 177 .000 .871 177 .000 
Scenario 4: MES - Contractualism Dimension .221 179 .000 .845 179 .000 
* This is lower bound of true significance 
** Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
114 
 
Hence, non-parametric methods to test for group differences such as Mann-Whitney test 
and the Kruskal-Wallis test were employed. To explore the relationship between two 
variables, non-parametric Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation (rho) were presented. 
Non-parametric techniques do not make assumptions about population distribution and 
do not have strict requirements as the parametric techniques required (Field, 2009; 
Pallant, 2007). When standard assumptions (that are commonly violated in social 
science research) such as normal distribution or equal sample sizes between groups, are 
not met, non-parametric techniques have little effect on the power of the test and the 
subsequent results. These methods have the benefit of requiring fewer assumptions, thus 
non-parametric techniques are able to preserve Type I error rates to nominal alpha when 
testing hypotheses without making an appeal to population parameters. Furthermore, as 
part of the study’s data were measured on nominal (categorical) and ordinal (ranked) 
scales, the choice of non-parametric analyses for the study was considered appropriate 
(Pallant, 2007). 
 
5.3.3. Reliability analysis 
 
Reliability is a measure of the internal consistency of a set of scale items (Sekaran, 
2006). There are a number of different internal indicators of internal consistency, but 
the most commonly used is Cronbach’s Alpha (Coakes, Steed, & Price, 2008; Smith, 
2011).  Cronbach’s Alpha can be interpreted as a correlation coefficient and its value 
ranges from 0 to 1. Cronbach’s Alpha is concerned with the degree to which the items 
that make up a scale are internally consistent with each other (Pallant, 2007).  
 
The results indicate that the Cronbach’s Alpha reliability coefficients for all variables 
are all above 0.6. Generally, Sekaran (2006) stated that reliabilities of less than 0.6 are 
considered to be poor, those of 0.7 are considered acceptable, those above 0.8 are good, 
while the closer the reliability coefficient to 1.0, the better. Table 5.5 indicates that, the 
internal consistency reliability of the variables used in this study is considered good. 
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Table 5-5: Reliability Analysis 
Items Cronbach Alpha N 
Overall items .854 117 
Organisational Commitment .882 15 
Locus of Control  .817 16 
Ethical Climate – Overall items .844 26 
Ethical Climate - Egoism Dimension .605 8 
Ethical Climate - Benevolence Dimension .702 5 
Ethical Climate - Principle Dimension .748 12 
Vignette 1: Moral Equity Dimension .896 4 
Vignette 1: Relativism Dimension .954 2 
Vignette 1: Contractualism Dimension .945 2 
Vignette 2: Moral Equity Dimension .933 4 
Vignette 2: Relativism Dimension .958 2 
Vignette 2: Contractualism Dimension .989 2 
Vignette 3: Moral Equity Dimension .941 4 
Vignette 3: Relativism Dimension .941 2 
Vignette 3: Contractualism Dimension .985 2 
Vignette 4: Moral Equity Dimension .940 4 
Vignette 4: Relativism Dimension .966 2 
Vignette 4: Contractualism Dimension .986 2 
 
5.3.4. Social desirability response bias analysis 
 
Consistent with the approach used in previous ethics research (J. R. Cohen, Pant, & 
Sharp, 1995; J. R. Cohen et al., 1996, 1998; Patel, 2003; Zhang et al., 2009b), the study 
measured social desirability response bias (SDRB) by asking the respondents two set of 
questions in each of the four vignettes: (1) “Rate the likelihood “YOU” would report to 
internal parties in your organisation”, and (2) “Rate the likelihood that “YOUR 
COLLEAGUES” would report to internal parties in your organisation”. The purpose of 
asking the question from the respondents' perspective, as well as the respondents' 
perception of their colleagues' judgment, was to attempt to control any systematic errors 
resulting from social desirability response bias. Responses were captured on a five-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5, in which 1 was equal to “Less likely”, and 5 equal to 
“Very likely”. The difference in responses between these two questions is the measure 
of SDRB (J. R. Cohen et al., 1995, 1996, 1998).  
 
As shown in Table 5.6 below, compared to the “You" question, the mean scores were 
higher than the "Your Colleagues" internal whistleblowing intentions in each of the four 
vignettes. Respondents indicated that their colleagues were less likely to perform 
internal whistleblowing intentions, compared to their own intentions. The largest likely 
difference (0.49) is in the responses to Vignette 2. The next largest social bias difference 
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(0.47) is in Vignette 4 responses. The smallest difference (0.31) is found in the Vignette 
3 responses. 
 
Table 5-6: Test of Social Desirability Response Bias in Each Vignette 
 You 
(A) 
Your Colleague 
(B) 
Mean 
Difference 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev (A) - (B) Z Sig 
Vignette 1 3.74 1.050 3.32 1.047 0.42 -5.542 .000 
Vignette 2 4.49 0.895 4.00 1.091 0.49 -6.098 .000 
Vignette 3 3.56 1.328 3.25 1.234 0.31 -4.864 .000 
Vignette 4 4.10 1.071 3.63 1.175 0.47 -6.211 .000 
 
The Wilcoxon Signed rank test (equivalent to parametric t-tests for paired samples) was 
used to find out whether SDRB existed among internal auditors within their responses 
to each of the four vignettes. The analysis (see Table 5.6) demonstrated that there were 
significant differences between the scores on "You" and "Your Colleagues" questions 
on all of the four vignettes (2-tailed, p<.001). These results reveal the existence of 
SDRB among internal auditors in this study. Although social desirability response bias 
existed in this study, prior ethics studies have stated that it was not a salient threat to the 
internal validity of the study’s findings (Nguyen et al., 2008b).  Furthermore, Randall 
and Fernandes (1991, p. 813) stated that, “previous research has convincingly 
demonstrated that observed levels of socially desirable responding vary with the levels 
of anonymity”. As the anonymity of the respondents in this study has been assured 
(refer section 4.4.4.1 earlier), the level of social desirability response bias in this study is 
considered as minimal. 
 
5.3.5. Assumptions of multiple regressions 
 
As stated in section 5.5.2 earlier, all individual variables (except Locus of Control) were 
not normally distributed. Multiple regression analyses on the other hand, are based on 
specific assumptions, which if not met, may lead to inaccurate and invalid inferences 
(Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). However, 
to some, the issue of meeting assumptions is a matter of degree, sometimes referred to 
as robustness, which suggest that a statistical procedure can be used even if some of the 
assumptions of analyses are violated (Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
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Since this study involves multivariate analysis, all of the variables together were 
examined with respect to multivariate normality. As such, discussions about testing the 
assumptions of multivariate analyses are hereby provided:  
 
5.3.5.1. Examination of residual statistics 
 
Major assumptions of multiple regression analyses include normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity, which could be assessed simultaneously through the examination of 
residual statistics and graphical examination of scatterplots, histograms, and normal 
probability plots for each regression model (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2007, p. 125) stated that “assumptions of the analysis are the residuals 
(differences between obtained and predicted DV scores) are normally distributed about 
the predicted DV score, that residuals have a straight-line relationship with predicted 
DV scores, and that the variance of the residuals about predicted DV scores is the same 
for all predicted scores”. 
 
Graphical examination of residual scatterplots for each model (one model for each 
vignette) showed acceptance of the multiple regression assumptions. The scatterplot for 
each vignette showed a systematic pattern to the residuals, with most of the scores 
concentrated in the centre. Additionally, examinations of the normal probability plots 
for each model showed an upward diagonal line, with slight curvature. Graphical 
observation of histograms showed that the assumption of normality had been met in all 
four models. All histograms showed a roughly normal distribution (a bell-shaped 
curve), where data were distributed almost symmetrically around the centre of the 
distribution. Model 1 (Vignette 1) and 3 (Vignette 3) were normally distributed, and 
Model 2 (Vignette 2) and 4 (Vignette 4) approximated normality. 
 
5.3.5.2. Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity exists when there is a strong correlation between two or more 
predictors in a regression model. The independent variables are said to be highly 
correlated when their r value is equal to 0.9 and above (Field, 2009; Pallant, 2007). 
Multicollinearity was assessed through the examination of correlation matrices (see 
Appendix 4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D). An examination of Spearman’s rho correlation matrices 
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for each model, revealed correlations of .70 or greater were detected in three of the 
models, i.e. Models 2, 3, and 4. The highest was between Moral Equity and Relativism 
variables (.866) detected in Model 3. Further tests were conducted based on SPSS’s 
colinearity statistics analysis by examining the variables’ tolerance scores and variance 
inflation factor (VIF). Specifically, all of the models had independent variables with 
tolerance scores above the cut-off point of .10 and VIF scores less than 10 (Pallant, 
2007). This indicates the absence of serious multicollinearity. Therefore, these variables 
were retained for analysis. 
 
5.3.5.3. Sample size 
 
It is extremely important to have enough data to obtain a reliable regression model 
(Field, 2009; Pallant, 2007), as small sample size may cause a result that does not 
generalise with other samples. Pallant (2007) stated that, multiple regression should not 
be used on small samples, where the distribution of scores is very skewed. So, the issue 
is how many cases or subjects are required to enable generalisability of results? 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 123) give a formula for calculating sample size 
requirements, taking into account the number of independent variables any study wish 
to use: N > 50 + 8m (where m = number of independent variables). A higher cases-to-
independent variables ratio is needed when the dependent variable is skewed (Pallant, 
2007; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) added that more cases 
are required if the dependent variable is not normally distributed, transformations are 
not undertaken (as the case in this study) and substantial measurement error is expected 
from less reliable variables. The current study has 15 independent variables and as such, 
according to the given formula, requires a total of 170 cases or subjects. This study 
received 180 usable responses, which superseded this initial requirement. 
 
5.4. Bivariate Correlations 
 
Spearman rho correlation coefficients (rs) presented in Appendix 4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D 
are used to assess the relationship between the variables investigated in this study. All 
independent variables in each model were consistently correlated with Internal 
Whistleblowing Intentions (dependent variables) in the hypothesised directions except 
for Egoism (positive sign in all models), Contractualism (negative sign in all models), 
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Status of Wrongdoer (positive sign in Model 1, 3, and 4), Gender (negative sign in 
Model 2, 3, and 4) and lastly, Tenure (negative sign in Model 3 and 4).  
 
Only independent variables that have significant correlations with dependent variables 
(internal whistleblowing intentions) as well as among independent variables are hereby 
discussed. Of the 15 independent variables, only four variables, i.e. Moral Equity, 
Relativism, Contractualism and Seriousness of Wrongdoing, were consistently showing 
significant correlations with internal auditors’ Internal Whistleblowing Intentions 
(dependent variables) in all four models. These indicate that internal auditors use more 
than one dimension in making their ethical judgment prior to making their internal 
whistleblowing intentions. Moreover, the nature and severity of the wrongdoing will 
spark the likelihood that these internal auditors will engage in such behaviour. Other 
variables such as, Principle was significantly correlated only in Model 1 and 3, Gender, 
only significant in Model 2, while Job Level, Age and Tenure were significant only in 
Model 1. These suggest that such variables are dependent on the case or type of 
wrongdoings as well as the status of the wrongdoer portrayed by these four vignettes. 
 
Interesting observations are also found in correlations between the independent 
variables. With respect to Locus of Control variable, internal auditors in this study were 
found to possess internal traits of locus of control, as shown by negative correlations in 
all four vignettes. A significant and negative correlation between Locus of Control and 
Organisational Commitment indicates that internal auditors with internal traits possess 
higher organisational commitment. Additionally, Locus of Control is found to be 
negatively correlated with Age, suggesting that older internal auditors possess internal 
traits of locus of control. With respect to the Organisational Commitment variable, it is 
significantly correlated to Job Level, Gender, Age and Tenure.  Internal auditors 
possessing higher organisational commitment are mostly from higher managerial levels, 
are men, older and have longer working tenure in their organisations. Finally, with 
respect to Gender variable, it is significantly correlated with Job Level and Age, 
suggesting that most male internal auditors in this study hold higher managerial 
positions and are older employees in their organisations. 
 
According to interpretation by J. W. Cohen (1988), the bivariate correlation results 
showed that the variables’ strength of relationship ranged between small to medium size 
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effects. It is important to note that the bivariate results are limited to the strength and 
direction of the linear relationship between the independent variables and the dependent 
variables. Bivariate findings do not provide information as to whether and how these 
independent variables influence internal auditors’ whistleblowing intentions.  
 
5.5. Multiple Regressions Analysis 
 
A standard multiple regression was conducted using the 15 independent variables to 
further investigate the hypothesised relationships among the variables. Multiple 
regressions supersede bivariate correlation analysis by allowing the study to investigate 
the influence of each of the independent variables on the dependent variable while 
simultaneously controlling for other independent variables. The study ran four 
regression models, one for each vignette, to assess the intentions to internally 
whistleblow.  
 
For multiple regression analysis purposes, ordinal variables such as Size of 
Organisation (coded 1 = 1,000 and more employees, 0 = Less than 1,000 employees), 
Job Level (coded 1 = Lower level, 0 = Higher level), Age (coded 1 = Older, 0 = 
Younger) and Tenure (coded 1 = More than 5 years, 0 = Less than 5 years) were re-
coded dichotomously. The regression results presented in the tables are discussed below 
with regard to the overall efficiency of each model, the absolute impact of each 
independent variable on internal whistleblowing, and the relative contribution of each 
independent variable to the model in predicting internal auditors’ whistleblowing 
intentions. Tables 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10 display the unstandardised regression 
coefficients or slopes (B), the intercepts, standardised regression coefficients or beta 
weights (β), and the multiple correlation coefficients (R), the coefficient of 
determinations (R2), for each vignette.  
 
5.5.1. Regression result – Model 1 
 
Table 5.7 illustrates the impact of all independent variables on internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions for Vignette 1. To recap, Vignette 1 is about a Marketing 
Executive taking unreported paid time off. According to the regression results, the linear 
combination of the 15 independent variables in model 1 significantly predicts internal 
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auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions, R2 = .33, F (15, 148) = 4.98, p = < .01. 
This model accounts for 33% of the variance in internal whistleblowing. The F ratio of 
4.98 is statistically significant at 1% level. The model appears to be efficient in 
predicting internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions.  
 
Table 5-7: Regression Results for Vignette 1 
 B S.E β t Sig. 
(Constant) -.187 1.346   -.139 .890 
Egoism .028 .205 .011 .135 .893 
Benevolence -.149 .202 -.075 -.737 .462 
Principle .218 .255 .084 .857 .393 
Size of Organisation -.036 .149 -.017 -.239 .812 
Job Level .272 .174 .130 1.561 .121 
Moral Equity -.015 .149 -.010 -.103 .918 
Relativism .291 .131 .228 2.221** .028 
Contractualism .093 .134 .071 .694 .489 
Locus of Control -.014 .012 -.096 -1.160 .248 
Organ. Commitment .006 .012 .048 .517 .606 
Seriousness of Wrongdoing .517 .102 .397 5.095*** .000 
Status of Wrongdoer .082 .074 .078 1.105 .271 
Gender -.128 .151 -.061 -.846 .399 
Age .280 .207 .133 1.351 .179 
Tenure -.110 .185 -.052 -.598 .551 
R2 = .336      
R = .579      
F-value = 4.984***      
Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
 
A review of the regression coefficients reveals that only two variables (Relativism and 
Seriousness of Wrongdoing) have positive impacts on internal whistleblowing and are 
significant at 5% and 1% level respectively, on internal whistleblowing when 
controlling for the other variables in the equation. The beta weights (β), indicate that 
Seriousness of Wrongdoing has the strongest impact on internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions in Vignette 1, followed by Relativism variable. 
 
5.5.2. Regression result – Model 2 
 
Table 5.8 illustrates the impact of all independent variables for Vignette 2. The case in 
Vignette 2 concerns an act of overstating purchases amount by a Production Manager. 
Regression results indicate that the linear combination of the 15 independent variables 
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in model 2 also significantly predicts internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing 
intentions, R2 = .13, F (15, 149) = 1.51, p = < .10. This model accounts only for 13% of 
the variance in internal whistleblowing. The F ratio of 1.51 is statistically significant at 
10% level. The model appears to be minimally efficient in predicting internal auditors’ 
internal whistleblowing intentions.  
 
Table 5-8: Regression Results for Vignette 2 
 B S.E β t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.343 1.631   1.436 .153 
Egoism -.147 .201 -.071 -.733 .465 
Benevolence -.219 .196 -.130 -1.117 .266 
Principle .494 .255 .224 1.939* .054 
Size of Organisation -.129 .143 -.072 -.901 .369 
Job Level .089 .172 .050 .517 .606 
Moral Equity -.057 .224 -.035 -.252 .801 
Relativism .336 .168 .254 1.999** .047 
Contractualism .167 .185 .113 .903 .368 
Locus of Control -.001 .011 -.010 -.104 .918 
Organ. Commitment .001 .012 .009 .084 .933 
Seriousness of Wrongdoing .201 .158 .115 1.273 .205 
Status of Wrongdoer -.161 .092 -.147 -1.751* .082 
Gender -.334 .153 -.186 -2.185** .030 
Age -.019 .201 -.011 -.094 .925 
Tenure .026 .177 .014 .145 .885 
R2 = .132      
R = .363      
F-value = 1.510*      
Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
 
The results reveal that Principle and Relativism have positive impacts and significant at 
10% and 5% respectively, while Status of Wrongdoer and Gender, on the other hand, 
have negative impacts and significant at 10% and 1%, on internal whistleblowing when 
controlling for the other variables in the equation. The beta weights (β), indicate that 
Gender has the strongest impact on internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions 
in Vignette 2, followed by Relativism, Principle, and Status of Wrongdoer.  
 
5.5.3. Regression result – Model 3 
 
Table 5.9 illustrates the impact for Vignette 3. Vignette 3 is about a request for 
reduction in doubtful debts by the Chief Executive Officer. The linear combination of 
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the 15 independent variables in model 3 significantly predicts internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions, R2 = .34, F (15, 149) = 5.11, p = < .01. This model accounts 
for 34% of the variance in internal whistleblowing. The F ratio of 5.11 is statistically 
significant at 1% level. The model also appears to be efficient in predicting internal 
auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions.  
 
Table 5-9: Regression Results for Vignette 3 
 B S.E β t Sig. 
(Constant) .997 1.995   .500 .618 
Egoism -.013 .257 -.004 -.052 .959 
Benevolence -.121 .250 -.048 -.482 .630 
Principle .603 .326 .184 1.849* .066 
Size of Organisation -.293 .185 -.111 -1.587 .115 
Job Level .306 .217 .116 1.410 .161 
Moral Equity -.111 .266 -.072 -.417 .677 
Relativism .237 .196 .175 1.204 .230 
Contractualism .060 .174 .048 .345 .731 
Locus of Control -.016 .015 -.090 -1.057 .292 
Organ. Commitment -.020 .015 -.122 -1.308 .193 
Seriousness of Wrongdoing .628 .130 .483 4.822*** .000 
Status of Wrongdoer -.023 .139 -.011 -.165 .869 
Gender -.332 .190 -.125 -1.746* .083 
Age -.208 .258 -.078 -.808 .420 
Tenure .036 .229 .013 .158 .875 
R2 = .340      
R = .583      
F-value = 5.106***      
Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
 
Regression coefficients reveal that Principle and Seriousness of Wrongdoing have 
positive impacts on internal whistleblowing and are significant at 10% and 1% level 
respectively, while Gender, on the other hand, has negative impact and significant at 
10%, on internal whistleblowing when controlling for the other variables in the 
equation. The beta weights (β), indicate that Seriousness of Wrongdoing has the 
strongest impact on internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions in Vignette 3, 
followed by Principle and Gender. 
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5.5.4. Regression result – Model 4 
 
Table 5.10 illustrates the impact of all independent variables for Vignette 4. This final 
vignette is about a request from a Chief Financial Officer to ignore an amount of 
liabilities to be recorded in the financial statements. The regression model showed that, 
the linear combination of the 15 independent variables in model 4 significantly predicts 
internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions, R2 = .29, F (15, 149) = 3.98, p = < 
.01. This model accounts for 29% of the variance in internal whistleblowing. The F ratio 
of 3.98 is statistically significant at 1% level. Overall, this model also appears to be 
efficient in predicting internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions.  
 
Table 5-10: Regression Results for Vignette 4 
 B S.E β t Sig. 
(Constant) 1.285 1.617   .795 .428 
Egoism -.019 .218 -.007 -.085 .932 
Benevolence -.321 .210 -.159 -1.525 .129 
Principle .768 .269 .291 2.856** .005 
Size of Organisation -.131 .155 -.061 -.843 .400 
Job Level .235 .184 .110 1.274 .205 
Moral Equity -.055 .178 -.041 -.308 .758 
Relativism .168 .149 .142 1.129 .261 
Contractualism .030 .150 .025 .199 .843 
Locus of Control -.017 .013 -.115 -1.317 .190 
Organ. Commitment -.010 .013 -.076 -.779 .437 
Seriousness of Wrongdoing .509 .110 .402 4.639*** .000 
Status of Wrongdoer -.033 .104 -.024 -.315 .754 
Gender -.178 .160 -.083 -1.112 .268 
Age .073 .217 .034 .337 .737 
Tenure -.172 .195 -.079 -.879 .381 
R2 = .286      
R = .535      
F-value = 3.973***      
Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
 
A review of the regression coefficients reveals that only two variables; Principle and 
Seriousness of Wrongdoing, have positive impacts on internal whistleblowing and are 
significant at 5% and 1% level respectively, on internal whistleblowing when 
controlling for the other variables in the equation. Again, the beta weights (β), indicate 
that Seriousness of Wrongdoing has the strongest impact on internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions, followed by Principle variable. 
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5.5.5. Regression result – Model 5 (Overall Vignettes) 
 
Attempts also have been undertaken to examine the overall impact of these 15 
independent variables to overall internal auditors’ whistleblowing intentions. In addition 
to the separate analysis undertaken on each of the four vignettes presented earlier, this 
study aggregated the four vignettes into one measure. Independent variables such as 
Moral Equity, Relativism, Contractualism, Seriousness of Wrongdoing and Status of 
Wrongdoer as well as the dependent variable, Internal Whistleblowing Intentions, which 
are vignette-specific, were each summed and averaged to determine a score for each 
variable.  Table 5.11 illustrates the impact of all independent variables on internal 
auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions for overall vignettes.  
 
Table 5-11: Regression Results for Overall Vignettes 
 B S.E β t Sig. 
(Constant) .612 1.781   .344 .732 
Egoism -.011 .177 -.005 -.060 .953 
Benevolence -.222 .174 -.141 -1.274 .205 
Principle .506 .222 .246 2.277** .024 
Size of Organisation -.152 .127 -.092 -1.197 .233 
Job Level .242 .151 .146 1.607 .110 
Moral Equity -.212 .248 -.134 -.854 .395 
Relativism .366 .170 .280 2.155** .033 
Contractualism .159 .194 .121 .820 .413 
Locus of Control -.013 .010 -.117 -1.270 .206 
Organ. Commitment -.005 .011 -.049 -.474 .636 
Seriousness of Wrongdoing .586 .152 .382 3.866*** .000 
Status of Wrongdoer -.032 .119 -.022 -.266 .791 
Gender -.233 .132 -.139 -1.761* .080 
Age .005 .177 .003 .028 .978 
Tenure -.038 .158 -.023 -.241 .810 
R2 = .263      
R = .513      
F = 3.309***      
Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
 
The regression model showed that, the linear combination of the 15 independent 
variables in Model 5 significantly predicts internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing 
intentions, R2 = .26, F (15, 139) = 3.31, p = < .01. This model accounts for 26% of the 
variance in internal whistleblowing. The F ratio of 3.31 is statistically significant at 1% 
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level. Overall, this model appears to be efficient in predicting internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions.  
 
The results show that Principle, Relativism and Seriousness of Wrongdoing, have 
statistically significant positive relationships with the intentions to whistleblow. 
Negative coefficient of Gender suggests that male internal auditors are less likely to 
internally whistleblow. This is contrary to the prediction.  The beta weights (β), indicate 
that overall, Seriousness of Wrongdoing has the strongest impact on internal auditors’ 
internal whistleblowing intentions, followed by Principle, Relativism and Gender. 
 
5.6. Additional Analyses 
 
Test of multiple regression showed that variables with ordinal data such as Size of 
Organisation, Job Level, Age and Tenure do not show any significant relationships in 
any of the four models. However, additional tests were conducted to determine whether 
there were any significant differences in the levels of internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions between the ordinal groups within the variables. Data in each 
variable are reported in four ordinal group type as explained in Chapter 4 earlier.  
 
As such, the Kruskall-Wallis test, a nonparametric equivalent of the parametric analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) was chosen because the independent variables consisted of more 
than two groups and the dependent variable, internal whistleblowing intention, was 
measured at the ordinal level. While the Kruskall-Wallis statistic tests for differences 
among multiple groups, it does not indicate where specific differences lie. When a 
difference was found through the Kruskall-Wallis test, the Mann-Whitney U test was 
used as a post-hoc statistic to determine which groups were different from one another 
in their internal whistleblowing intentions. The Mann-Whitney test is a nonparametric 
equivalent of the parametric independent sample t-test. Instead of comparing means of 
the two groups, as in the t-test, the Mann-Whitney test compares medians. The scores 
were grouped and compared with one another to determine if there were significant 
differences in the ranks for the two groups.  
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5.6.1. Size of organisation 
 
The first additional test begins with the effect of four different size groups of 
organisations to internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. However, the 
results of the Kruskal-Wallis test across all four vignettes did not find any significant 
differences in the internal whistleblowing intentions for the four different size groups of 
organisations in each of the vignette.  
 
5.6.2. Job level 
 
With regards to the effect of different type of internal auditors’ Job Level, the Kruskal-
Wallis test found that there are significant differences in Vignettes 1 and 2 only. For 
Vignette 1, there was a significant difference within the Job Level in the internal 
whistleblowing intentions between the four groups, ᵡ2 (3, n = 179) = 14.618, p = 0.002 . 
There was a rank difference among groups (refer Table 5.12). The “Higher than 
manager” group recorded a higher mean rank score than the other three managerial level 
groups.  
 
Because the overall test was significant, the Mann-Whitney U test was used as a post-
hoc statistic to determine which groups were different from one another in their internal 
whistleblowing intentions in Vignette 1. Specifically, those in the “Higher than 
manager” group are more likely to whistleblow than their juniors, (Z = -2.505, p = 
0.012), seniors, (Z = -3.663, p = 0.000), and managers, (Z= -2.184, p = 0.029).  
 
Table 5-12: Kruskal-Wallis comparing Job Level for Vignette 1 
  Job level N Mean Rank P value 
Internal 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
(Vignette 1) 
Junior 23 83.13 .002 
Senior 66 76.79   
Manager 68 95.05   
Higher than manager 22 121.20   
Total 179     
 
For Vignette 2, there was also a significant difference within the Job Level in the 
internal whistleblowing intentions between the four groups, ᵡ2 (3, n = 179) = 8.217, p = 
0.042. There was a rank difference among groups (refer Table 5.13). Again, the “Higher 
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than manager” group recorded a higher mean rank score than the other three managerial 
level groups.  
 
Table 5-13: Kruskal-Wallis comparing Job Level for Vignette 2 
  Job level N Mean Rank P value 
Internal 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
(Vignette 2) 
Junior 23 87.04 .042 
Senior 66 82.78   
Manager 68 90.54   
Higher than manager 22 113.09   
Total 179     
 
The Mann-Whitney U test was used as a post-hoc statistic to determine which groups 
were different from one another in their internal whistleblowing intentions in Vignette 
2. Specifically, those in the “Higher than manager” group are more likely to 
whistleblow than their juniors, (Z = -2.341, p = 0.019), seniors, (Z = -2.876, p = 0.004), 
and managers, (Z= -2.206, p = 0.027). 
 
5.6.3. Age 
 
With regards to the effect of different level of internal auditors’ Age, the Kruskal-Wallis 
test found that there are significant differences only in Vignette 1. For Vignette 1, there 
was a significant difference by age group in the internal whistleblowing intentions of 
internal auditors between the four age classification groups, ᵡ2 (3, n = 179) = 13.391, p = 
0.004. There was a rank difference among groups, with the highest age group (Group 4: 
46 or older) recording a higher mean rank score than the other three age groups (refer 
Table 5.14). 
 
Table 5-14: Kruskal-Wallis comparing Age for Vignette 1 
  Age N Mean Rank P value 
Internal 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
(Vignette 1) 
Under 25 years old 6 69.25 .004 
25 – 35 years old 91 78.23   
36 – 45 years old 49 103.49   
46 or older 33 106.20   
Total 179     
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As the overall test was significant, Mann-Whitney test was used as a post-hoc statistic 
to determine which groups were different from one another in their internal 
whistleblowing intentions in Vignette 1. Specifically, those in the “46 or older” group 
were more likely to whistleblow than those in “25-35 years old”, (Z = -2.850, p = 0.004) 
only. Meanwhile, those under “25-35 years old” were less likely to whistleblow than 
those in “36-45 years old” group (Z = -2.853, p = 0.004). 
 
5.6.4. Tenure 
 
The final additional analysis concerns the effect of different level of internal auditors’ 
Tenure in their organisation. Again, the result of Kruskal-Wallis test was only 
significant in Vignette 1. For Vignette 1, there was a significant difference by working 
tenure in the internal whistleblowing intentions between the four groups, ᵡ2 (3, n = 179) 
= 11.320, p = 0.010. There was a rank difference among working tenure groups, with 
the longest working tenure (Group 4: 11 years or more) recorded a higher mean rank 
score than the other three groups (refer Table 5.15). 
 
Table 5-15: Kruskal-Wallis results comparing Tenure for Vignette 1 
  Tenure N Mean Rank P value 
Internal 
whistleblowing 
intentions 
(Vignette 1) 
Less than 2 years 46 76.58 .010 
2 – 5 years 57 88.54   
6 – 10 years 31 83.56   
11 years or more 45 110.00   
Total 179     
 
The Mann-Whitney test was used as a post-hoc statistic to determine which groups were 
different from one another in their internal whistleblowing intentions in Vignette 1. 
Specifically, those internal auditors whose working tenure was in the “11 years or 
more” group were more likely to whistleblow than those in “less than 2 years”, (Z = -
3.250, p = 0.001), “2-5 years”, (Z = -2.174, p = 0.030), and “6-10 years” groups, (Z= -
2.304, p = 0.021). 
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5.7. Summary 
 
There are five research questions that this study aimed to address in regards to internal 
auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. To address these questions, fifteen 
hypotheses were developed and tested through standard multiple regression models. The 
summary of the results of the multiple regression analyses are displayed in Table 5.16 
and summarised with respect to the research hypotheses. 
 
Table 5-16: Summary of Hypotheses Results 
Factors H Items Vig 1 
Sig 
Vig 2 
Sig 
Vig 3 
Sig 
Vig 4 
Sig 
Overall 
Sig 
Orgn H1a Egoism No No No No No 
 H1b Benevolence No No No No No 
 H1c Principle No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H2 Size of Organisation No No No No No 
 H3 Job Level No No No No No 
Ind H4a Moral Equity No No No No No 
 H4b Relativism Yes Yes No No Yes 
 H4c Contractualism No No No No No 
 H5 Locus of Control No No No No No 
 H6 Org. Commitment No No No No No 
Sit H7 Seriousness of wrongdoing Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 H8 Status of Wrongdoer No Yes No No No 
Demo H9a Gender No Yes Yes No Yes 
 H9b Age No No No No No 
 H9c Tenure No No No No No 
Note: 
Sig = significant 
No = reject hypothesis 
Yes = accept hypothesis 
 
Five hypotheses were tested to address the influences organisational factors had on 
internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. The hypotheses proposed that 
Benevolence, Principle, and Job Level would positively influence internal auditors’ 
internal whistleblowing intentions across the four vignettes. Egoism and Size of 
Organisation, on the other hand, were predicted to negatively influence internal 
auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. Multiple regression results revealed that 
131 
 
only Principle variable has significant and positive influence in all models except for 
Model 1.  
 
To address what influences individual factors had on internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions, five hypotheses were tested. The hypotheses proposed that 
Moral Equity, Relativism, Contractualism, and Organisational Commitment would 
positively influence internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions across the four 
vignettes. Locus of Control, on the other hand, was predicted to negatively influence 
internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. The multiple regression results 
revealed that only the Relativism variable has significant and positive influence on 
internal whistleblowing intentions in Models 1 and 2.  
 
Two research hypotheses were tested to address the influence of situational factors on 
internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. Seriousness of Wrongdoing was 
posited to positively influence internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions 
across the four vignettes, while Status of Wrongdoer was predicted to negatively 
influence internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. Results reveal that 
Seriousness of Wrongdoing variable has significant and positive influence on internal 
whistleblowing intentions in Models 1, 3 and 4. Status of Wrongdoer was found to be 
negatively significant only in Model 2. 
 
To address what influences individual demographic factors (Gender, Age, and Tenure) 
had on internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions, three hypotheses were 
tested. As opposed to the hypothesised relationship, the influence of Gender was 
statistically significant and negative across Models 2 and 3 only. Age and Tenure, on the 
other hand, were not statically significant in any of the models.  
 
The final research question sought to answer which of the organisational, individual, 
situational and demographic factors had the strongest influence on internal auditors’ 
internal whistleblowing intentions. In the study, the examination of beta weights 
indicated that the variables of Seriousness of Wrongdoing, Relativism, and Principle 
significantly contributed to the models in predicting internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions. Seriousness of Wrongdoing was the strongest predictor of 
internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions in all models, except in Model 2. 
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The current quantitative, correlational research study was intended to generate an 
understanding of why internal auditors make their ethical decisions to internally 
whistleblow based on four given types of vignettes.  The findings and analyses of the 
data were produced from 180 responses from a random sample of 1,000 Malaysian 
internal auditors who responded to a direct mail survey. A discussion of the findings, 
limitations and future directions of study of whistleblowing are offered in Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS, CONTRIBUTION, 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The study examines factors that will affect Malaysian internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions. The study focused on four main factors; Organisational, 
Individual, Situational and Demographic factors to gain an understanding of ethical 
decision-making by internal auditors in organisational settings. Several variables within 
these four main factors were selected based on previous research. This chapter provides 
a discussion of the research findings, contribution of this study, limitations of the 
current study, and directions for future research. The chapter will relate the analysis 
performed in the previous chapter with the whistleblowing literature and offers some 
insights with regards to the Malaysian environment. 
 
6.2. Discussion of Research Findings 
 
The results in Chapter 5 indicate that each type of wrongdoing portrayed in each 
vignette is unique and that the internal auditors’ ethical behaviour is case specific. This 
conforms to Miceli, Near, and Schwenk’s (1991) suggestions that organisational 
members have different reactions to different types of wrongdoing. The findings which 
emerged from the current study suggest that the main predictors of internal auditors’ 
internal whistleblowing intentions were Principle ethical climate (Organisational 
factor), Relativism dimensions of ethical judgment (Individual factor), Seriousness of 
Wrongdoing (Situational factor) and Gender (Demographic factor). 
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6.2.1. Organisational factors as related to internal whistleblowing 
 
6.2.1.1. Ethical climate 
 
The study explored the links between the three types of ethical climate dimensions, 
namely: Egoism, Benevolence and Principle with the internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing tendencies. As such, this study hypothesised that internal auditors were 
less likely to internally whistleblow in organisations characterised as having Egoism 
dimensions. Meanwhile, where organisations were characterised as possessing either 
Benevolence or Principle dimensions, it is expected that, these internal auditors are 
more likely to whistleblow internally.  
 
The multiple regression results showed that, only perception of principle climate was 
significant in predicting internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions (except for 
Vignette 1). Victor and Cullen (1988) argued that organisations have distinct ethical 
climates and the result of this study proved that that internal auditors have a distinct 
principle ethical climate dimension within their own organisations or specifically within 
their departments. Principle climate is based on the belief that there are universal 
principles of right and wrong and ethical decisions taken by the organisational members 
are based upon the application or interpretation of rules, laws and standards (Victor & 
Cullen, 1988). As such, the results supported the principle environment possessed by 
these internal auditors in Malaysia who are rule-abiding organisational members. 
Although the scenario in Vignette 1 did show that internal auditors have some concern 
(as shown in descriptive results for Vignette 1), it is more likely that internal auditors in 
this study regard the financial type of organisational wrongdoing in Vignettes 2, 3 and 4 
to be far more serious than the non-financial type of wrongdoing as portrayed in 
Vignette 1 (merely taking unreported time off).  
 
In the current study, obviously the principle climate adhered to by the internal auditors 
was shown to be more salient than egoism and benevolence climate within the internal 
auditing environment. This suggests that the climates of egoism and benevolence do not 
exist within the internal auditing departments in Malaysia. In other words, the internal 
auditing departments in Malaysian organisations do not foster an environment where 
members behave entirely for their own self interest (as denoted within egoism climate 
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dimension) or concern for the well-being of others within and outside of their 
organisations (as represented by the benevolence climate dimension). This indicates that 
the internal auditors internalised the value of principled reasoning that is related to their 
occupational task. Internal auditors as rule-abiding professionals ought to conduct their 
audit work objectively as required by the IIA’s Professional Practices Framework (that 
set the rules and conduct of the internal auditing profession).  The perception of 
principle climate as internalised by these internal auditors is also consistent with the 
requirement of the International Standard for the Professional Practices of Internal 
Auditing (ISPPIA) which explains the “objectivity” of the profession, whereby internal 
auditors are expected not to subordinate their judgment on any audit matters to others, 
especially to their management (IIA, 2006).  
 
6.2.1.2. Size of organisation 
 
The bystander intervention theory suggests that the diffusion of responsibility found in 
larger groups would dissuade individuals from engaging in their prosocial behaviour in 
helping out a victim.  With regards to whistleblowing behaviour, the theory would 
suggest that an increase in the size of organisation may generate greater diffusion of 
individuals’ responsibility to take remedial action. Therefore, the study hypothesised 
that, the larger the size of organisation, the less likely anyone would engage in 
whistleblowing behaviour. 
 
Initially, descriptive results in all four vignettes showed that internal auditors working in 
organisations having more than 1,001 employees (larger organisations) have lower 
means for internal whistleblowing (refer Table 5.3). Although multiple regression 
results showed the expected negative relationship between the size of organisation and 
the likelihood of internal auditors’ whistleblowing intentions across all the four 
vignettes, the results however, are not significant in all the vignettes and as such, failed 
to support the notion of Latane and Darley’s (1968) “diffusion of responsibility”. The 
result showed that size of organisation was not strongly associated with whistleblowing, 
and this is similar with the findings in other previous studies (see Barnett, Cochran, & 
Taylor, 1993; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Read & Rama, 2003; Rothwell & 
Baldwin, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). These prior studies however, did not acknowledge the 
concept of “diffusion of responsibility” in developing their hypotheses. 
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One possible explanation for such insignificant outcomes resulted in this study could be 
due to the type of the wrongdoings portrayed in the vignettes. As highlighted by Latane 
and Darley (1968), the term of “diffusion of responsibility” is to explain the likelihood a 
person (the whistleblower) would intervene in an emergency situation. Although these 
internal auditors acknowledged that such wrongdoings in some vignettes were regarded 
as serious, to them, the situations in the vignettes may not be regarded as emergency 
situations that require immediate solutions. Whistleblowing is a complex phenomenon 
and internal auditors in this study would necessarily examine various internal measures 
before taking further actions. Furthermore, Latane and Darley (1968) stated that the 
decision process for whistleblowing behaviour goes through five steps (refer section 
2.2.1 earlier) and each step is critical in making the whistleblowing decision. The five-
step processes showcased such tedious ethical decision-making that is required to be 
made prior to the decision to internally whistleblow and also highlighted the dilemmas 
that could be faced by these internal auditors in mitigating the so-called “emergency 
situation”. 
 
6.2.1.3. Job level 
 
Hypothesis 3 proposed that internal auditors holding higher managerial positions are 
more likely to internally whistleblow than those in lower level positions. Results from 
the descriptive statistics showed that a majority of internal auditors who are willing to 
whistleblow in all four vignettes came from the “Higher than managers” group level 
(refer Table 5.3). However, multiple regression results failed to demonstrate significant 
relationships between internal auditors’ job level and their internal whistleblowing 
intentions in all four vignettes. Such insignificant outcomes seem to be similar to 
previous studies by Fritzsche (1988), Lee, Heilmann, and Near (2004), and Rothschild 
and Miethe (1999). 
 
Rothschild and Miethe (1999) argued that contrary to the general expectations, 
whistleblowing by higher job levels may be seen as a retaliatory action as their acts are 
seen as a serious violation of normal company loyalty norms. Furthermore, Fritzsche 
(1988) reasoned that though higher job levels are more likely to undertake sound ethical 
decisions, they actually have lower ranking in organisational power structure. As such, 
this brings us back to the notion of power theories by Miceli et al., (2008) and Near and 
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Miceli (1995) earlier. Even though whistleblowing represents an influence process 
(Near & Miceli, 1995), it is however, not influential to those in higher rankings of 
organisational power structure (higher management levels).  Though internal auditors 
may be said as having the credibility and knowledge to react, they may be not able to 
persuade those in higher rankings levels to agree to such action. These actually validate 
the kind of dilemmas that the internal auditors are currently facing. 
 
Additional analyses using Kruskal-Wallis were then conducted to investigate whether 
there are any significant differences between internal auditors’ job level in their 
intentions to whistleblow. The results were significant only for Vignettes 1 and 2. It 
seems that internal auditors holding a higher managerial level are more willing to 
internally whistleblow for wrongdoings conducted by wrongdoers in a lower level 
hierarchy. Vignettes 1 and 2 demonstrated that those wrongdoers were merely a 
Marketing Executive and a Production Manager, while in Vignettes 3 and 4, the 
wrongdoers were a Chief Executive Officer and a Chief Financial Controller. This 
inconsistency with regards to these internal auditors’ choice for whistleblowing 
behaviour demonstrated the kind of dilemma that these internal auditors could face in 
the event of actual whistleblowing. 
 
Such inconsistency showed that the credibility of a potential whistleblower is dependent 
on the status of wrongdoers. The power that such higher managerial levels possess is 
only limited to their lower level subordinates or staff under their control. This explains 
the reason why action (internal whistleblowing intentions) could only be taken against 
wrongdoers in lower level groups as demonstrated in Vignettes 1 and 2 respectively. 
This finding may also indicate that lower level group fear the possibility of management 
retaliation where the wrongdoer is of a higher status than themselves. Prior studies have 
indicated a relationship between fear of retaliation and whistleblowing (Keenan, 1995; 
Near & Miceli, 1990).  
No significant difference was found for job level for Vignettes 3 (wrongdoer was a 
Chief Executive Officer) and 4 (wrongdoer was a Chief Financial Controller). As 
indicated earlier, the power of wrongdoers may further influence the retaliation process 
(Cortina & Magley, 2003). Specifically, exposing the wrongdoing conducted by 
members of a higher organisational hierarchy actually means that the whistleblowers 
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challenge their position (Cortina & Magley, 2003). Questioning the actions of top 
personnel, which Black (1976) likened to “upward deviance”, is considered as the most 
serious kind of deviant behaviour and is considered as a serious offence in a socially 
stratified society (Black, 1976; Miceli et al., 1999). As such, management, including the 
wrongdoer, may then retaliate against the whistleblower (Near et al., 1993). 
Additionally, Cortina and Magley (2003) added that, peers or colleagues that are 
supportive of the whistleblowers could only respond at a distance, particularly if a 
powerful wrongdoer is involved, as they may be fearful of being seen as aligning with 
the whistleblowers. As such, they provide a logical explanation for such behaviour as 
demonstrated by these Malaysian internal auditors. 
 
6.2.2.   Individual factors as related to internal whistleblowing 
 
6.2.2.1. Ethical judgment 
 
It is hypothesised that internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions would 
increase when the evaluation of their Moral Equity, Relativism and Contractualism 
dimensions are greater. Descriptive results indicated that internal auditors’ ethical 
concerns are mainly a function of the Moral Equity dimension in undertaking their 
ethical judgments (refer Table 5.2). This is similar to findings in prior ethics studies 
(Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Cruz, Shafer, & Strawser, 2000; Ellis & Griffith, 2001; Flory et 
al., 1992). This is then followed by the Relativism and Contractualism dimensions. The 
highest mean for the Moral Equity dimension was shown in Vignette 2, then followed 
by Vignettes 1, 4 and 3 respectively. It is interesting to note that Vignette 2 was also 
ranked as the most serious type of wrongdoing by internal auditors compared to all 
other forms of vignette.  
 
On the other hand, the results of multiple regressions reveal that Relativism dimension 
was found to be the only significant ethical judgment predictor for internal 
whistleblowing intentions. This outcome however, was limited to Vignettes 1 and 2 
only. Relativism dimension was defined by Reidenbach and Robin (1990) as perception 
of what is right versus wrong based on guidelines or parameters embedded in the social 
or cultural system rather than individual consideration. Looking at the type of 
wrongdoings in both Vignettes 1 and 2, internal auditors perceived that there are 
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certainly clear “right versus wrong” cases that had breached their organisations’ work 
conduct. Obviously, the act of work absenteeism (Vignette 1) and stealing (Vignette 2) 
were not culturally acceptable to Malaysian internal auditors.  
 
Neither the Moral Equity nor Contractualism dimensions appeared to influence internal 
whistleblowing intentions in any of the vignettes. Generally the results provide less 
support for the MES than had been found in previous studies. Based on the 
interpretation given by Reidenbach and Robin (1990), Moral Equity and 
Contractualism dimensions are interpreted solely based on individual perceptions, 
unlike the Relativism dimension, which is governed by social or cultural values, and not 
based on individual perceptions. As the role of internal auditing is solely based on the 
guidelines set by internal auditors’ organisations and their professional associations, 
these two dimensions do not seem to work with the internal auditing profession. 
 
6.2.2.2. Locus of control 
 
Hypothesis 5 posited that internal auditors with an internal locus of control will be more 
likely to whistleblow than those with external locus of control. Results of multiple 
regression analysis in all four vignettes did not show a significant relationship between 
locus of control and internal whistleblowing intentions. The results however, supported 
the direction of such a relationship (negative relationship) and provided evidence that 
internal auditors in this study possessed an internal trait of locus of control. This 
confirms the statement by Donnelly et al. (2003) who stated that individuals having 
internal locus of control are better suited for positions in an audit setting, and that of 
Spector (1982), who suggested that internals are more likely than externals to engage in 
prosocial behaviour. Thus, the internal auditors’ actions in the current study appear to 
conform with the notion by Brief and Motowidlo (1986) that defined prosocial 
behaviour as an act performed by organisational members to stop wrongdoing within 
their organisation, with the intention of benefiting persons within and outside the 
organisation. 
 
The reason why the locus of control variable contradicts the expected proposition could 
be related to the findings of the Miceli, Near, and Dozier (1991) study, which also 
showed an insignificant relationship between these two variables. Miceli, Near, and 
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Dozier (1991) also suggested that the distinction between internals and externals in their 
study appears to be irrelevant under the condition of threat of retaliation. To relate with 
the current study, the judgment of the ethicality of the vignettes made by the internal 
auditors in the current study seems somehow to be limited and is dependent on the 
higher managements’ judgment and their acceptance as a whole. Although internal 
auditors in this study engaged in prosocial behaviour, the given situations are not under 
their control and their decision to internally whistleblow could not influence others, in 
this case their managements outcomes which are contrary to the expectation of previous 
studies (see Chiu, 2003; Curtis & Taylor, 2009; Miceli et al., 2008). This brings us back 
to the kind of dilemma that these internal auditors had to face prior to making their 
ethical decision. Furthermore, in the Malaysian context, whistleblowing is still in its 
infancy stage and is regarded as a stigma resulting in hesitancy on the part of the 
whistleblower to reveal the wrongdoing and the wrongdoer. 
 
6.2.2.3. Organisational commitment 
 
Hypothesis 6 proposed that internal auditors with higher organisational commitment are 
more likely to whistleblow. Basically, the internal auditors’ level of commitment to 
their organisations will determine how far they will go in acting on their internal 
whistleblowing intentions. However, there appears to be a lack of studies investigating 
the effect of organisational commitment and internal whistleblowing intentions. As 
studies have advocated that individuals with higher organisational commitment levels 
will showcase their prosocial behaviour of whistleblowing (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; 
Street, 1995), this study would also expect the internal auditors to exercise such 
behaviour. 
 
Contrary to expectations, the results of the study failed to show support for Hypothesis 
6 in any of the vignettes. The inability of organisational commitment to explain 
whistleblowing behaviour is similar with that demonstrated in the Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran’s (2005) study. A study by Somers and Casal (1994) however, found that 
only moderate levels of organisational commitment may affect the likelihood of 
whistleblowing. However, unlike the Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) and 
Somers and Casal (1994) studies, this study utilised four vignettes in various forms to 
determine internal auditors’ ethical decision-making initiatives. 
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By examining the status of wrongdoer in each vignette, Vignettes 1 and 2 portrays a 
lower status of wrongdoer involving a Marketing Executive and Production Manager, 
unlike the other types of wrongdoer in Vignettes 3 (Chief Executive Officer) and 4 
(Chief Financial Officer).  It seems that the organisational commitment of these internal 
auditors appears to be hampered by the status of the wrongdoers. This validates the 
pertinent ethical dilemma issues that these internal auditors faced in executing their 
internal whistleblowing intentions in these two vignettes.  
 
6.2.3.   Situational factors as related to internal whistleblowing 
 
6.2.3.1. Seriousness of wrongdoing 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 of the study, a number of studies have examined, and 
consistently provided evidence, that seriousness of the wrongdoing is the consistent 
predictor of individual whistleblowing intentions (e.g. Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Curtis, 
2006; Schultz et al., 1993; E. Z. Taylor & Curtis, 2010). The current study contributes 
to the literature by applying it to an internal auditors’ sample. The study hypothesised 
that seriousness of wrongdoing will have a positive influence on internal auditors’ 
internal whistleblowing intentions. The multiple regression results showed that the 
seriousness of wrongdoing depicted in all vignettes was found to have a significant 
influence (except for Vignette 2) on internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing 
intentions. Internal auditors who perceived the wrongdoings to be more serious were 
more likely to report these behaviours than internal auditors who perceived the 
wrongdoings to be less serious. This finding was consistent with the previous research.  
 
Vignette 2 however failed to indicate a similar significant result although the descriptive 
finding showed that the vignette was rated having the highest means on its seriousness 
of wrongdoing variable as compared to other vignettes being studied. To recap, Vignette 
2 described a situation where a Production Manager involved in a cash misappropriation 
scheme; a highly serious act as compared to other three vignettes being rated by these 
internal auditors.  The possible reason for such results could be due to an internal 
channel of reporting that may not be suitable for this type of wrongdoing. If the internal 
auditors have found substantial evidence that such wrongdoing did occur, it would be 
most appropriate for such type of wrongdoing to be reported directly to the Royal 
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Malaysian Police, Commercial Crime Division. Such a wrongdoing could be 
categorised as an occupational crime which was defined by Clinard, Quinney, and 
Wildeman (1994) as offences committed by individuals for themselves in the course of 
their occupations and offences of employees against their employers. In Malaysia such 
an offence may be prosecuted under Section 403 to 404 (criminal misappropriation of 
property) or Sections 405 to 409 (criminal breach of trust) of the Penal Code which 
carry serious penalties. 
 
6.2.3.2. Status of wrongdoer 
 
Hypothesis eight posits that internal auditors would be less likely to whistleblow on a 
more powerful wrongdoer compared to a less powerful one. Descriptive results 
indicated that status of wrongdoers in Vignette 3 was rated as very powerful (M = 4.68) 
and this is followed by Vignette 4 (M = 4.41), Vignette 2 (M = 4.09) and Vignette 1 (M 
= 3.07) respectively. Although the beta direction in Vignettes 3 and 4 was as expected 
(negative signs), the multiple regression results however, showed that only Vignette 2 
indicated such a relationship as significant (only at 10% level).  
 
The wrongdoer in this vignette holds only a lower organisational position in their 
organisation (i.e. Production Manager, as opposed to CEO or CFO as in Vignettes 3 and 
4). The results showed that internal auditors are more likely to whistleblow on less 
powerful wrongdoers. This is in contrast to findings from previous studies (e.g. Cortina 
& Magley, 2003; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991). These internal auditors 
acknowledged that powerful wrongdoers have significant control in their organisations 
in terms of resources as well as having the required technical and management skills. 
Hence, it is not easy for the internal auditors to terminate wrongdoings conducted by 
these powerful wrongdoers in their own organisation due to fear of many forms of 
negative consequences, including retaliatation.  
 
6.2.4.   Demographic characteristics as related to internal whistleblowing 
 
Analyses were also conducted to test the effect of three types of demographic variables 
on internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. Review of previous 
whistleblowing studies have validated that these demographic variables have shown 
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consistently mixed results when being tested. Even in the review of literature 
concerning ethical decision making, these demographic variables have consistently been 
found to be insignificant and unrelated to ethical decision making (see Loe, Ferrell, & 
Mansfield, 2000; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005).  In whistleblowing studies, Brennan 
and Kelly (2007) stated that these demographic variables offer weak and conflicting 
results on the influence of individual’s whistleblowing behaviour, while Park et 
al.(2005) showed that demographic variables made no significant difference in 
whistleblowing intentions. Internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions were 
analysed by reference to three demographic factors: gender, age and their working 
tenure in organisations.  
 
With regards to gender, significant differences contributed to internal auditors’ 
whistleblowing intentions, only in Vignettes 2 and 3. The fact that Vignette 2 in the 
study was rated by internal auditors as very unethical, and had a very serious nature of 
wrongdoing as compared to other three vignettes, while the wrongdoer in Vignette 3 
was a Chief Executive Officer could be contributing factors for this significant 
association. Hypothesis 9 (a) which proposed that male internal auditors would be more 
likely to whistleblow than their female counterparts is only true in situations where the 
fact of the case is being regarded as very serious and very unethical in nature or the 
wrongdoing was perpetrated by someone from the highest management level. As such, 
this is consistent with prior studies that have found that women are less likely than men 
to engage in whistleblowing acts (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998; Miceli & Near, 1988, 
1992; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991; Sims & Keenan, 1998). However, such a finding 
would only be limited to highly serious and very unethical types of organisational 
wrongdoings as portrayed in Vignettes 2 and 3. Furthermore, although previous studies 
indicated that men are more likely to whistleblow than women, such differences are said 
to be minimal and the reasons are not entirely clear (Miceli & Near, 1988, 1992). 
Overall, more recent studies have acknowledged that gender does not account for 
differences in individual whistleblowing tendencies (MacNab & Worthley, 2008; Miceli 
et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2009a). This is clearly portrayed by the insignificant 
relationships in Vignettes 1 and 4 respectively. These findings are consistent with much 
of the work on gender differences in accounting/auditing research generally (see Coram, 
Ng, & Woodliff, 2003; Gammie & Gammie, 2009; Radtke, 2000).  
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The study also investigated the influence of age in internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions. The finding showed that whistleblowing is not significantly 
associated with age in any of the vignettes. As such, Hypothesis 9 (b) is not supported. 
Although the study predicted that younger internal auditors are less likely to blow the 
whistle, Miceli and Near (1992, p. 116) have actually argued that “it is difficult to 
assume whether younger members will be more or less likely to blow the whistle than 
older members”. This again confirmed that the relationship between age and 
whistleblowing intention has been fairly weak, as evidenced by insignificant 
relationships in the all four vignettes. 
 
Tenure was also hypothesised to have a positive impact on internal whistleblowing 
intentions (Hypothesis 9 (c)). However, multiple regression results again showed that 
this relationship was not supported in all vignettes. Similar with the age variable, the 
outcomes for working tenure also show weak support for internal whistleblowing 
intentions. The link between tenure and whistleblowing is inconclusive due to 
insignificant results found in this study. The current findings fall in line with the 
previous research (Barnett et al., 1993; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; 
Rothschild & Miethe, 1999; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007a; Sims & Keenan, 1998; 
Singer, Mitchell, & Turner, 1998) that fail to substantiate the significance of these 
variables to whistleblowing. 
 
Thus, in the current study, internal auditors’ intentions to whistleblow on organisational 
wrongdoings cannot be explained or predicted by these demographic variables (i.e., 
gender, age and tenure). The absence of support for the hypothesised relationships 
between these demographic variables and internal whistleblowing is consistent with the 
inconclusive findings in prior whistleblowing literature. One potential explanation for 
the lack of statistically significant findings from the current study may be due to there 
being something about the internal auditing profession that has resulted in their 
individual differences with regard to their intentions to whistleblow to disappear. The 
fact that such a profession is said to be in a unique position to prevent, deter, and detect 
corporate wrongdoing (Hillison et al., 1999; Pearson et al., 1998) and that the 
whistleblowing by these internal auditors is regarded as being role-prescribed (Dozier & 
Miceli, 1985), may cause such individual differences to become invalid. 
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6.3. Contribution of the Current Study 
 
6.3.1.   Contribution of findings to theory 
 
This study explored the determinants of whistleblowing intentions by using prosocial 
behaviour theory and ethical climate theory to provide the general framework for 
predicting the individual behavioural intentions used in this study. The link between 
these two theories and internal whistleblowing was developed, but the findings were not 
conclusive. The results of this study extend an organisation’s ability to predict 
whistleblowing intentions among internal auditors in Malaysia.  
 
1. Prosocial behaviour theory: The empirical results confirm that perceptions of 
prosocial behaviour are generally lower among internal auditors when it involved 
situations where the type of wrongdoing is serious and involves a higher level of 
wrongdoer. This confirms the findings of previous studies that have suggested that 
characteristics of the wrongdoing and/or characteristics of the wrongdoer may have 
significant implications on the decision to blow the whistle (Mesmer-Magnus & 
Viswesvaran, 2005). Though studies have advocated that prosocial behaviour theory 
could explain the behaviour of whistleblowers in an emergency situation, the 
behaviour is actually dependent on the nature of the case and actors involved in that 
situation. The research on the ‘‘bystander effect’’ in explaining the concept of 
diffusion of responsibility by Latane and Darley (1968) in this study, proved that not 
only are internal auditors less likely to help in larger organisations, but they were 
also seen as unlikely to engage their internal whistleblowing intentions when such 
wrongdoings  involved higher levels of organisational members.  
 
2. Ethical climate theory: The current study extends and delimits the capacity of 
ethical climate theory to explain internal auditors’ whistleblowing behaviour. 
According to Cullen et al., (1993, p. 103), ethical climates are ‘‘the ethical 
dimensions of organization culture’’ that members perceive to be the ethical norms 
and identity of organisations. The current study provides more insights of how the 
“principle dimension” of ethical climate, a climate associated with the requirement 
of the internal auditing profession, was found to be associated with their willingness 
to internally whistleblow. Ethical climate research has been enhanced through 
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investigating problems reflecting a variety of ethical dilemmas and types of 
wrongdoings in the current study. The results confirm that “principle dimensions” of 
ethical climate have a significant relationship with internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions. Ethical climate research has been enhanced through 
addressing the predictive capacity of ethical climates more directly related to the 
internal auditing profession, whereby their values are associated with both 
requirements to their profession as well as to their employers. Rothwell and Baldwin 
(2006) argued that the ethical climates variable is not generalisable to public 
organisations and may not be a valid predictor for whistleblowing behaviour. Their 
statements are understandable as their study showed that none of the ethical climates 
showed consistent results when utilising employees from one U.S. state government 
department. Specifically, unlike prior whistleblowing studies by Rothwell and 
Baldwin (2006, 2007a) which used employees in public organisations, this study 
utilised internal auditors from private organisations who have real knowledge in 
mitigating corporate wrongdoings. Furthermore, another argument put forward by 
Rothwell and Baldwin (2006) stating that the Victor and Cullen’s (1988) ethical 
climates variable has limited capacity to affect whistleblowing, contrasts with the 
results of this study, which show the opposite to be the case. This study found that 
organisational climate may influence the behaviour of its employees however, it 
may very well depend on the type of the case.  
 
6.3.2.   Contribution of findings to practice 
 
From a practical perspective, the findings of the current study have implications for both 
Malaysian researchers and local regulators.  Miceli et al., (2009, p. 381) acknowledged 
that “the body of empirical literature concerning whistleblowing outside of North 
American settings is in its infancy ...”. As such, the following findings in Malaysian 
specific settings are likely to be insightful in terms of:  
 
1. Internal auditors as whistleblowers: The issue of whistleblowing is particularly 
important to the internal auditing profession. The current study has contributed to 
the current literature in the internal auditing field which previously had been 
neglected. Undeniably, internal auditors could indeed be regarded as internal 
whistleblowers to correct their organisational wrongdoings. Employees whose job 
147 
 
roles require them to whistleblow are willing to report wrongdoing, unlike other 
typical employees (Miceli et al., 2008). The arguments that the disclosures of 
corporate wrongdoings by these internal auditors are role-prescribed and should not 
be considered as whistleblowing acts are unfounded. The fact that internal auditors’ 
unique full-time focus as independent but inside observers, on risks and controls is 
vital to a sound governance process as well as to sound financial reporting. The need 
for internal auditing within corporate governance structures has never been more 
clearly demonstrated than by previous events affecting organisations such as Enron 
and WorldCom. Internal whistleblowing by internal auditors provides organisations 
with the opportunity to correct the wrongdoing before the consequences escalate to 
cause devastating loss of reputation and general public embarrassment. However, 
the actual ethical dilemma and conflict of interest faced by this profession cannot be 
discounted. Unless the Malaysian organisations lay out clear and unbiased internal 
mechanisms for internal auditors to stem organisational wrongdoing internally from 
the very beginning, the end results will likely be disastrous to the whole 
organisation.   
 
2. Factors affecting whistleblowing decisions: The study indicated two major 
predictors of internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing decisions, i.e. principle 
ethical climate dimension and the seriousness of wrongdoing. This suggests the need 
for increasing awareness and legitimisation of whistleblowing in the workplace, 
which in turn will hopefully increase internal auditors’ intentions to whistleblow 
internally. Such a need could be improved through educational and training 
programs that could be conducted by the local regulatory agencies such as the 
Securities Commission and Institute of Internal Auditors of Malaysia (IIA 
Malaysia). Potential ethical problem areas or possible types of wrongdoing that are 
most likely to occur in organisations should be identified initially. The vignettes 
used in this study provide some indication of ethical problems on which 
management may need to focus.  The influence of different types of unethical 
behaviour and wrongdoing conducted by different types of wrongdoers has shown 
the actual challenges of the whistleblowing dilemma and how internal auditors 
respond to it. It is important to note key differences across the four vignettes in the 
formation of internal whistleblowing intentions within organisations. However, the 
vignettes are not exhaustive as internal auditors need to be aware of new and 
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evolving ethical issues and new forms of organisational wrongdoing that they may 
confront. Malaysian regulatory agencies need to focus on emerging problem areas 
that reflect contemporary situations that internal auditors will most likely to face. 
 
3. Whistleblowing policy as a corporate internal control mechanism: The internal 
auditors’ job level, their internal locus of control and their organisational 
commitment variables were found to be unrelated to internal whistleblowing 
behaviour. This further validates the call by IIA Malaysia of the need for Malaysian 
firms to adopt an internal structure for whistleblowing. Currently, Malaysian 
companies do not have an internal structure for that purpose (Tan, 2006), as such, 
there is a need to institutionalise such a structure to enhance communication 
channels within the organisation to address questions, concerns, suggestions or 
complaints internally. Should there be a concern for any incidence of corporate 
wrongdoing, a whistleblowing policy offers the organisation the opportunity to 
resolve the issue internally, before being exposed to the public (Barnett, 1992b). As 
such, organisations need to introduce their own “Whistleblowing Policy” to protect 
any person wishing to report fraud and wrongdoing. Whistleblowers, whose 
identities should be protected, need to have direct access to the appropriate parties 
depending on the position of the suspected wrongdoer within the organisation. The 
policy should guarantee the anonymity necessary and appropriate response to 
reports of fraud. If employees have any concerns about what is proper conduct for 
themselves or others, it is expected they will do the right thing and raise their 
concern without fear or favour. A sound internal mechanism may further heighten 
the prevention and detection of wrongdoing and boost employees’ confidence in 
their organisational internal reporting structure. This move should exemplify 
Malaysian firms’ zero-tolerance towards any attempt to commit corporate fraud and 
wrongdoing. 
 
4. Research on whistleblowing studies in Malaysia: The study of whistleblowing is 
relatively new in Malaysia and many of the variables that may influence the 
whistleblowing decisions have not been fully examined. The current study has 
provided some insights to several of the variables involved in this complex ethical 
decision-making behaviour.  In addition, this study adds to the literature by using a 
Malaysian sample to complement the gap in the previous studies and to extend the 
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use of vignettes to cover research in the Malaysian internal auditing field.  This 
would hopefully stimulate further research on ethics and whistleblowing intentions 
in other business sectors. It is recommended that a larger sample size, not only 
among internal auditors, but with other different groups of professionals involved in 
Malaysian firms, should also be included. This should produce more generalisable 
results. 
 
6.4. Limitations of the Current Study 
 
Despite the contributions of this study, a number of limitations are to be noted. Many of 
these limitations represent opportunities for future research. The main limitations of this 
study concern the following: 
 
1. The use of self-reported data: The most obvious shortcoming of the current study 
is the use of self-reported data to determine internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions. All data were obtained from one source – the 
respondents. This may raise some concerns regarding the validity and 
generalisability of the findings. Some respondents may perceive themselves as 
being bolder, more ethical or more capable than others. However, Miceli and Near 
(1984, p. 703) highlighted that, “although self-reported data may be flawed, it is not 
known how better data can be obtained practically”. Chiu (2003) has also suggested 
that it is difficult to find a second source of information about an individual’s 
ethical behaviour, one that is neither distorted nor biased. As the study relied upon 
the perceptions of internal auditors, the usefulness of the results depends upon the 
accuracy and honesty of the self-reported data. As such, the decisions for internal 
auditors to whistleblow or not on observed organisational violations is a personal 
experience that can only be captured by merely asking internal auditors’ intentions 
to report it. 
 
2. The effect of social desirability bias: As the study utilised the use of self-reported 
data, the presence of social desirability bias may result.  It is known from this study 
that, there exist differences in reported behaviours between the internal auditors 
themselves and their colleagues, thus, clearly indicating the presence of social 
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desirability bias. Though the possibility of social desirability bias was meticulously 
addressed in the Research Method chapter earlier, the respondents however, may be 
tempted to give the socially desirable response rather than describe what they 
actually think, believe or do. 
 
3. The use of vignettes: Although scenarios or vignettes are said to be the most 
widely used approach in ethics research (O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), the use of 
hypothetical vignettes carries with it further limitations. While the use of a vignette 
approach allows one to address potentially sensitive issues by presenting the issues 
hypothetically (Alexander & Becker, 1978; Morris, Rehbein, Hosseini, & 
Armacost, 1995), respondents may feel free to indicate their intentions with no real 
commitment to the actual behaviour. This may then lead to the social desirability 
bias problems discussed earlier. Furthermore, vignettes are also susceptible to 
satisficing by respondents (Stolte, 1994), a tendency for respondents to process 
vignette information less carefully and effectively than they would under ideal or 
real conditions (Krosnick, 1991). This may then lead to the respondents 
misunderstanding or overlooking certain key constructs. Furthermore, a key finding 
from the study of meta-analysis by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found 
that the predictors from studies that use vignettes to gauge whistleblowing 
intentions were not similar to those studies that examine actual whistleblowing 
behaviour. They pointed out that the differences were probably due to 
“psychological distance” (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005, p. 292) between 
behavioural intentions versus actual action. However, they too acknowledged that it 
is very difficult to study actual whistleblowing behaviour in such a sensitive field of 
study as this. However, as previous ethics researchers (see Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; 
Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Patel, 2003) have 
supported and recognised the approach of utilising hypothetical vignettes in ethics 
research, such method is deemed as practical and suitable for this study. 
 
4. Cross-sectional research: The study employed a cross-sectional questionnaire 
survey whereby participants were asked to imagine situations as described by the 
given hypothetical vignettes and report on their internal whistleblowing intentions. 
Thus, participants may have engaged in some form of justification in order to be 
congruent with their ethical decision behaviour and its underlying antecedents. 
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Furthermore, due to the cross-sectional nature of the sample, significant 
relationships may have been diluted and gone undetected. Though researchers have 
called for more cause-effect research to understand the complexities of 
whistleblowing behaviour, unfortunately, such cause-effect research (such as field 
experimental and longitudinal survey designs) is not suitable in whistleblowing 
studies. As such, previous researchers (Chiu, 2003; Keenan, 2002a; Patel, 2003; 
Zhang et al., 2009b) have pointed out that, although research based on cross-
sectional survey data have some limitations, this could be the best option for some 
time to come. Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991, p. 127) had cautioned that, 
“because of obvious ethical concerns, one cannot randomly select employees to 
witness manipulated wrongdoing in order to determine which individual or 
situational characteristics are associated with whistleblowing”. Furthermore, such 
studies if conducted may require the respondents to be identified, which may then 
violate the ethical conduct of this research.  
 
5. Sensitiveness of the study: It is known that the nature of whistleblowing studies is 
very complicated as it involves serious ethical issues (Miceli & Near, 1984; Miceli, 
Near, & Schwenk, 1991). As such, it is possible that the respondents involved in this 
study may draw different conclusions relative to the whole population. Another 
point to consider is that, as a whistleblowing study may raise various sensitive 
organisational issues, respondents may be reluctant to identify themselves or, worst 
of all, may not even respond to the study’s questionnaire. Therefore, although cross-
sectional survey data has its own limitations, such data for whistleblowing studies 
are considered as acceptable. Due to this sensitivity, the study only focuses on 
internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions rather than their actual 
intentions. Although intention has been the main concern in most ethics study and 
the theoretical relationship between moral intent and moral behaviour has been 
supported in previous research (i.e. Victor, Trevino, & Shapiro, 1993) the findings 
of this study may not be indicative of internal auditors’ actual internal 
whistleblowing decisions. Internal auditors who stated that they will report on 
organisational wrongdoing activity may not actually do so. 
 
6. Generalisability: Lastly, the issue of generalisability should be considered. The 
generalisability of the current study’s results is limited by the particular context of 
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the study’s experiment. The effects of different combinations of the factors that 
affect the likelihood of internal whistleblowing represent interesting extensions for 
future research. Whether the behaviours observed in this study are generalisable to 
other areas of the business environment and individuals other than internal auditors 
also represent interesting avenues for future research. Within the internal auditing 
field, although previous researchers have taken the initiative to utilise internal 
auditors in their empirical whistleblowing studies (see Arnold & Ponemon, 1991; 
Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008), caution should also be 
taken when generalising the results of this study. The most pertinent differences 
from these previous studies were, among others, the methodologies adopted (actual 
behaviour vs hypothetical scenarios or vignettes), types of scenarios or vignettes 
being examined, number of scenarios or vignettes being utilised, as well as various 
different types of variables that were being studied. Therefore, any inferences 
derived from the results of this study should be cautiously interpreted. 
 
6.5. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
While this research effort breaks new ground in verifying links between organisational, 
individual, situational and demographic factors and internal whistleblowing intentions is 
Malaysia, there is still a need for more research in this area. Given the evidence 
presented in this thesis, there are several avenues possible for future research: 
 
1. In the present study, the validity of the model of the study assesses only its ability 
to predict and explain the formation of intentions to whistleblow within the 
organisation and not its ability to predict whistleblowing behaviour. Future research 
needs to expand the understanding of whistleblowing acts by exploring the 
relationship between behavioural intentions to whistleblow on organisational 
wrongdoings and actual whistleblowing behaviour, the factors that influence this 
relationship as well as the consequences that follow in engaging such behaviour. 
 
2. Future research about internal whistleblowing should explore the influence of 
additional variables on whistleblowing behaviour that have been consistently found 
to be related to individual ethical decision making in organisations in the literature. 
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Due to study constraints, this study has ignored other potential organisational and 
individual variables that could affect individual’s internal whistleblowing decisions. 
These variables might include organisational variables, such as whistleblowing 
policy (Barnett, 1992b). Possible individual variables would be cognitive moral 
development (Rest, 1986), and the relationship between violator and would-be 
reporter (Jones, 1991). As such future research should try to explore the effects of 
these potential variables to expand the current findings about internal auditors’ 
intentions to whistleblow. 
 
3. Since the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002, legislatures in several 
countries have adopted laws to encourage individuals to engage in whistleblowing.   
The influence of the newly installed Malaysian legislation in whistleblowing also 
merits additional consideration. As the laws may also protect whistleblowers from 
retaliation, the influence of this legislation on other than internal auditing 
profession or specifically other organisational members in Malaysia may likely 
yield new insights. The influence of different approaches (e.g., organisational 
whistleblowing policy) to laws and regulations can be studied by comparing 
responses of respondents within the organisations. This may provide evidence of 
whether this new Malaysian legislation will have a supportive effect on the 
incidence of whistleblowing and on termination of organisational wrongdoing. 
Such outcomes may well depend on how well the legislation is implemented and 
whether it has any tangible effect on wrongdoing in organisations. 
 
4. Further, as mentioned in the limitation section, the self reported information about 
sensitive issues like whistleblowing may solicit socially desired responses to the 
questions. Although the current study had exercised caution to reduce the influence 
of social desirability on study findings (refer section 5.3.4 of the thesis), internal 
auditors who said they intended to whistleblow might not do so. The data for social 
desirability are not part of the research objectives for this study and the purpose of 
collecting the social desirability data was basically to address and control the 
problem of social desirability bias, which have been disregarded in ethics research 
(Bernardi & Guptill, 2008; Randall & Gibson, 1990). Initial findings from the 
social desirability bias test indicated that there are significant differences between 
the scores of “You” and “Your Colleagues” internal whistleblowing intention 
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questions on all four vignettes. Although this is regarded as not a salient threat to 
the internal validity of the study’s findings (Nguyen et al., 2008b), the reason for 
such differences should be further investigated and this should be regarded as an 
interesting avenue for future empirical research. Furthermore, Cavanagh and 
Fritzsche (1985) argue that responses to questions such as “what I would do” 
compared to “what others would do” provide a valuable and quite different 
information. 
 
6.6. Conclusion  
 
The literature has recognised that the internal auditing profession has evolved and 
gained an important role in their organisations. Currently, despite focussing on the 
traditional role of organisational compliance procedure, there have been new demands 
for the internal auditing profession to extend their efforts beyond the regulatory 
compliance issues. There have been growing responsibilities for internal auditors to 
ensure effective risk management and to promote corporate governance procedures 
within their organisations. These responsibilities also include the need for internal 
auditors to internally whistleblow on any type of corporate wrongdoings that occurred 
within the organisations. However, such requirements have consequences in the form of 
subsequent ethical dilemmas.  
 
As such, this is the first study to test an internal whistleblowing decision-making model 
among Malaysian internal auditors. Specifically, the study examined internal auditors’ 
intentions to whistleblow and the factors that influence their internal whistleblowing 
intentions in Malaysian organisations. For this purpose, an internal whistleblowing 
theoretical model that included a number of organisational, individual, situational and 
demographic factors was developed and tested using data from a sample of Malaysian 
internal auditors. The results of this study showed several of the variables that may 
influence Malaysian internal auditors’ ethical decisions to whistleblow internally within 
their own organisations. Clearly the findings demonstrate that, internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing behaviour in organisations appears to be a complex phenomenon 
influenced by the interplay of: organisational factors - how organisations manage to 
encourage the reporting of organisational wrongdoings; individual factors - how the 
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internal auditors think about the ethical decision, situational factors - types of 
wrongdoing and the status of wrongdoers, and demographic factors – the effect of 
gender, age, and tenure of internal auditors. Table 6.1 summarised the overall 
conclusion of the current study. 
 
Table 6-1: Summary of the conclusion of the study 
Objective of 
study 
To examine factors that will affect Malaysian internal auditors’ internal 
whistleblowing intentions. 
Focus of the 
study 
Organisational, individual, situational and demographic variables and 
their impact on the internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions. 
General 
findings 
Internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing intentions are case-specific 
and this confirms the results of previous studies that organisational 
members have different reactions to different types of wrongdoing. 
Main 
findings 
Depending on types of wrongdoing, the findings which emerged from 
the current study suggest that the main predictors of internal auditors’ 
internal whistleblowing intentions were: 
 Principle ethical climate (Organisational factor), 
  Relativism dimensions of ethical judgment (Individual factor),  
 Seriousness of Wrongdoing (Situational factor), and 
  Gender (Demographic factor). 
 
 
The results of the current study have potential implications for both Malaysian 
researchers and local regulators to promote internal whistleblowing mechanisms within 
Malaysian organisations. As discussed previously, these implications may further 
clarify that internal auditing profession ought to be regarded as internal whistleblowers 
in order to mitigate organisational wrongdoings. As in most social studies, the results of 
this study also revealed the need to expand current knowledge and to explore the 
influence of additional factors involved in internal auditors’ internal whistleblowing 
decisions. 
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Appendix 2: Cover Letter 
 
Dear participants, 
 
Re: Survey on Internal Auditors’ Reporting Intentions 
 
You are invited to participate in a study which is being conducted as a requirement toward the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Business) at Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia 
(W.A.). The study will focus on organisational, individual and situational factors and their impact 
on internal auditors’ reporting intentions on corporate wrongdoings or questionable acts. 
 
This survey is divided into five sections. It is important that you complete all sections. The 
usefulness and outcome of the study will depend upon the honesty and care with which you 
answer the questions. Please read the instructions for each section carefully. Choose a 
response that gives the best indication of how you would typically think, feel and experience. 
You will require about 25 to 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
 
This is an anonymous questionnaire and participation in this project is entirely voluntary. No 
personally identifiable information will be collected from you. Participants for this study have 
been selected at random from the Institute of Internal Auditors of Malaysia‘s (IIAM) database 
with the permission of the IIAM. All data will be treated with the strictest confidence and will only 
be used for the purposes of this study. If the information you provide is published, you will not 
be identified in any written work as presentation of the data will be aggregated. Your assistance 
to the successful completion of the questionnaire is both invaluable and fundamental. Please 
return the completed questionnaire in the attached self-addressed envelope provided. 
 
If you have any questions or require any further information regarding this research, please 
contact: 
 
Syahrul Ahmar Ahmad 
7/18 Bennevis Turn 
Kinross, WA 6028 
Perth, Australia. 
Email: syahrula@student.ecu.edu.au  
Professor Malcolm Smith 
(Principal Supervisor) 
Edith Cowan University 
Faculty of Business and Law 
270 Joondalup Drive 
Joondalup W.A. 6027 
Perth, Australia. 
Email: malcolm.smith@ecu.edu.au  
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the study and wish to speak to an independent 
person, you may contact: 
 
Research Ethics Officer 
Edith Cowan University 
Phone: +61 8 63042170 
Email: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au  
 
Thank you very much for your participation.  
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
Syahrul Ahmar Ahmad 
Doctoral Candidate 
Edith Cowan University 
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Appendix 3: Survey Instrument 
 
A Survey on Internal Auditors’ Reporting Intentions 
 
Confidentiality 
The views expressed in the completed questionnaire will be treated in the strictest 
confidence. Any information identifying the respondents will not be disclosed. 
Please answer ALL questions 
SECTION 1  
Instructions: Below is a series of statements designed to indicate how you feel about working 
in your present organisation. CIRCLE the number corresponding to your level of agreement with 
each statement using the following response scale. 
 Strongly
Disagree Disagree 
 
Neither 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I am willing to put in much more effort than is 
normally expected to make this organisation 
successful.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. I tell my friends that this is a great organisation 
to work for.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. I feel very little loyalty to this organisation. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I would accept almost any type of job 
assignment in order  working for this 
organisation.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. I find that my values and the organisation's 
values are very similar.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. I am proud to tell others that I am part of this 
organisation.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. I could just as easily work for a different 
organisation provided the type of work was 
similar.   
1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. This organisation really inspires me to perform 
well in this job. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. It would take very little change in my present 
circumstances to cause me to leave this 
organisation.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. I am extremely glad I chose this organisation 
to work for, over others I was considering at 
1 2 3 4 5 
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the time I joined.  
11. There's not much to be gained by sticking with 
this organisation indefinitely.   
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. Often, I find it difficult to agree with this 
organisation's policies on important matters 
relating to its employees.   
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. I really care about the fate of this organisation. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. I prefer to work with this organisation.  1 2 3 4 5 
15. Deciding to work for this organisation was a 
definite mistake. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
SECTION 2  
Instructions: In this section, the level of agreement related to individual control will be 
measured. CIRCLE the number corresponding to your level of agreement with each statement 
using the following response scale.  
 Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neither 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. A job is what you make of it.  1 2 3 4 5 
2. On most jobs, employees can achieve 
whatever they set out to accomplish.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. If you know what you want out of a job, you 
can find a job that gives it to you.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. If employees are unhappy with a decision 
made by their boss, they should do something 
about it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. Getting the job you want is mostly a matter of 
luck. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. Making money is primarily a matter of good 
fortune. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. Most people are capable of doing their jobs 
well if they make the effort.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. In order to get a really good job you need to 
have family members or friends in high places. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. Promotions are usually a matter of good luck. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. When it comes to landing a really good job, 
who you know is more important than what you 
know. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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11. Promotions are given to employees who 
perform their job well. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. To make a lot of money you have to know the 
right people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. It takes a lot of luck to be an outstanding 
employee on most jobs. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. People who perform their jobs well generally 
get rewarded for it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. Most employees have more influence on their 
supervisors than they think they do.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. The main difference between people who 
make a lot of money and people who make a 
little money is luck. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
SECTION 3  
Instructions: The following questions relate to the general climate in your company. Please 
answer the following in terms of how it really is in your company, NOT how you would prefer it to 
be. Indicate by circling the number which best represents your opinion. To what extent are 
these statements true about your company? 
 Completely
False False 
 
Neither 
 
True 
Completely
True 
1. Employees are mostly out for themselves. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Employees’ major responsibility to consider 
efficiency first. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. Employees are expected to follow their own 
moral beliefs. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. Employees are expected to do anything for the 
co.’s interests. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. Employees look out for each others’ good. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. There is no room for one’s own personal 
ethics. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. It is very important to follow strictly the co.'s 
rules. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. Work is sub-standard only when it hurts the 
co.’s interests. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. Each employee decides for his/herself what is 
right and wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. Employees protect their own interest above 
other considerations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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11. The most important consideration is each 
employee’s sense of right and wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. The most important concern is the good of all 
employees. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. The first consideration is whether a decision 
violates any law. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. Employees are expected to comply with both 
the law and professional standards over and 
above other considerations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. Everyone is expected to stick by co.’s rules 
and procedures. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. Employee’ major concern is always what is 
best for others. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
17. Employees are concerned with the co.’s 
interests—to the exclusions of all else. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
18. Successful employees in this co. go by the 
book. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
19. The most efficient way is always the right way. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Employees are expected to strictly follow legal 
or professional standards. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
21. Employees’ major consideration is what is best 
for everyone. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
22. Employees are guided by their own personal 
ethics. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
23. Successful employees strictly obey the co.’s 
policies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
24. The law or ethical code of your profession is 
the major consideration. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
25. Each employee is expected, above all, to work 
efficiently. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
26. It is expected that you will always do what is 
right for the customer and public. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
SECTION 4  
Instructions: In this section, there are 4 case scenarios which deal with issues that you might 
face as an internal auditor in your organisation. Please read each of the case and then 
respond to ALL five questions accompanying each case. Keep in mind that there are no right or 
wrong answers; the study is only interested in your perceptions. CIRCLE the number you feel 
best reflects your opinion. 
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Scenario 1 
Last week, you overheard a Marketing Executive, talking to his colleague about taking paid time 
off (PTO) and how he did not report it to his manager. The Marketing Executive even mentioned 
to his friend that his manager will not likely follow up on the missed work time. 
You know that this behaviour is against company policy and is facilitated by inconsistent 
management practices in your organisation. You know that as long as the Marketing Executive’s 
manager is unaware of his behaviour, he will continue to take PTO without reporting it.  
 
a. Rate the seriousness of the behaviour (taking paid time off) in the above scenario. 
Not at all serious   Very serious 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
b. Rate how powerful the Marketing Executive is in the organisation. 
Not at all powerful   Very powerful 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
c. Rate the likelihood that YOU would report the above behaviour committed by the Marketing 
Executive to: 
a. internal parties in your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. external parties outside your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
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d. Rate the likelihood that YOUR COLLEAGUES would report the above behaviour committed 
by the Marketing Executive to: 
a. internal parties in your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. external parties outside your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
e. Evaluate the Marketing Executive’s behaviour in the above scenario. 
Unethical    Ethical 
1 2 3 4 5 
Unfair    Fair 
1 2 3 4 5 
Unjust    Just 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not morally right  Morally right 
1 2 3 4 5 
Unacceptable to my family  Acceptable to my family 
1 2 3 4 5 
Culturally unacceptable  Culturally acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Traditionally unacceptable  Traditionally acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Violates an unwritten  
social contract 
 Does not violate an unwritten  
social contract 
1 2 3 4 5 
Violates an unspoken  
social contract 
 Does not violate an unspoken  
social contract 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Scenario 2 
While auditing the stock purchases you discover that the Production Manager insists on paying 
one of the suppliers in cash only. When you ask the Production Manager about this situation he 
explains that he is able to negotiate discounts by paying for the goods in cash.  
However, upon further investigation you discover that the Production Manager is in fact 
overstating purchases from this supplier and taking the money for himself. The transaction has 
gone unnoticed because of weak internal controls and the close relationship between the 
Production Manager and the Managing Director. You estimate the amount of the cash 
misappropriated in the current year to be RM12,000. 
 
a. Rate the seriousness of the behaviour (overstating purchases and taking the money) in the 
above scenario.  
Not at all serious   Very serious 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
b. Rate how powerful the Production Manager is in the organisation. 
Not at all powerful   Very powerful 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
c. Rate the likelihood that YOU would report the above behaviour committed by the Production 
Manager to: 
a. internal parties in your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. external parties outside your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
d. Rate the likelihood that YOUR COLLEAGUES  would report the above behaviour to:  
a. internal parties in your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. external parties outside your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
e. Evaluate the Production Manager’s behaviour in the above scenario. 
Unethical    Ethical 
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1 2 3 4 5 
Unfair    Fair 
1 2 3 4 5 
Unjust    Just 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not morally right  Morally right 
1 2 3 4 5 
Unacceptable to my family  Acceptable to my family 
1 2 3 4 5 
Culturally unacceptable  Culturally acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Traditionally unacceptable  Traditionally acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Violates an unwritten  
social contract 
 Does not violate an unwritten  
social contract 
1 2 3 4 5 
Violates an unspoken  
social contract 
 Does not violate an unspoken  
social contract 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Scenario 3 
During the audit of trade receivables, the accountant told you that the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of your company has requested him to reduce the estimate for doubtful debts in order to 
increase reported income. The CEO argued that it is a common practice in the industry when 
times are hard.  
Historically, the company has made very conservative allowances for doubtful accounts, even in 
bad years. The CEO’s request would make it one of the least conservative in the industry. In 
order to satisfy the request by the CEO, the accountant makes the adjustment.  
 
a. Rate the seriousness of the request (reduction of provision for doubtful debts) in the above 
scenario.  
Not at all serious   Very serious 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
b. Rate how powerful the CEO is in the organisation. 
Not at all powerful   Very powerful 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
c. Rate the likelihood that YOU would report the above request committed by the CEO to:   
a. internal parties in your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. external parties outside your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
d. Rate the likelihood that YOUR COLLEAGUES  would report the above request committed 
by the CEO to:  
a. internal parties in your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. external parties outside your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
e. Evaluate the CEO’s request in the above scenario. 
Unethical    Ethical 
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1 2 3 4 5 
Unfair    Fair 
1 2 3 4 5 
Unjust    Just 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not morally right  Morally right 
1 2 3 4 5 
Unacceptable to my family  Acceptable to my family 
1 2 3 4 5 
Culturally unacceptable  Culturally acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Traditionally unacceptable  Traditionally acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Violates an unwritten  
social contract 
 Does not violate an unwritten  
social contract 
1 2 3 4 5 
Violates an unspoken  
social contract 
 Does not violate an unspoken  
social contract 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Scenario 4 
In the current year’s financial audit, you discovered a substantial amount of unrecorded 
liabilities. You consulted the company’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to discuss the matter, 
however he argues that the amount is immaterial and therefore it is unnecessary to make 
adjusting entries to the financial statements. The CFO believes that he should know as well as 
anyone what financial statement readers would or would not deem to be material.  
You feel that the amount is material and the financial statements should be adjusted 
accordingly, however the CFO is firm with his decision as he explain that the adjustment will 
affect current year’ bonus payment to all employees of Jackson Manufacturing Bhd. 
 
a. Rate the seriousness of the decision (unrecorded liabilities) in the above scenario.  
Not at all serious   Very serious 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
b. Rate how powerful the CFO is in the organisation. 
Not at all powerful   Very powerful 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
c. Rate the likelihood that YOU would report the above decision made by the CFO to:   
a. internal parties in your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. external parties outside your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
d. Rate the likelihood that YOUR COLLEAGUES  would report the above decision made by 
the CFO to:  
a. internal parties in your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. external parties outside your organisation. 
Less likely   Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
e. Evaluate the CFO’s decision made in the above scenario. 
Unethical    Ethical 
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1 2 3 4 5 
Unfair    Fair 
1 2 3 4 5 
Unjust    Just 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not morally right  Morally right 
1 2 3 4 5 
Unacceptable to my family  Acceptable to my family 
1 2 3 4 5 
Culturally unacceptable  Culturally acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Traditionally unacceptable  Traditionally acceptable 
1 2 3 4 5 
Violates an unwritten  
social contract 
 Does not violate an unwritten  
social contract 
1 2 3 4 5 
Violates an unspoken  
social contract 
 Does not violate an unspoken  
social contract 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
  
187 
 
 
SECTION 5  
This section relates to demographic information about you and your company. Please tick (√) 
the appropriate box. All answers will remain strictly confidential and anonymous. 
 
 
a. What is your gender?  
 
 
Male  Female 
 
b. What is your age? 
 
 
Under 25 years old 
 
 
25 – 35 years old 
 36 – 45 years old 
 46 or older  
 
c. How many years have you been with your present employer? 
 
 
Less than 2 years 
 
 
2 to 5 years 
 6 to 10 years 
 11 years or more 
 
d. Which of the following best describes the level of your current job? 
 
 
Junior 
 
 
Senior 
 Manager 
 Other (please specify)_________ 
 
e. How many people are employed by your company? 
 
 
0 to 500 employees 
 
 
501 to 1,000 employees 
 1,001 to 3,000 employees 
 More than 3,000 employees 
 
f. Type of individual membership with IIAM?  
 
 
Professional member  Associate member 
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End of Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for your time and co-operation in completing this questionnaire. Your opinions are 
valuable and your participation is required for the completion of this project. Please return the 
completed research instrument in the postage-paid, self addressed envelop provided. Please 
also ensure that you have answered ALL questions. 
 
Syahrul Ahmar Ahmad 
syahrula@student.ecu.edu.au 
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Appendix 4A: Spearman’s rho Bivariate Correlation Matrics : Vignette 1 
 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Int whistleblowing 1.000                
2. Egoism .093 1.000               
3. Benevolence .120 .564** 1.000              
4. Principle .198** .521** .621** 1.000             
5. Size -.042 .052 -.010 .034 1.000            
6. Job level .233** -.022 -.023 .103 -.056 1.000           
7. Moral equity .391** .027 .021 .034 .023 .165* 1.000          
8. Relativism .383** .111 .200** .157* .056 .147 .656** 1.000         
9. Contractualism -.349** -.077 -.114 -.120 -.069 -.139 -.646** -.691** 1.000        
10. Locus of control -.235** .034 -.037 -.099 -.159* -.141 -.197* -.180* .264** 1.000       
11. Org. commitment .313** .211** .392** .440** .116 .217** .202** .259** -.205** -.501** 1.000      
12. Seriousness .488** .192* .212** .191* -.040 .047 .432** .315** -.376** -.161* .261** 1.000     
13. Status .059 .061 .075 .031 .075 -.143 -.060 -.080 .119 .119 -.087 .040 1.000    
14. Gender .067 .016 .074 .131 -.012 .268** -.045 .009 -.016 -.115 .179* .108 -.015 1.000   
15. Age .272** -.059 -.041 .069 -.099 .558** .205** .209** -.209** -.247** .280** .125 -.090 .232** 1.000  
16. Tenure .161* .062 .065 .214** .080 .337** .139 .153* -.090 -.066 .279** .119 .076 .104 .551** 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 4B: Spearman’s rho Bivariate Correlation Matrics : Vignette 2 
 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Int whistleblowing 1.000                
2. Egoism .011 1.000               
3. Benevolence .013 .564** 1.000              
4. Principle .148 .521** .621** 1.000             
5. Size -.045 .052 -.010 .034 1.000            
6. Job level .141 -.022 -.023 .103 -.056 1.000           
7. Moral equity .161* .057 .055 .074 .083 .034 1.000          
8. Relativism .277** .068 .156* .150 .046 .073 .660** 1.000         
9. Contractualism -.234** -.083 -.139 -.178* -.125 .035 -.661** -.719** 1.000        
10. Locus of control -.070 .034 -.037 -.099 -.159* -.141 -.127 -.148 .115 1.000       
11. Org. commitment .071 .211** .392** .440** .116 .217** .041 .061 -.156* -.501** 1.000      
12. Seriousness .240** .002 .099 .127 -.076 .053 .261** .209** -.267** -.006 .109 1.000     
13. Status -.037 .069 .064 .004 -.010 -.142 .139 .027 -.073 .037 -.013 .266** 1.000    
14. Gender -.158* .016 .074 .131 -.012 .268** -.130 -.166* .135 -.115 .179* -.149* -.275** 1.000   
15. Age .058 -.059 -.041 .069 -.099 .558** .056 .014 .006 -.247** .280** .047 .000 .232** 1.000  
16. Tenure .026 .062 .065 .214** .080 .337** .000 .009 .033 -.066 .279** .050 .032 .104 .551** 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 4C: Spearman’s rho Bivariate Correlation Matrics : Vignette 3 
 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Int whistleblowing 1.000                
2. Egoism .042 1.000               
3. Benevolence .052 .564** 1.000              
4. Principle .162* .521** .621** 1.000             
5. Size -.069 .052 -.010 .034 1.000            
6. Job level .086 -.022 -.023 .103 -.056 1.000           
7. Moral equity .416** .061 .107 .111 .053 .054 1.000          
8. Relativism .371** .063 .100 .120 .051 .041 .866** 1.000         
9. Contractualism -.362** -.093 -.164* -.104 -.079 -.023 -.848** -.816** 1.000        
10. Locus of control -.133 .034 -.037 -.099 -.159* -.141 -.231** -.140 .125 1.000       
11. Org. commitment .006 .211** .392** .440** .116 .217** .105 .026 -.061 -.501** 1.000      
12. Seriousness .538** .050 .070 .145 .045 .060 .740** .573** -.633** -.225** .132 1.000     
13. Status .124 -.060 -.050 -.050 .025 -.008 .093 .090 -.101 -.074 .021 .204** 1.000    
14. Gender -.103 .016 .074 .131 -.012 .268** -.031 -.046 .064 -.115 .179* .026 -.174* 1.000   
15. Age .001 -.059 -.041 .069 -.099 .558** .096 .071 .009 -.247** .280** .054 -.026 .232** 1.000  
16. Tenure -.023 .062 .065 .214** .080 .337** .108 .096 -.045 -.066 .279** .021 -.020 .104 .551** 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 4D: Spearman’s rho Bivariate Correlation Matrics : Vignette 4 
 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Int whistleblowing 1.000                
2. Egoism .036 1.000               
3. Benevolence .043 .564** 1.000              
4. Principle .142 .521** .621** 1.000             
5. Size -.047 .052 -.010 .034 1.000            
6. Job level .117 -.022 -.023 .103 -.056 1.000           
7. Moral equity .348** -.002 .077 .038 -.018 .103 1.000          
8. Relativism .302** .036 .131 .074 -.002 .063 .786** 1.000         
9. Contractualism -.333** -.008 -.164* -.089 -.050 -.059 -.787** -.769** 1.000        
10. Locus of control -.133 .034 -.037 -.099 -.159* -.141 -.218** -.170* .199** 1.000       
11. Org. commitment .028 .211** .392** .440** .116 .217** .133 .080 -.140 -.501** 1.000      
12. Seriousness .488** -.039 .077 .006 -.034 .088 .562** .422** -.486** -.130 .045 1.000     
13. Status .138 -.028 -.023 -.007 .020 .001 .090 -.040 -.119 -.071 .013 .352** 1.000    
14. Gender -.085 .016 .074 .131 -.012 .268** -.003 .004 .058 -.115 .179* -.098 -.154* 1.000   
15. Age .022 -.059 -.041 .069 -.099 .558** .090 .110 -.026 -.247** .280** .035 -.045 .232** 1.000  
16. Tenure -.096 .062 .065 .214** .080 .337** -.031 .010 .042 -.066 .279** -.090 .030 .104 .551** 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
